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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation, I build upon Darwin’s (1859/1964) metaphor of the complex biological
tangle of a river bank - plants, birds, insects, and earth - to paint a picture of transformative
learning as aesthetic (Dewey, 1934/2005; Eisner, 1998, 2002b; Greene, 1995, 2001; Liston,
2001), and embodied (Dewey, 1958; Johnson, 2007; Shusterman, 2006), and thereby connected
to the learner’s life experience, including his/her/their ecological, cultural, and historic
situatedness. I call this complication of Darwin’s metaphor the ecofeminist tangled bank. For my
purposes, an ecofeminist theoretical framework provides a means of analyzing oppressive
conceptual frameworks that perpetuate hierarchy and domination, and which lack an appreciation
for meaningful difference (Chircop, 2008). Such oppressive frameworks, I argue, characterize
much about the current approach to learning. Transformative learning, or learning which leaves
the individual changed, seeing the world differently than before, and “willing to act in
accordance with those differences” (Girod, Twyman, & Wojcikiewicz, 2010, p. 804), may be
fostered through aesthetic learning. Investigating the impact of aesthetic learning experience
(Dewey, 1934/2005; Eisner, 1998, 2002b; Greene, 1995, 2001; Liston, 2001), I theorize that such
experiences inscribe themselves on the body, becoming the impetus for the individual’s
passionate desires (Garrison, 1997). Ultimately, I paint a picture of learning as the subjective
“exertion of a choice” (Darwin, 1871).
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PREFACE
"Courage, pugnacity, perseverance, strength and size of body, weapons of all kinds, musical
organs, both vocal and instrumental, bright colors, stripes and marks, and ornamental
appendages, have all been indirectly gained ... through the influence of love and jealousy,
through the appreciation of the beautiful ... and through the exertion of a choice."
Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex (1871, pp. 794-795).

In many ways, this dissertation represents a reflection on the educational experiences that
have shaped my self-understanding as well as my conception of what constitutes meaningful
learning. Within this process, my students, teaching colleagues, professors, and the many writers
listed in my references comprised my learning community (Liston, 2001; Palmer, 2007). At the
outset, I reflected on the story, which I share at the beginning of chapter one, of my student, who
came to understand abstract expressionism by doing abstract expressionism; I realized I found it
very moving to witness the moment when the pieces came together for him. As I observed, such
learning transforms the individual, enabling him or her to see the world differently than before
and to act on those differences (Girod, Twyman, and Wojcikiewicz, 2010). I argue that
transformative learning is aesthetic, embodied, and connected to the learner’s previous
experience.
I entered the conversation around transformative learning through the door of aesthetic
experience and John Dewey’s (1934/2005) ideas of an experience. From there, Greene (1995,
2001), Eisner (1998, 2002b) and Liston (2001) helped me situate aesthetic learning within
curriculum studies. Realizing that patriarchy’s inherent oppositional hierarchy prevents a
complete understanding of learning, my ‘heart’ then suggested that ecofeminism, which has
always resonated with me, provides a powerful means of critiquing patriarchy and therefore, it
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provides a robust framework to support my thoughts on learning. Therefore, rather than
beginning with my theoretical framework, my readers will note, my initial thoughts and readings
suggested ecofeminism to me. The threads I create in each chapter, weave together in chapter six
where I propose a new conceptual metaphor that I entitle, the ecofeminist tangled bank, a
complication of Darwin’s (1859/1964) biotic tangle of plants, birds, insects, and earth, on a river
bank, to which I add interhuman and intrahuman tangles.
At first glance learning, aesthetics, the body, and ecofeminism seem disparate, so
essentially different that each can have nothing to say to the other. I see them as interconnected
by the ability of aesthetic experiences of the body, understood within an ecofeminist frame, to
inform a holistic vision of learning. My dissertation utilizes an ecofeminist lens to consider
learning from a viewpoint that recognizes knowing as embodied and thereby connected to an
individual’s environment and culture (Harvester & Blenkinsop, 2010). Such a viewpoint
incorporates an ethic that is care sensitive and rooted in the aesthetic; it engenders an analysis of
oppressive conceptual frameworks and offers insights into mitigating those current approaches to
education which are unsuccessful (Harvester & Blenkinsop, 2010). Ecofeminism allows me to
weave ideas of connection, growth, and holism throughout my dissertation as a foil to the binary
oppositions embedded within K-12 education today.
I frame a vision of learning as transformative experience which leaves the individual
changed, which unfolds as the individual exerts a choice to approach, to learn, and to be
changed; such exertion is not inspired by utility, but by the aesthetic in the form of subjective
sensory experience. Such learning becomes part of who we are. We accept the idea that trauma
lives in the body, subconsciously affecting what we choose to approach or avoid (van der Kolk,

8
2014). In my dissertation, I theorize that the aesthetic does the same; giving impetus to those
passionate desires (Garrison, 1997) that become the focus of our lives.
Today, in the United States, a market model, in which knowledge is seen as a commodity
that is owned by the consumer and the state, characterizes the general understanding of how
education works (Hohr, 2013; Liston, 2001; Ravitch, 2016). In such a model, high-stakes testing
is a sensible means of holding students and teachers accountable for commodified knowledge
(Hohr, 2013; Liston, 2001; Ravitch, 2016). When accountability is front and center, those aspects
of education that are easily measurable quickly overshadow those that are aesthetic even though,
in reality, as this dissertation highlights, the aesthetic qualities are responsible for the
development of both meaning and skill within the individual (Hohr, 2013). For students in the K12 classroom, the view of learning as an easily measurable commodity, so removed from their
lived, embodied, reality, is detrimental to their love of meaningful learning and to the passion
that is the motivation for truly educative experiences. Stated another way, the view of learning as
a purely cognitive process that is disconnected from the student’s lived experience can be
characterized by the split of the mind from the body (Garrison, 1997). An ecofeminist framework
(Besthorn & McMillen, 2002) helps me to critique the oppression inherent in this mind-body
split.
The power of ecofeminism can be seen in its ability to illuminate the manner in which
systems of oppression interlock and "feed off each other" (Tong, 2009, p. 278). An ecofeminist
framework integrates experience and personal expression in order to acknowledge and coalesce
"rational, emotional, visceral, imaginative, and intuitive ways of understanding" (Stephens, 2013,
p. 39). For my purpose, ecofeminism can illuminate ideas of aesthetic experience as

9
transformative and embodied, to lay the groundwork for a holistic vision of transformational
learning arising from dialogue between mind and body.
As I previously stated, in U. S. schools today there is heavy focus on rote learning, test
preparation, and test scores, which are seen as true evidence of student learning above all other
representations (Liston, 2001; Ravitch, 2016). This view sees knowledge as fixed and eternal as
exemplified by Plato's belief in a hierarchy of fixed and eternal Forms or metaphysical truths
(Garrison, 1997). If knowledge is fixed, then the teacher is a kind of midwife who ushers in
knowledge that already exists (Garrison, 1997). Within such a paradigm, teachers are directed by
those who set policy to work harder to stuff more information into students’ heads in ways that
are efficient yet do not elevate or empower students, nor does such an approach meet students
where they are, or enable them to find their own passionate desire for knowledge (Garrison,
1997; Ravitch, 2016).
According to Jim Garrison (1997), John Dewey offers a solution. For Dewey, all
reasoning begins with need and with a desire to secure some value, and learning is a creative and
artistic activity that seeks an elegant, beautiful, and harmonious solution, and where aesthetic
values emerge with those solutions (Garrison, 1997). For Dewey (1934/2005) the aesthetic
qualities of learning are key to fostering the type of experience that results in the individual
seeing the world differently than before, in becoming transformed.
Dewey and Plato were similar in their belief that the beautiful, the harmonious, and the
well formed are one (Garrison, 1997). But, according to Garrison (1997), Dewey's ideas differ
with Plato's in at least two important ways. First, Dewey disagrees with Plato's supernatural
epistemology, which advocates that we are all trying to discover an ultimate truth, one that may
have been revealed to us supernaturally, perhaps even before we were born (Garrison, 1997). As
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a naturalist, Dewey rejected any separation between natural and supernatural; for him, existence
is a single whole (Garrison, 1997). So, while Plato adhered to a static supernaturalism, Dewey
believed that the beautiful, harmonious, and well-formed are the result of rhythmic growth
(Garrison, 1997). "Beautiful forms are produced by practical reason, and constructive practical
inquiry bestows value" (Garrison, 1997, p. 15). In this way, as the individual manipulates the
material of her own sensory experiences, she imaginatively glimpses possibilities to create
meaning and values (Garrison, 1997).
Another dualism Plato embraced that Dewey rejected, was the separation between theory
and practice. As a holist, Dewey’s belief was that practice involves theory and is in fact, the
outward manifestation of theory (Garrison, 1997). Plato's transcendental Ideas became ideals for
Dewey. That is to say they were desired possibilities, values, or what he referred to as
"ends-in-view" (1938/1997 For Dewey, the ideally possible, replaces ultimate Ideals or Forms.
Similarly, “the relationship is not between the natural and the supernatural: It is a naturalistic
dialectic of the actual and ideally possible. Creativity and genesis characterize the cosmos for
Dewey” (Garrison, 1997, p. 22). Imagination can help us to see from the vantage point of
another, and by sharing perspectives, finite humans can grow wiser; dialogues across differences
are a growth medium for the individual gaining a more complete picture of reality (Garrison,
1997; Greene, 1995).
Ecofeminism goes a step further critiquing dualisms, such as between theory and
practice, since it reveals “a logic of interwoven oppression” (Plumwood, 1996, p. 211),
supported by hierarchical power which acts to provoke and enlarge the thinking that splits man
and woman, humans and nature, and so forth. In a hierarchical, dualistic, oppositional worldview, oppression is inseparable from value based, tiered ranking (Besthorn & McMillen, 2002).
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Ecofeminism proposes thinking of social and natural systems in a way that marries "the
complexity of … difference with an understanding of relationships of dominatory power"
(Cudworth, 2005, p. 13), in order to provide for the analysis and mitigation of relations of power
within and between social and natural systems.
Throughout my dissertation, in order to render my ecofeminist vision of learning as
aesthetic, embodied and connected, I draw heavily on Delores Liston’s (2001) conception of Joy,
as she describes in Joy as a Metaphor of Convergence: A Phenomenological and Aesthetic
Investigation of Social and Educational Change. In her view, Joy is not the same as happiness,
which depends upon external events, instead Joy, arises from self-reflection and is not dependent
on circumstances (Liston, 2001). Fulfillment and justice define this interpretation of Joy
revealing the beauty and ethics that is at our core as beings (Liston, 2001). Because Joy brings
attention to interrelatedness, it has no space for hierarchy or oppression; it reveals a greater
understanding and experience of our world. Additionally, when we understand our
interrelatedness, the awareness of our connection encourages us to behave in a way that is caring
(Liston, 2001). As Liston (2001) describes, Joy is a metaphor of convergence, meaning that it
results when “fields of study that seemed previously to be unrelated” (p. 2) are experienced as
interrelated, helping us radically change the way we “experience and interpret” the world. I
embrace this thinking and weave threads of Joyful convergence into my work.
In order to further illuminate how aesthetic, transformative learning is embodied, in this
dissertation I investigate how, as our “tool of tools,” the body is necessary for thinking, taking
action, and perceiving (Shusterman, 2006).
As human thought would not make sense without the embodiment that places the
sensing, thinking subject in the world and thereby gives her thought perspective
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and direction, so wisdom and virtue would be empty without the diverse, fullbodied experience on which they draw and through which they manifest
themselves in exemplary embodied speech, deeds, and radiating presence
(Shusterman, 2006, p. 17).
Our Western conception of the superior rational self provides the impetus for marginalizing
anything to do with the body (Plumwood, 1996).
Pleasure plays a key role in how we experience the world with our bodies since pleasure
is deeply rooted in our evolutionary past as well as in our integration with the natural world,
(Chatterjee, 2014b; Gopnik, 1998). Pleasure drives us to beauty and beauty produces different
responses within us for different reasons; it engages our sensations, emotions and meaning
flexibly (Chatterjee, 2014a; 2014b; Shimamura, 2013). Our reactions of pleasure cause us to
continually seek out those objects and experiences that we find aesthetic (Chatterjee, 2014a).
Aesthetic pleasure is rooted in basic appetites, but it also extends beyond them since the
same brain system that guides us in choosing what to eat is utilized as we evaluate something
abstract like fairness or another person’s reputation (Chatterjee, 2014a; 2014b). Our reward
system allows us to experience pleasure, to evaluate that pleasure, to plan how to get more
pleasure, and to modify and restrain our methods; in other words our reward system helps us
learn (Berridge & Kringelbach, 2008; Chatterjee, 2014b). So the pleasure we find in subjective,
aesthetic experience becomes an important piece of the puzzle for understanding learning that is
transformative. As my title suggests, “the exertion of a choice” (Darwin, 1871, p. 794-795),
whether by a female bird or a student in a classroom, springs from aesthetic experience.
Organization and Purpose
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Each chapter of this dissertation begins with a story of learning that relates to the topic of
the chapter. Some of the experiences I describe come from my own teaching, others do not, but
each offers a springboard for the thoughts in the chapter. The stories I relate have enabled me to
reflect on what I believe about learning and to give those beliefs a shape; they paint a powerful
picture for me and my hope is, they do the same for my readers.
In Chapter 1, I investigate historical understandings of the aesthetic, including how these
understandings have evolved over time; incorporating the nature of pleasure and beauty within
the aesthetic, as well as feminist aesthetic viewpoints. Finally, I examine the aesthetic within
education, particularly as approached by educators John Dewey, Maxine Greene, and Elliot
Eisner. In Chapter 2, I explore the qualities and contexts of aesthetic learning as engaged by
educational researchers, with particular attention on aspects of such experiences from the point
of view of the learner. In Chapter 3, I outline an ecofeminist theoretical framework. As I stated, I
chose this framework because of ecofeminism’s ability to make interrelated systems of
oppression visible. This ability assists me in shining a light on how these oppressions are brought
to bear on our approach to learning (Selam, 2006). An ecofeminist theoretical framework lays
the groundwork for an epistemology that recognizes knowing as embodied and connected to the
learner’s lived experience (Harvester & Blenkinsop, 2010; Selam, 2006). It paves the way for an
ethic that is care-sensitive and rooted in the aesthetic; and finally, since it provides a means of
analyzing the oppressive conceptual frameworks that shape educational practice, it can also offer
insights into mitigating current, largely unsuccessful, approaches to education (Harvester &
Blenkinsop, 2010). In Chapter 4, I illuminate an ecofeminist vision of learning as embodied by
exploring the role of embodied, aesthetic experience within learning. Ecofeminism reveals how
the ‘logic of domination’ (Warren, 1996), invigorates the Western proclivity for placing the
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head, where logic and reason reside, over the body, from which emotion and subjectivity
emanate. Chapter 5 explores the field of neuroaesthetics and what neuroscience reveals about
learning. In this chapter I propose that aesthetic learning has the ability to inscribe on the body
becoming the source of an individuals life’s work and passionate desire (Garrison, 1997). In
Chapter 6, I look at possibilities for the future. Pulling all the pieces together, I unite ideas of
emergent growth and holism with embodied, aesthetic, educative experience to propose a
different metaphor for learning: the ecofeminist tangled bank.
By converging many seemingly disparate threads, I expand the present understanding of
learning held my many, as simply a score on a test, to encourage a vision of cognition as one
piece of the whole. An ecofeminist vision, which honors individual experience, engenders a
fuller appreciation of the embodied, aesthetic nature of learning experiences. By presenting a
holistic picture of what constitutes educative experience, I paint a Joyful (Liston, 2001) vision of
learning as aesthetic, embodied and connected; offering insights into understanding why a onesize-fits-all approach to learning, rigidly focused on standards and accountability, is detrimental
to students who would benefit from being introduced to the beauty of subject matter.
In the field of Curriculum Studies we see curriculum in its broadest sense, as an emergent
force in education that we seek to reveal and to understand (Flinders & Thornton, 2009). In
today’s school settings, where knowledge, that has nothing to do with their own lived
experience, is forced upon students, this dissertation provides me an opportunity to offer a shift
in focus from knowledge as disembodied property, to knowledge as a natural result of lived,
aesthetic experience. It adds to the conversations of those who seek to reveal the qualities of
learning that are harmonious, resonant, and beautiful, and to consider why human beings learn.
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All organisms, even amoebae, are driven to either approach or avoid other organisms
(Chatterjee, 2014a). If this instinct is at the root of our aesthetic drive, then it shapes our desire
for food, for each other, and even for abstract ideas like fairness, and as such, this drive is basic
to our desire to exert a choice and to learn (Chatterjee, 2014a; Darwin, 1871). The primordial
urge to approach or avoid is experienced in shades and degrees and with limitless possibilities of
combination in order to assist individuals in forming an understanding of the world. My
dissertation follows this line of thinking to uncover an ecofeminist vision of learning as aesthetic,
embodied, and connected.
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CHAPTER 1
IDEAS OF THE BEAUTIFUL: DEFINING THE AESTHETIC
The students in my fourth grade art class had just learned about Jackson Pollock (19121956), an Abstract Expressionist painter. The Abstract Expressionist movement began in the
United States after World War II, emphasizing dynamic, energetic gesture, and thoughtful focus
on color (Jansen & Jansen, 2001). In terms of a fourth grade understanding, Jackson Pollock
wanted to paint things we cannot see with our eyes, like ideas or feelings, rather than things we
can see like a tree or a bird. On this particular spring day I was observing my student,
Christopher, through the window as he created his own Abstract Expressionist piece on the patio,
outside my classroom. Covered in old shirts to protect his clothing, he was having a wonderful
time slinging the paints of his chosen color scheme at a giant piece of paper. I could tell he was
singing to himself as he painted and I was curious to know what music he had chosen to express
his experience. As I made my way outside, I could hear that it was Beethoven’s Symphony #5. I
watched and listened to him and after a moment he stopped, turned to me and said, “You know,
Mrs. Eswine, I used to think this stuff was just drips and splashes, but now I see that it’s about
energy.” I was stunned. He had it. Christopher owned the words that reflected his understanding
of Abstract Expressionism. His statement was not the result of something he memorized and yet,
prior knowledge had a place. I knew that he understood the concept deeply.
I recognize the results of the ‘ah-ha moment’ when the proverbial light bulb goes on in
my student, and my belief is, that moment is encouraged by something elemental, within the
learner that compels him or her to strive for a deep understanding – to connect the dots.
Christopher had constructed his learning from pieces of information he had gotten from me and
from his music teacher. Additionally, even though he had never met Jackson Pollock or
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Beethoven personally, he knew enough about them that they were real to him and the knowledge
he had of them was useful.
I theorize that Christopher’s putting-together-of-pieces sprang from a need for clarity; a
need that explains why, at least in part, certain things please us and we find them aesthetic, a
need that Liston (2001) terms epistemic hunger. In the first two chapters of this dissertation, I
focus on the aesthetic aspects of learning. In order to bring into focus what I mean by ‘aesthetic
aspects of learning,’ an investigation of the term ‘aesthetic’ is useful. For most people the term
evokes a vague sense of the beautiful. In this chapter, I look at historical understandings of the
aesthetic; aesthetic as beauty and pleasure; aesthetics from a feminist perspective; and aesthetics
in the work of educators John Dewey, Maxine Greene, and Elliot Eisner, in order to hone a
useful definition.
Historical Grounding of the Aesthetic
The term “aesthetic” is derived from the Greek, aisthetikos, meaning sensitive or
sentient. The philosophy of aesthetics is concerned with ideas of the beautiful and the ugly and
with the study of the mind and emotions in relation to the sense of beauty or the beautiful
(“Aesthetics”, 2016). Though conceived by the ancient Greeks, extensive philosophical
reflection in aesthetics began to emerge with the increasing of leisure time in Europe in the
eighteenth century (Seung, 2010). This is why many texts begin discussions of aesthetics with
Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten’s use of the term, “aesthetic” in his thesis Aesthetica (1750); a
reaction to the rational philosophy of Descartes (Inwood, 1993; Sheppard, 2009). Baumgarten
contended it was a mistake to fail to link sensations and perceptions with knowledge since
perception and sensation provide an equally valid conception of reality (Baumgarten, 1750).
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Though Baumgarten had first used the term, it was Kant’s Critique of Judgment (1790)
that linked aesthetics with a philosophy of art (Inwood, 1993; Sheppard, 2009; Shusterman,
2003). Writing in the later part of the 18th century, Kant became the most influential of the early
aesthetic philosophers (Seung, 2010). He held the human ability to reason in the highest regard,
believing the ability to judge, enables human beings to experience beauty (Seung, 2010).
Aesthetic judgments of beauty, or judgments of taste, as he sometimes called them, have four
key features according to Kant. True beauty is free from concepts; true beauty is disinterested;
true beauty is necessary; and true beauty is universal (Seung, 2010). As meanings shift in more
than 200 years, these terms require some explanation.
To be free from concepts means that beauty should be free from purpose or intent; similar
to appreciating sand patterns on a beach without naming those patterns. As Kant sees it, the arts
are impure because they involve concepts (Dickie, 2015; Seung, 2010). He also believed that a
certain amount of distance or disinterestedness was necessary for aesthetic judgment in order that
one might critique without the interference of emotion or desire (Scruton, 2011).
[T]aste in the beautiful is alone a disinterested and free satisfaction; for no
interest, either of sense or of reason, here forces our assent...Taste is the faculty
of judging of an object or a method of representing it by an entirely
disinterested satisfaction or dissatisfaction. The object of such satisfaction is
called beautiful. (Kant, 1790/1987, p. 43)
Even today, Kant’s views on the idea of disinterest continue to receive the most attention
(Seung, 2010). Kant’s understanding of disinterest is not the same as ‘uninterested’, but instead it
indicates freedom from self-interest; there is no desire to possess true beauty (Seung, 2010).
Disinterestedness helps the one who perceives to recognize those objects that are good or
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beautiful in themselves (Dickie, 2015; Stolnitz, 1998; Zangwill, 2014). Though clearly, beauty
comes to us through our senses, for Kant, it does not follow that a sense of beauty is a noncognitive process, since, rising above one’s sensual nature is a key measure of moral goodness
(Dickie, 2015; Seung, 2010). For Kant true beauty pleases in an intellectual way (Dickie, 2015;
Seung, 2010).
Kant differentiated aesthetic judgment from moral judgment (Seung, 2010). In his view,
if we say that something is “good,” the goodness is relative to some purpose; a judgment of the
beautiful (a judgment of taste), is purely contemplative (Seung, 2010). Though judgment of
beauty is initially subjective because of its relation to feeling, the aesthetic relies on cultivation
and “disinterested contemplation” and thus is not sensual (Kant, 1790/1987; Seung, 2010).
Kant’s third key feature of beauty, it must be “necessary,” indicates that true beauty is a
product of the human mind though it manifests itself as if it were a real property of an object,
like weight or chemical composition (Seung, 2010). For example, there is no objective property
to a sunset that makes it beautiful, human minds determine it so. Closely connected to true
beauty as “necessary” is true beauty as “universal” (Seung, 2010). While human minds
determine the sunset is beautiful, those minds also agree it is so (Seung, 2010). Similar to
common sense, true beauty is commonly accepted (Seung, 2010).
Kant and other Continental Rationalist aesthetic philosophers, who included Baumgarten,
were considered formalists because they judged the formal aspects of art rather than the content
as most important (Dickie, 2015; Seung, 2010). For these philosophers, beauty had more to do
with rational ideas like harmony, balance, and scale (Scruton, 2011).
During the same period, British philosophers, who included Lord Shaftesbury (16711713), Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746), David Hume (1711-1776), and Edmund Burke (1729-
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1797), investigated the aesthetic through a slightly different lens (Dickie, 2015; Scruton, 2011).
Rather than distance and disinterestedness, these British philosophers utilized an
intuitionist/analytic dichotomy for the philosophical structuring of aesthetics; with intuitionists
believing that beauty is a sensory version of moral goodness and analytics believing that beauty
is determined through the dissection of conceptions (Dickie, 2015; Stolnitz, 1998; Zangwill,
2014). British eighteenth century philosophers are known for three main ideas regarding the
aesthetic. First, human nature is universal (within limits) and therefore studies of beauty can be
universal (Dickie, 2015). Second, our responses to beautiful objects are of the senses or feelings
and are not cognitive; this is a “natural” response (Dickie, 2015). And third, a natural response is
overlaid by the individual’s communal experiences, habits and customs (Dickie, 2015).
Both Hutcheson and Hume maintained that judgments of beauty are judgments of taste
and not of reason; taste nevertheless operates according to general principles, which might be
discovered through empirical investigation (Dickie, 2015). For Hume, delicacy of taste is not
merely "the ability to detect all the ingredients in a composition,” but also our sensitivity "to
pains as well as pleasures, which escape the rest of mankind" (Dickie, 2015, p. 17). Thus, for the
analytic-intuitionists, sensory discrimination is linked to a capacity for pleasure (Dickie, 2015).
This thinking differs from Kant’s, who separated beauty, pleasure, and moral goodness,
believing that though a perception of beauty might begin with the senses, such perception could
only result from thoughtful reflection (Seung, 2010).
The period from 1685-1815, sometimes called the “long” eighteenth century, is also
referred to as the Enlightenment (Beardsley, 1966; Seung, 2010). In the nineteenth century, or
the Romantic era, the scope of what was considered great art was widened to include works
whose lack of attention to form was offset by the presentation of emotions (Beardsley, 1966).
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During the Romantic period, the enjoyment of feeling and emotion through cultivation of “a
more intense awareness of felt quality” (Beardsley, 1966, p. 247) was the norm. The Romantic
epistemology was “a kind of emotional intuitionism” (Beardsley, 1966, p. 246) which was a
reaction against ideas of rationalism and empiricism. Romanticism embraced metaphor and
myth, finding that “poetry can still be the medium through which we know the nature of reality
and the inwardness of each other” (Beardsley, 1966, p. 259). One of the major ideas in
Romanticism, in addition to the elevation of emotion, was the idea of the organism (Beardsley,
1966). Organicism embraced a deep sense of the unity of all things in nature, and humanity’s
ability to produce art, grew out of this sense of connection with nature (Beardsley, 1966).
Organicism relates to what is known as holism today.
Since these beginnings, aesthetic thinking has tended to shift between the
rational/empirical and the emotional/subjective ends of the spectrum (Beardsley, 1966; Dickie,
2015; Stolnitz, 1998). What the early aesthetic philosophers held in common was the view that
the rational/cognitive aspects of experience are in opposition to the sensory/emotional/affective
portions of experience. As Garrison (1997) notes, such thinking descends from Plato, who
embraced dualism between reason and emotion. I agree with Garrison (1997), reason and
emotion, working together, provide creative tension; thus experience, enriched by creative
tension, is a single whole (Garrison, 1997).
Thinking back to the story, at the beginning of this chapter, of my student Christopher,
rather than employing either a rational/cognitive or an emotional/sensory approach to Abstract
Expressionism and the painting he was creating, Christopher relied on reason and emotion to
give meaning to his experience; thus it was an experience. In Art As Experience (1934/2005),
Dewey wrote:
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It is not possible to divide in a vital experience the practical, emotional and
intellectual from one another and to set the properties of one over against the
characteristics of the other. The emotional phase binds parts together into a single
whole: "intellectual" simply names the fact that the experience has meaning;
"practical" indicates that the organism is interacting with events and objects, which
surround it. (p. 61)
I think this holistic view of aesthetic experience best describes Christopher’s experience; he
emotionally enjoyed the physical aspects of the ‘action painting’ process, and the experience had
“meaning” because he had an understanding of Abstract Expressionism and Jackson Pollock, he
even wove a little Beethoven into the mix. This cognitive knowledge added to his experience. As
I see it, the cognitive and emotional are continually in dialogue. They function together,
holistically. The desire to give the cognitive aspects of experience hierarchy over the affective,
emotional aspects is part of the Western thinking we have inherited from Plato.
The next part of this chapter springs forward from these early roots to look at the nature
of pleasure and beauty in the aesthetic, as well as the aesthetic from a feminist viewpoint. I also
investigate the views of three educational theorists John Dewey, Maxine Greene, and Elliot
Eisner.
The Nature of Pleasure and Beauty in the Aesthetic
Stemming from Kant’s two uses of the term “aesthetic” in his several Critiques, there is
still a “wrenching duality” within the field of aesthetics (Shaviro, 2007). “On one hand,
[aesthetics].. designates the theory of sensibility as the form of possible experience; while on the
other hand, it designates the theory of art as the reflection of real experience” (Shaviro, 2007, p.
1). Contention between aesthetics as an objective philosophy of art versus aesthetics as a

23
philosophy of subjective sensory experience contributes to confusion surrounding the term
“aesthetic” (Shaviro, 2007).
Beautiful objects frequently do possess an objective quality that can be understood when
compared to standards of beauty, but for Korsmeyer (2004) what these beautiful objects share,
more importantly, is a capacity to evoke a response in a subject. Rather than some quality of an
object itself, finding something "beautiful" is a "subjective effect involving the arousal of
feeling" (Korsmeyer, 2004, p. 38). As Scruton (2011) defines it, “the judgment of beauty orders
the emotion and desire of those who make it. It may express their pleasure and their taste: but it
is pleasure in what they value and taste for their true ideas” (p. 164). In this view, the pleasure an
individual finds in beauty is personal, an extension of their life experience and culture. Pleasure
in beauty is also intentional, meaning it can be “neutralized by argument and amplified by
attention” (Scruton, 2011, p. 26), therefore, pleasure in beauty is more connected to the
intellectual than pleasure in eating or drinking, which arise from sensations. For British
philosopher, Roger Scruton, (2011), to discern the presentation of the form of the beautiful
object and the type of pleasure it presents is important, in order to determine if that pleasure is
purely sensory or if it includes intellectual.
Art critic, Arthur Danto (2006) finds that beauty is but one mode of artistic presentation,
the others include: disgust, horror, sublimity, and sexuality. Since art is embodied meaning,
beauty should not be left out of the conversation though he does not see it as a useful means for
judging good art from bad art (Danto, 2003). Philosophy professor, Carolyn Korsmeyer (2004),
also finds beauty implicated in the link between the aesthetic, pleasure, and desire since what is
beautiful gives us pleasure and therefore, we want to possess it. I explore the neurology of
pleasure and desire, or what neurologists call liking and wanting, more fully in chapter five
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where I investigate neuroaesthetics, but at this point I wish to note that the connection between
beauty and pleasure also has implications for goodness and moral virtue because all of these
utilize our brain’s neurological pleasure responses (Chatterjee, 2014a; Korsmeyer, 2004). While
there is a physiological connection between pleasure and beauty, Korsmeyer (2004) sees tying
the aesthetic to a feeling of pleasure as problematic since pleasure is idiosyncratic and individual.
As I have described, the term “aesthetic” is often ambiguous. Aesthetics can be an
objective philosophy of art, or art criticism; it can be a subjective exploration of sensory
experience, or even what it means to live a good life (Lintott, 2010; Servomaa, 1997). We can
see it in terms of theories of beauty or in the pleasure beauty imparts. For my purpose, which is
to understand the role of the aesthetic in learning, I must gather more threads before weaving the
cloth. Therefore I will gather a feminist viewpoint on aesthetics in the next portion of this
chapter.
A Feminist Aesthetic
I propose that a ecofeminist perspective offers insights for critiquing the hierarchies that
pervade Western thinking, which I investigate in greater depth in chapter three, as I shape my
theoretical framework, but within an investigation of aesthetics, a feminist aesthetic becomes an
instrument for reframing questions; where issues that spring from hierarchical thinking, such as
disinterest, or distinctions between craft and art, no longer matter (Hein, 1990). In a feminist
aesthetic, even ideas that are usually seen as oppositional such as the cognitive versus the
affective nature of aesthetic experience can coexist because they are viewed as a matter of
context, or, of where we place the frame, rather than as opposing (Hein, 1990). Feminism helps
us appreciate that the position of the observer is always situated (Zimmerman, 2011).
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Experience is central to feminist thought, but what is meant by experience is not mere
empirical observation, as much of philosophy tends to construe it (Lintott, 2010). Instead,
feminist experience is what art, literature, and science deal with; the lived experience of feeling
as well as thinking, of performing actions as well as receiving impressions, and it includes an
awareness of our connections with other people as well as of our own sensations (Lintott, 2010).
Aesthetic theorizing and feminist theorizing share a concerned with the immediate and
experiential. Within both, there is an inherent pluralism that prohibits any ability to be separated
from experience and both are dedicated to the understanding of the essence of a thing (Hein,
1990).
Feminism aims to overturn what many consider the most entrenched hierarchy there is:
the hierarchy of gender (Hein, 1990). "Feminists accept gender, not as a metaphysical or
biological reality, but as an analytic category like class or race, a tool for understanding complex
relations" (Hein, 1990, p. 281). Gender is not simply a descriptive qualifier; instead, intertwined
with all other qualifiers such as age, ethnicity, or sexual orientation, gender highlights the
understanding that all knowledge is situated knowledge (Hein, 1990; Zimmerman, 2011).
Historically, art practices have perpetuated the subordination of women by ignoring the work of
women artists, objectifying women's bodies, romanticizing sexual exploitation, and labeling
women's work as ‘craft’ rather than ‘art’ (Hein, 1990; Korsmeyer, 2004). Placing importance on
context, feminist aestheticians also investigate social, political and ethical issues (Hein, 1990;
Lintott, 2010). The resulting feminist aesthetic theorizing can have a practical result, since
revealing the essence of a thing can expose the underlying metaphors we uncritically accept,
which have a powerful influence on society's understanding of the world (Hein, 1990; Lintott,
2010).
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In Plato’s epistemological hierarchy, the intellectual world of forms, where ideas such as
beauty, truth, and goodness supposedly reside, is superior to the sensory, natural realm (Tong,
2009). Arising from this thinking, Western philosophy has prompted a hierarchy which places
men, who are associated with the mind and ideas, in a position superior to women, who are
associated with nature and the body (Griffin, 1987; Tong, 2009). In this thinking women are
viewed as naturally emotional and men are essentially rational (Tong, 2009).
A feminist aesthetic becomes a useful tool for critiquing hierarchical assumptions that
have come to us from Western philosophy. As Allen (1992) states, "musing on the circumference
of experience" (p. 102), enables the questioning of underlying binary constructions. Because it
honors the experience of the viewer and participant, the idea of multiplicity finds a home in
feminist aesthetics (Hein, 1990).
Aesthetics in Education: John Dewey, Maxine Greene, and Elliot Eisner
In my field, curriculum studies, three figures are prominent for their work surrounding
ideas of the aesthetic as it impacts education in general, and curriculum in particular. Each stands
in a different place and time, thus providing a slightly unique point of view; yet all express
recognition of the role of the aesthetic, be it beautiful or sublime, in experiences that shape the
educational process. Elliot Eisner began his career as an art teacher, which is my own field and
therefore, his application of the ideas of Dewey and Greene are particularly important to me. For
this reason he receives a lion’s share of attention in this chapter.
John Dewey
John Dewey explored ideas of aesthetics and experience in his book Art as Experience
(1934/2005), which he dedicated to Albert C. Barnes with whom he had innumerable discussions
surrounded by Barnes’ extensive art collection. The Barnes Foundation Institute’s collection
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consists of more than 2,500 paintings by such artists as Renoir, Cezanne, Matisse, Picasso,
Rousseau, Seurat, Degas, and Van Gogh (The Barnes Foundation, 2016). I can only imagine how
proximity to so much beautiful and expressive art would inspire thoughts of what constitutes
aesthetic experience.
According to Dewey (1934/2005), many times, the physical art product is confused with
the aesthetic object. We see this in the example of a statue, which is in actuality, a piece of
marble. The artist’s action on that marble with his or her ‘form’ is what makes it aesthetic. “The
artist has the power to seize upon a special kind of material and convert it to an aesthetic medium
of expression” (Dewey, 1934/2005, p. 208). Accordingly, “art is not nature; art is a human
endeavor. Nature must be transformed to become art “ (Dewey, 1934/2005, p. 82). When the
Greeks formed the idea of art as reproduction, this did not mean they reproduced nature but that
they reproduced ideals associated with the society (Dewey, 1934/2005). Their art reflected and
reproduced what they valued: order, proportion, and symmetry. Thus, engagement with art
produces aesthetic experiences “by reducing the raw material of that experience to matter
ordered through form” (Dewey, 1934/2005, p. 138). The individual’s experience, which could
stop short with a kind of noticing, becomes transformative when he or she engages with the art
form and allows him or herself to be changed by that engagement (Dewey, 1934/2005). For
Dewey, experience is primarily a way of living in the world. Not wholly mental or even
conscious; instead, experience is “a relation between doing and undergoing” (1934/2005, p. 48).
What Dewey describes transcends either sensory or cognitive engagement alone to include both
and to become transformative.
If we imagine experience on a continuum, then at one end we would find those things we
do on autopilot, like brushing our teeth or taking out the garbage; the mundane. These are
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activities that we have difficulty recalling whether we did or not. Such experiences are necessary
and useful to our wellbeing despite being forgettable. On the other end of the continuum are
those events that are transformative. These are activities that once they are done, we are never
the same. Experiences such as becoming a parent fit on this end of the continuum and they
exemplify what John Dewey (1934/2005) called an experience.
As Dewey (1934/2005) describes, an experience embodies certain qualities: it satisfies an
impulsion; is receptive and perceptive; it causes the one engaged to reflect; and it achieves
consummation. When we are open to receiving rather than functioning on autopilot, we are made
available for an experience. “The aesthetic or undergoing phase of experience is receptive and
results in greater perceptibility” (Dewey, 1934/2005, p. 55). This perceptibility goes beyond
recognition, which is satisfied when a label is applied. When something is perceived, emotion
pervades the perceiver and takes the form of outgoing energy in order to receive; there is a
willingness to be changed; perceiving therefore, is not passive (Dewey, 1934/2005). Since
perceptibility is the product – or even the by-product of “continuous and cumulative interaction
of the organic self with the world” (Dewey, 1934/2005, p. 229), an activity that inspires greater
perceptibility has the potential to become an experience. Additionally, an experience feeds,
satisfies or answers an impulsion. An impulsion is similar to an impulse but more active, more
akin to a hunger or demand and it carries with it an urge toward action (Dewey, 1934/2005).
Reflection is also important to an experience because when we reflect, we draw a distinction
between form and substance (Dewey, 1934/2005). In other words, through the perceiver’s
thoughtful consideration, the chunk of marble is distinguished from the marble sculpture. In
terms of the one engaged in an experience, her sensibilities and understandings are ordered or
changed through her form’s engagement with the matter of the experience. Through reflection
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the one engaged becomes cognizant of a shift in understanding, as she draws a distinction
between her old and new understanding, a new awareness dawns and she is transformed. This
drawing of a distinction marks an experience that has been carried to consummation (Dewey,
1934/2005).
Describing the shift from a traditional toward a more aesthetic, progressive education in
the early twentieth century, Dewey (1938/1997) was dismayed to find that many times an
either/or, oppositional point of view served to guide progressive schools. For example,
expression and cultivation of individuality were placed in opposition to imposition from above;
external discipline was opposed by free activity; learning from texts and teacher was opposed by
learning through experience; acquisition of isolated skills by drill and practice was opposed by
acquisition of skills because of their vital appeal; preparing for a remote future was opposed by
opportunities at the present; and static aims and materials were opposed by understand the world
as changing (Dewey, 1938/1997). Dewey was distressed that so many progressive schools and
teachers felt that moving from a traditional to a progressive philosophy meant that all that was
previously embraced, which was construed as traditional, must be thrown out. Instead of being
grounded on what is opposed, Dewey (1938/1997) supported a philosophy of experience. In this
vision, the focus was placed on the quality of the experiences provided to students. Such a
philosophy, built on constructive development, ensured experiences that were both educative and
worthwhile (Dewey, 1938/1997).
An experience is always what it is because of a transaction taking place between
an individual and what, at the time, constitutes his environment, whether the latter
consists of persons with whom he is talking about some topic or event, the subject
talked about being also a apart of the situation; or the toys with which he is
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playing; the book he is reading (in which his environing conditions at the time
may be England or ancient Greece or an imaginary region); or the materials of an
experiment he is performing. The environment, in other words is whatever
conditions interact with personal needs, desire, purposes, and capacities to create
the experience, which is had. Even when a person builds a castle in the air he is
interacting with the objects which he constructs in fancy. (Dewey, 1938/1997, p.
43-44)
Educative experiences do not occur in a vacuum but instead they have both continuity and
interaction (Dewey, 1938/1997). The principle of continuity holds that when an experience is
connected to all previous experiences it becomes available to be useful – to be continued –
giving preparation for future life experiences (Dewey, 1938/1997). When the school considers
the “power and purpose of those …[being] taught”, it understands the needs and capacities of the
students, and it will design experiences that are interactive and continuous (Dewey, 1938/1997,
p. 45).
Along with continuity and interaction, educative experiences encompass freedom.
Freedom in education involves the learner in active cooperation in the construction of the
purposes involved in his/her studying (Dewey, 1938/1997). Freedom is the power to frame
purpose or an end view. In some progressive schools in the early twentieth century, allowing the
students freedom to construct experiences equaled the teacher abandoning responsibility for the
design of those experiences. Dewey (1938/1997) describes the formation of purpose as a
complex intellectual exercise involving: “1) observation of surrounding conditions; 2)
knowledge of what has happened in similar situations in the past; and 3) judgment which puts
together what is observed and what is recalled to see what they signify” (p. 69). Without
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observation, knowledge, and judgment there is no purpose, only impulse (Dewey, 1938/1997).
Most K-12 students do not possess skills, judgment, or the sophistication to create interactive and
purposeful experiences for themselves without creative guidance from the teacher.
When he wrote the essays compiled in Experience and Education (1938/1997), Dewey’s
aim was to encourage progressive teachers to embrace the purposeful design of educative
experiences for students, avoiding the mindset that saw an embrace of experience as a wholesale
rejection of old-style didactic teaching. He wanted them to sit in-between.
Maxine Greene
For educator Maxine Greene (1995; 2001), the point of learning the skills and rudiments
of any academic discipline is so they may contribute to one’s ability to discern, or to see and
name. Accordingly, education’s duty is to make the aesthetic experiences embodied in the arts,
available to students by teaching them the language, skills, and rudiments of those various fields
(Greene, 1995). “The encounter with the truth of art happens in the estranging language and
images which make perceptible, visible, and audible that which is no longer, or not yet,
perceived, said, and heard in everyday life” (Greene, 1995, p. 27). Greene places herself at
neither one end nor the other of Shaviro’s (2007) “wrenching duality.” Instead she sits in the
midst of both where subjective aesthetic experience is informed by the understanding of the
objective qualities of a given art form. The objective forms are made meaningful within sensory
experience, and sensory experience is given shape and meaning through the clarity provided by
the objective forms (Greene, 1995, 2001)
Teaching educators the importance of learning to be fully present to art and to impart
that understanding to their students was Greene’s mission as philosopher in residence at the
Lincoln Center’s Institutes for the Arts in Education each summer. “We are fully present to art
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when we understand what there is to be noticed in the work at hand, release our imaginations to
create orders in the field of what is perceived, and allow our feelings to inform and illuminate
what is to be realized” (Greene, 1995, p. 138). Learning about art and aesthetics should imbue
the student with a sense of agency, even power (Greene, 1995). Paintings, literature, theater, and
film can open doors and provide transformational experiences for those who are empowered to
engage with them. “We can enable all sorts of young people to realize they have the right to find
works of art meaningful against the backdrop of their own lived lives” (Greene, 1995, p. 164).
To “realize” a work of art requires effort. Yes, there is an initial response but there is a
deliberate balance between the spontaneous response and what is communicated on deeper
reflection (Greene, 1995). “We are all helped to see what the artist tries to oblige – to obligate
the percipient to create what the artist discloses, to become an accomplice in freedom with the
artist, an accomplice in releasing possibilities” (Greene, 1995, p. 149).
Imagination, or the “ability to look at things as if they could be otherwise” (Greene, 2001,
p. 122), is an important result of aesthetic engagement. As human beings we look at the world
through the crust of our own constructed domain; through imagination we are able to decenter
ourselves (Greene, 1995, 2001). Engagement with the arts and the aesthetic opportunities they
provide supplies a medium through which individuals can engage their imaginations to envisage
a different, better world (Greene, 1995). For Greene, engagement with the arts is a necessary
piece of the educational puzzle. Painting, poetry, music, literature, and drama are each endowed
with objective bodies of knowledge that comprise the milieu for enriched subjective experience;
for Greene, providing learning opportunities within the aesthetic realm is key to a complete
education (Greene, 1995).
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Elliot Eisner
For my purpose, Dewey and Greene lead to Elliot Eisner. I see Dewey’s ideas of
experience and Greene’s thoughts on imagination reflected in practical ways in Eisner’s writings.
Though, of the three, I was most familiar with Eisner before beginning my program in
Curriculum Studies, Dewey and Greene have brought me to an even greater appreciation and
understanding of Eisner’s work. Since my field is arts education, and visual art in particular,
Eisner, who was also a visual art teacher, is a hero of mine. During my master’s program at
Georgia Southern University, Eisner’s book, The Educational Imagination: On the Design and
Evaluation of School Programs (1979), was a pivotal text, influencing my practice by
encouraging me to teach my students not only to create art, but look at art critically in terms of
its place in history, the aesthetic theory to which it ascribes, and to discuss and justify their
judgments about its nature, merits, and importance (Eisner, 1979). Given the name, discipline
based art education (DBAE); this approach enabled me to build a successful visual arts program.
I am indebted to Elliot Eisner.
As Elliot Eisner (1991) relates, the arts saved him. The son of Russian, Jewish
immigrants, Eisner was born in Chicago, Illinois, in 1933. Elementary school was particularly
challenging for him, as Eisner (1991) describes:
…arithmetic was problematic and frustrating, my handwriting was and is at
present not particularly good, spelling was a relentless bore, and English grammar
– the diagramming of sentences whose features remain before me as vividly now
as they were then – was largely meaningless, even when I was able to correctly
indicate the difference between a direct and indirect object. But art – ah, that was
another story. (p. 34)

34
Eisner (Inside the Academy: Elliot Eisner, 2012) still recalls his third grade teacher, Eva
Smith, who recommended to his mother that young Elliot attend the Junior School for
elementary and high school students at the Art Institute of Chicago. Referring to the paintings
which line the walls of that institute, he says, “all my friends are hanging on the walls of that
building” (Eisner, 1991, p. 34). From such inauspicious beginnings as a student, Eisner went on
to earn an art degree from the Art Institute of Chicago, and then undergraduate and graduate
degrees from the University of Chicago (Inside the Academy: Elliot Eisner, 2012). Until his
death in 2014, Eisner was the Lee Jacks Professor of Education and Professor of Art at Stanford
University (Inside the Academy: Elliot Eisner, 2012).
The three goals of education according to Eisner (1997) are first, for students to
understand those ideas that are important, beautiful and powerful, and second, to be able to think
critically and analytically and to utilize their imaginations in order to see connections.
Additionally, they should use their understanding and ability to critically analyze and enhance
their own lives and the lives of others (Eisner, 1997).
All knowledge is not cognitive but instead much is tacit; thereby, much knowledge is
intuitive, experiential, personal, and secured in action (Eisner, 1998). According to Jerome
Bruner (1990, as cited in Eisner, 1998), there are two ways of knowing; these include
paradigmatic knowledge and narrative understanding. Narrative understanding is fostered
through stories while paradigmatic knowledge is generated through scientific explanations
(Bruner, 1990). Important though the skills of reading, writing, and computing are, they are not
the only means of representing human understanding; schooling privileges written and spoken
communication along with the ability to utilize mathematics and the language of numbers
(Eisner, 2002b). In Eisner’s (2002b) vision, students must learn to ‘read’ important ideas that
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are rendered nondiscursively so that they may understand those ideas. In order to engage in this
type of reading, students require experience and instruction, enabling them to realize that
‘smartness’ may exceed the limits of language arts and math (Eisner, 2002b). According to
Suzanne Langer (1957/1976):
The arts, like language, abstract for experience certain aspects for our
contemplation. But such abstractions are not concepts that have names. Discursive
speech can fix definable concepts better and more exactly. Artistic expression
abstracts aspects of the life of feeling which have no names, which have to be
presented to sense and intuition rather than to a word-bound, note-taking
consciousness. (p. 94-95)
When curricula in any discipline utilize aesthetic properties, thereby generating aesthetic
experiences, they engender aesthetic learning for the student (Eisner, 2002b). In any artistic
medium, how forms relate is critical (Eisner, 2002b). Within the arts we learn to attend to
relationships through questioning and thereby develop judgment. Eisner (2002b) says this about
judgment:
One of the interesting and important features of … judgment is that it cannot be
reduced to rule, recipe, formula, or algorithm. There is no chart that one can
consult, no prescription that one can follow. Judgment depends on feel, and feel
depends on a kind of somatic knowledge that enables one to determine if the form
at hand has what Nelson Goodman [(1978, p. 169)] once called "rightness of fit".
When the body is engaged, the source of information is visceral; the sensibilities
are employed to secure experience that makes it possible to render a judgment and
to act upon it. (p. 201)
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Eisner (2002b) finds it important for those in the field of education to look to the arts to reveal
possibilities for approaching student learning in order to enable students’ abilities to effectively
form judgments. The arts can teach that intrinsic satisfactions matter (Eisner, 2002b). For anyone
who loves what he or she does, the joy is in the journey, rather than simply the destination. In my
work, I have seen a fourth grade student hide an illness from her parent in order to be allowed to
attend school, because the class was "doing a time machine" that day. Allowed to attend school –
what a remarkable concept! The satisfaction, for that student, was not in the actual history that
was learned that day, as was the teacher's goal, instead, the satisfaction was the journey... in this
case, the journey in a fake time machine! According to Eisner (2002a) intrinsic satisfaction is the
best predictor that the learner will pursue the activity voluntarily, later in life, when the choice is
theirs. I would go a step further to theorize that these aesthetic moments of intrinsic satisfaction
form the basis of our passionate desires, or eros (Garrison, 1997). "The capacity of an art form
to touch us depends on the relationships that are composed by artists" (Eisner, 2002b, p. 201). If
we can alter the wording slightly it sheds light on my thesis, that learning itself can be aesthetic:
"[t]he capacity of a subject matter to touch us depends on the relationships that are composed by
teachers." To leave out, erase, or even avoid the influence of a skilled, passionate teacher on the
aesthetic quality of the subject for the student is impossible. For both teacher and students,
intrinsic satisfactions matter.
Another lesson the arts can teach education is the “what” and the “how” cannot be peeled
apart; in other words, form matters. The way we say something (the form) impacts what is said
(the content); demonstrating how "form and content interpenetrate" (Eisner, 2002b, p. 199).
Additionally, the ability to be flexibly purposive (Dewey, 1934/2005), or opportunistic, by
cultivating the ability to shift goals and avoid becoming rigidly pinned to aims, is something
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education can learn from the arts. The arts can teach how to employ a process of assessing one's
own progress to achieve purpose when the trajectory is not linear (Eisner, 2002a). The arts can
teach that finding more than one answer is not a sign of failure and all outcomes need not be
identical (Eisner, 2002a). Finally, the arts can teach us all to savor the ride; to see the beauty in
whatever medium we employ (Eisner, 2002b) and as I previously stated, the journey matters.
For an additional answer to the question of why the aesthetic is so important, we only
need look as far as our own sensory systems (Eisner, 1998). Humans have a low tolerance for
homeostasis or equilibrium; we are easily bored and we like the stimulation of varied experience
(Eisner, 1998). Rather than seeking to reduce it, human beings actually seek stimulation;
aesthetic experience is a source of stimulation and problem solving is a source of aesthetic
experience (Eisner, 1998). By exploring and then solving problems, whether building a
sandcastle or a skyscraper, humans enjoy the aesthetics of active problem solving (Eisner, 1998).
When we leave the aesthetic out of the curriculum, we teach students that we do not
value what it teaches (Eisner, 1998). The neglect or absence of a subject communicates its
unimportance to the student (Eisner, 1998). Our educational system’s embrace of ideas like
accountability means that curriculum is broken into small bits, making it difficult for students to
see how each portion is part of a larger whole (Eisner, 1998). There is no big picture, "no larger
conception or armature" upon which the small bits of the curriculum can be placed (Eisner, 1998,
p. 41). Our need for stimulation is not the only motivation human beings have for seeking the
aesthetic; our need to give order to our world is similarly motivated. We want the world to make
sense and aesthetic order helps the world fit together; it creates harmony (Eisner, 1998).
According to Eisner (2002a), there are five assumptions about knowledge that currently
serve as a foundation for both research and practice in the field of education. What I call the
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epistemology of the art-less. First is the assumption that knowledge of the world is based on truth
rather than on any kind of belief systems. Second, knowledge is predictable, orderly, and formal,
because of its basis in patterns (Eisner, 2002a). Knowledge shines a light on "the permanent
structures underlying all the changeable phenomena of Nature" (Toulmin, 1990, p. 34, cited in
Eisner, 2002a, p. 377), situating it as universal, not local (Eisner, 2002a). For example objects in
China fall to the ground in the same way they to in the U.S. Further assumptions include the
belief that knowledge does not express values but instead is value neutral (2002a). Finally,
knowledge is testable, and verifiable, and necessarily declarative (Eisner, 2002a). In other words
"the limits of cognition were very much defined by the limits of language... what you could not
say, you could not know" (Eisner, 2002a, p. 377). This view of knowledge, called episteme,
continues to impact our educational system in profound ways, coming to us from the ancient
Greeks, episteme refers to true and certain knowledge (Eisner, 2002a).
Though such thinking began with Plato, it did not die with Plato; instead these ideas
continue to inform our deepest beliefs about intelligence and what counts for knowledge. Eisner
(2002a) offers an example in the utilization of the terms ‘intelligence’ and ‘talent.’ Talent is
used to describe someone who is good at things related to the body: the arts or sports. Our
current idea of intelligence describes those who are good at rational thought, rather than those
who are good at abstraction (Eisner, 1998). In our culture there is a contradiction between the
terms aesthetic and knowing, which stems from Plato's conception of the hierarchies of
knowledge (Eisner, 1998). For Plato (as for Kant), episteme, or true and certain knowledge,
could not be dependent upon the senses (Eisner, 1998). Dependable knowledge is gained, not
through the empirical world of the senses, but through exercise of our rationality, by abstraction
(Eisner, 1998).
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We see Plato's ideas of episteme found in our conceptions of what it means to be
intelligent (Eisner, 1998). The idea of knowledge as something out there, waiting to be
discovered, prevails (Eisner, 1998). Not a techne, or, something that is made, instead knowledge
is a universal (Eisner, 1998). "Mathematics, the queen of the sciences, is the apotheosis of human
intelligence" (Eisner, 1998, p. 39). This is seen as true because mathematics does not require
empirical evidence, only rational comprehension (Eisner, 1998). The idea, that rational
comprehension is the true understanding of knowledge and intelligence, is woven so deeply into
Western consciousness, that we hold it as a truth, rather than a view. Eisner (1998) offers the
example of the rod placed in a glass of water. Our sense of sight tells us the straight rod is bent evidence that our senses cannot be trusted.
Given these assumptions, the aesthetic becomes a casualty in American education.
It is embedded in a historical context that has underestimated the role it plays in
[humanity’s]… effort to know. The aesthetic aspects of human experience are
considered luxuries. And luxuries, as we all know, can be rather easily foregone
in hard times. (Eisner, 1998, p. 40)
When episteme is embraced and the aesthetic aspects of learning are ignored, there is a profound
effect on the understanding of what constitutes knowledge. In such a setting, knowledge is seen
as: revealing regularities not uniqueness; separate from belief; universal, not local; separable
from values; and dependent on language for its very existence (Eisner, 2002a).
Unlike Plato, Aristotle called attention to a more pluralistic conception of knowing;
advancing the idea that there are many ways that understanding is enlarged (or that people learn)
and, therefore, there is a constructed character to knowledge (Eisner, 2002a). A different type of
knowledge, according to the Greeks, was phronesis. Phronesis is knowledge that is wise and
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practical; "contingent rather than necessary" (Eisner, 2002a, p.375), or, even more to the point, it
is knowledge arising from lived experience. Deliberation, when we metacognitively explore
possibilities with others, is a way of securing phronesis (Eisner, 2002b). Additionally, phronetic
knowledge is gained through experience, it addresses distinctive situations in which a person
decides on action that is morally framed and serves the greatest good (Eisner, 2002a). As one
example, developing wise, practical reasoning, or phronesis, is a portion of what an individual
needs in order to be a great teacher; artistry is another (Eisner, 2002b).
Eisner understood that the research engaged within a field shapes the field’s practice.
When he wrote The Enlightened Eye (2002c), his goal was to change the focus of educational
research, away from a heavy reliance on social science paradigms toward more qualitative
approaches. He made strides in achieving his goal, and today, educational research can take
many qualitative forms. This has helped to shift attention toward phronesis and away from
episteme, but there is still work to be done.
When we decide the content and tasks to include in the curriculum, we are also deciding
on the mental skills we wish to cultivate in our students (Eisner, 1998). In this way we can see
that, indeed, “curriculum is a mind altering device” (Eisner, 1997, p.1). When the aesthetic is
ignored, the sensibilities are ignored with devastating effect since through our sensibilities, our
perception and awareness are secured (Eisner, 1998).
Attention to the aesthetic aspects of the subjects taught would remind students
that the ideas within subjects areas, disciplines, and fields of study are human
constructions, shaped by craft, employing technique, and mediated through some
material. Works of science are, in this sense, also works of art. (Eisner, 1998, p.
42)
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Including the aesthetic aspects of subjects within the curriculum helps students to avoid
concluding that knowledge is fixed and discoverable rather that created (Eisner, 1998). As the
story of my student, Christopher, at the beginning of this chapter revealed, his experience
creating an abstract expressionist painting, combined with the information he had read about
Jackson Pollock and his life, helped him discover that a painting can express and idea like
“energy.” Thus through his sensibilities, his perception and awareness were secured (Eisner,
1998).
Today, test performance is the basis for rewards in schools, resulting in a laser focus by
teachers and students on something that is short-term and instrumental (Eisner, 1998; Liston,
2001; Ravitch, 2016). Frequently left in the dust in the American educational system is the
aesthetic piece (Eisner, 1998). An approach that includes the aesthetic would foster within
students, a willingness to imagine possibilities that are not now, but which might become; a
desire to explore ambiguity; a willingness to forestall premature closure in pursuing resolutions;
and the ability to recognize and accept the multiple perspective and resolutions that works in the
arts celebrate (Eisner, 1998; Greene, 1995).
While there are certainly basic requirements for some skills, such as the ability to express
ones self in writing or the ability to utilize mathematics skillfully, only through the talents of
unique individuals is our culture is enriched (Eisner, 1998). Rooted in the assumptions of
fairness, standards offer the feel-good presumption that uniform expectations regarding student
goals is a good idea. In addition to encouraging a problematic focus on testing, standards create a
stumbling block in today’s educational system by obscuring the effects of difference among
students on school success. While the damaging effect of low teacher expectations on student
achievement, must be considered, differences in interests, goals, aptitude, and even in region of
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residence do matter (Eisner, 1998). "[T]he education reform movement, in its anxiety about
quality, wants to rein in our diversity, to reduce local discretion, and to give everybody the same
target at which to aim" (Eisner, 1998, p. 180). A rigid adherence to standards leaves no room for
innovation, nor does it allow for the passion of the teacher or students to enter the equation.
Process and content are the "what" and "how" of education. What is included and how
that is taught provides a doorway to information. A student must first pass through the door
before they can partake of learning opportunities. The kind and shape of doorway, provides for
and limits the means of access for learners. Additionally, educational doorways exist within a
cultural foundation. Culture can indicate a shared way of life and a medium for growth. Both
meanings have application when we consider that a culture, which provides opportunities for
growth for the greatest number of citizens, enhances our shared way of life, and our democracy
(Eisner, 1997).
Decisions regarding the forms of representation selected for use within a school’s
learning environments impact the process, content, culture, and equity of individual’s
experiences in that environment. In this case, forms can be understood as products made by
artists and scientists that have aesthetic features which appeal to others (Eisner, 1997, 1998;
Greene, 1995). The form of representation a teacher utilizes restricts possibilities by imposing
the limits of the form on the thinking of the students (Eisner, 1997; Greene, 1995). Forms of
representation develop different cognitive skills, in the same way that exercising different
muscles develops those muscles and not others. Forms of representation are mediated through
materials required for that form, and different cognitive skills are employed in order to manage
them (Eisner, 1997; Greene, 1995).
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When the teacher selects a form a representation, it frames the experience for the
students, constraining what they are able to see as well as how they can represent it (Eisner,
1997). "Tools are not neutral. Forms of representation are tools and they are not neutral" (Eisner,
1997, p. 4). Forms of representation can be combined to enrich the array of resources that
students can respond to. Though sometimes it can be helpful to focus attention on specific tasks
in mathematics or language, enriched learning environments can expand the sensory modalities
and thus expand learning opportunities for students. Additionally, an expansive learning
environment better mimics the real world in which a multitude of overlapping representations are
required. Additionally, "(e)ducational equity is provided not merely by opening the doors of the
school to the child but by providing opportunities to the child for success once he or she arrives.
The provision of a resource-rich environment is an extremely important way in which genuine
educational equity can be achieved" (Eisner, 1997, p. 5). Each form of representation can be
utilized in a multitude of ways that call students to exercise different combinations of skills and
forms of thinking (Eisner, 1997). In this way, the arts influence our experience by providing the
languages that inform different ways of knowing that are non-discursive (Eisner, 2002b). We
need to educate children to understand and to use for themselves the forms of representation
available in our culture. "…forms are what enable us to make our ideas public...we can't have
musical idea without thinking and representing what we have thought musically" (Eisner, 1998,
p.1). How we choose to represent knowledge or learning affects both what we are able to say and
what we are able to see (Eisner, 2002b; Greene, 1995).
Eisner, (1997) suggests inspecting culture for "cognitive artifacts" or products of thought
from which we may come to understand the forms of thinking that lead to each (p. 2). Since
humans create meaning through generation of these artifacts, investigation of the kinds of
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meaning that humans are capable of creating, and the forms of thinking used to create them, is
possible and necessary if we wish to make informed decisions about what and how we teach.
Inclusion of a wide assortment of forms of representation within learning experiences can
expand the minds of the learners involved in those experiences. Understanding the forms of a
particular discipline and the aesthetic properties they possess can render clearly to the competent
percipient, those aspects of the world that may not be communicated directly. As Eisner (1998)
relates, “…different forms of language make different forms of knowing possible. What we can
come to understand through literary forms cannot be revealed through the propositional
discourse of science. Conversely, what science can help us understand cannot be disclosed
through literary form” (p. 11). Thus, learning involves acquiring the ability to read the forms of a
discipline (Eisner, 1998).
Resolving problems that students and teachers care about, while utilizing the disciplinary
structures of biology, history, art, and mathematics is a way to overcome the problem of the
fragmentation of learning (Eisner, 1998). In other words, by utilizing a convergence of
disciplines, teachers can encourage Joy for learning within their students (Liston, 2001). For the
student, a robust learning experience must also include gaining ability to utilize the tools of
expressiveness. According to Herbert Read (1943):
Education is the fostering of growth, but apart from physical maturation, growth
is only made apparent in expression - audible or visible signs and symbols.
Education may therefore be defined as the cultivation of modes of expression - it
is teaching children and adults how to make sounds, images, movement, tools and
utensils. A man [sic] who can make such things well is a well-educated man. If he
can make good sounds, he is a good speaker, a good musician, a good poet; if he
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can make good images, he is a good painter or a sculptor; if good movements, a
good dancer or laborer; if good tools or utensils, a good craftsman. All faculties of
process, and all… involve art. (p. 10)
We should not interpret Read’s statement to mean our educational system should produce artists
whose sole purpose is to become expressive; instead, Eisner (2002b) advances the idea of
helping students "form purpose to guide their work" (p. 51). Where a focus on expressiveness
alone could result in every endeavor becoming utterly exploratory, instead, encouragement to
become flexibly purposive (Dewey, 1934/2005) encourages a student toward mastery of form,
and dedication to matters of intention.
The focus on learning as aesthetic requires a change from the idea of teaching as "applied
social science" (Eisner, 2002b, p. 282), toward an idea of teaching as an art. As an example,
knowing when to lead and when to allow the learner to lead, or feeling the right moment to
improvise, are aspects of the art of teaching. If artistry in teaching becomes the ideal, then tools
that artists use to hone their craft can be helpful to teachers. According to Eisner (2002b), a
teaching studio in which teachers can perform and then receive reflection on that performance
could enhance the artistry of teaching. In most schools there is not a system set up to allow for
critical and helpful feedback for teachers. This highlights the difficulty of how to know what you
don't know; what Eisner (2002b) refers to as "secondary ignorance" (p.49). Primary ignorance
involves knowing that you don't know which is much easier to overcome, but secondary
ignorance is impossible to overcome without feedback (Eisner, 2002). Good educational
criticism can mitigate secondary ignorance and also assist teachers with awareness of their
strengths (Eisner, 2002).
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Rather than leaving out the social sciences all together, Eisner (2002b) promotes the
consideration of teaching as an art form that is informed by, but not ruled by, the social sciences
(Eisner, 2002b). Learning to see and reflect on one's practice as a teacher/artist is enhanced with
informed criticism that illuminates noteworthy aspects of the one's practice (Eisner, 2002b).
Teachers shape the environment they share with students through their interactions with students
both through the experiences they design and also through their timing, manner and tone as they
speak to students (Eisner, 2002a). Additionally, the teacher’s own passions translate to students.
For Eisner (2002b) teaching is an art. As he describes, "By artistry I mean a form of practice
informed by the imagination that employs technique to select and organize expressive qualities
to achieve ends that are aesthetically satisfying" (Eisner, 2002b, p. 49). What person who has
ever taught, would not agree with such a definition. In The Art and Craft of Teaching (1983),
Eisner describes teachers as more like orchestra conductors than technicians, and as such "they
need rules of thumb and educational imagination, not prescriptions" (p. 6).
Effects of a teacher’s practice may not manifest themselves until long after students leave
school and in ways the teacher can never imagine. The way we assess most learning in school is
by asking students to perform at a certain time. Yet what students have actually learned may not
come to the surface until years after they have finished the course. During the various stages of a
person’s life, lessons that the individual was not aware of learning may emerge. Maturity can
promote appreciations never before experienced. As Eisner relates:
[W]hen I was in the fourth grade my teacher, Miss Purtle, asked me to have a
"one man" show of my paintings in the classroom. It was an experience that made
a difference I will never forget. A nine year-old having a one man show of his
paintings? What matters is that such occasions, occasions whose importance may
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be unknown to the teacher, do matter, and may continue to matter long after the
child has left the classroom. (Eisner, 2002b, p. 50)
Eisner (1998) suggests an aesthetic education engages what psychologists term the conative part
of the brain, which guides how one acts on thoughts (cognitive) and feelings (affective), in order
to "frame the world as an object of enjoyed perception" (p.98). Various situations in teaching
require particular, rather than general, solutions. Such solutions require artistry, which involves
"sensibility, imagination, technique, and the ability to make judgments about the feel and
significance of the particular" (Eisner, 2002a, p. 382). Such judgments involve the teacher’s
understanding of how their own lived experience impacts with those of their students (Clandinin
& Connelly, 1988b). Through socialization, which includes school experiences, we come to see
the world through a frame of reference that is common to the culture in which we are socialized
(Eisner, 2002b). These frames of reference not only include, they also exclude; students learning
is affected by the frame of reference placed around them by their culture, which they bring to
each educational situation and which includes the culture the teacher creates within the
classroom (Eisner, 2002b). Eisner makes a compelling case for inclusion of aesthetic principles
within the curriculum, teaching, and learning.
Final Thoughts
When I watched my student, Christopher, create his own abstract expressionist painting I
knew I was witnessing something significant because it caused a reaction in me. I have come to
view this dissertation process as a journey to attach words to that event. For me, as a painter,
words can be pesky and hard to pin down. How I felt watching and listening to my student, cued
me to the significance of how Christopher felt; it encouraged me to notice. This dissertation is
my effort to inform that noticing.
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What comprises the experience for the one engaged in learning, if, as Emily Dickinson
states:
…I read a book and it makes my whole body so cold no fire can ever warm me, I
know that is poetry. If I feel physically as if the top of my head were taken off, I
know that is poetry. These are the only ways I know it. Is there any other way?
(Bianchi and Dickinson, 1924, as cited in Schubert, 2009a, p. 150)
The embodied experience of learning is what I seek to theorize around. Within this document, I
have used metaphors of weaving and a journey to describe my own process. Journeys and
weavings are orderly, and predictable with obvious beginnings and endings. I am afraid to think
that an Abstract Expressionist painting is probably a better fit as a metaphor. A linear approach is
orderly, even peaceful and apparently, quite out of reach for me. I can think of no better
description for emergent growth (Garrison, 1997) than my own process: load up with color and
feeling, and see where it goes.
Let me attempt to be somewhat linear: My goal for this chapter was to hone a useful
definition from which to consider the aesthetic as a key to learning. With roots in ancient Greece,
aesthetic philosophy owes much to eighteenth century European philosophers and Immanuel
Kant in particular, for starting the debate on what comprises “the aesthetic”. Stemming from
Kant’s uses of the term aesthetic, today aesthetics can be both an objective philosophy of art and
a philosophy of subjective sensory experience (Shaviro, 2007). As an artist I find both useful.
With Greene (1997) and Korsmeyer (2004) I recognize, when it comes to aesthetic awareness,
where I place the frame is key.
A feminist aesthetic contributes to my understanding of subjective sensory experience
because it helps to critique the hierarchies inherent in my desire to place Christopher’s
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intellectual experience above his emotional, affective experience. A feminist aesthetic helps me
see them as connected. According to Korsmeyer (2004) the pleasure an individual finds in
beauty is personal, an extension of their life experience and culture. For Maxine Greene (1995,
2001) objective forms are made meaningful with sensory experience, and sensory experience is
given shape and meaning through the clarity provided by objective form. My student,
Christopher, required both sensory experience and objective form to cement his learning.
Christopher’s experience also reflected John Dewey’s ideas of an experience. He began
with an impulsion to create an action painting in the manner of Jackson Pollock. As he began the
experience, I surmise there was a sense of identifying how wonderful it felt to be allowed to sling
paints at something while as school. Then, perhaps he identified with Jackson Pollock, whom he
had studied and he experienced a perception, or awareness, of all the pieces that constituted his
environment; the art materials and the cognitive bits of knowledge. Within that context, and with
a desire to tell me what was in his mind, Christopher reflected out loud on the experience. This
required receptiveness on his part as his experience achieved consummation when he drew a
distinction, “I used to think this was just drips and splashes, but now I see it’s about energy!”
The receptiveness involved a willingness to let go of the old thinking. The experience was also
educative, in that it was connected to previous experience. It enabled his previous ideas about
action painting to being useful because they were a foil for his new understanding of action
painting. In this manner, his previous experience was continued, preparing him for future
interactions with works of art. The experience constituted a transaction between Christopher and
his environment, which I had helped to construct, consisting of my pedagogy, the curriculum, the
setting, and materials available within the art room.

50
Christopher’s experience also demonstrates what Eisner means when he says, "form and
content interpenetrate" (Eisner, 2002b, p. 199). Observing this experience we cannot separate the
“what” from the “how,” they were in dialogue, each responding to the other. Also, it
demonstrates the importance of intrinsic satisfactions and the journey.
The arts provide a good starting point for thinking about aesthetic engagement. We have
all been transformed by literature or a play and we easily discern the ability of the arts to allow
us vicariously to reap the benefits of an experience (Dewey, 1934/2005). I believe while the arts
can make such transformative experiences readily assessable and obvious, they are not the only
purview of such experience. Deep learning is an aesthetic experience and we miss an important
piece for understanding what drives us to learn when those learning experiences that answer a
need, inspire reflection, and cause the individual to be perceptive are ignored.
In this chapter I have traced the historic roots of the idea of the aesthetic. With
Korsmeyer (2004), Greene (1997), and Polyani (1966), I place the frame over the spot where
subjective experience is informed by objective qualities of a given form or discipline. For the
purposes of this dissertation, I define the aesthetic as subjective sensory experience, informed by
an objective understanding of the entity or experience at hand. Sometimes, we characterize this
subjective sensory experience as “beautiful,” though perhaps affecting or stirring are more
accurate. Within aesthetic learning, there is a relationship between both subjective and objective
experience and form.
In the next chapter, I investigate classroom practices that engage aesthetic learning
opportunities for students, including research on the topic.
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CHAPTER 2
INVESTIGATIONS OF AESTHETIC LEARNING EXPERIENCES
“A person who truly learns exists transformed, not just of mind, but of heart, eye, and body.
Education should leave us different, understanding more, seeing differently, and willing to act in
accordance with those differences” (Girod, Twyman, and Wojcikiewicz, 2010, p. 804).

The science teacher towered above his elementary students as they made their way into
the surf. The students, ages 6 through 12, were wearing personal flotation devices (PFDs), and
assisted by the teacher and several high school students, they utilized ropes and poles to pull a
100-foot beach seine through the coastal waters. As they finished and dragged the net onto the
beach, the “catch” began to flip and move about. Wide-eyed, the young students moved closer
and one-by-one, the teacher released each fish, crab, and stingray from the net, handed it to a
student to return to the sea and offered them some kind of encouragement or instruction as they
assisted in the process: “Hold it this way.” “See, it’s not going to hurt you.” “This fish likes to
swim fast, you can tell by his body shape and fins.” At last, only one aggressive crab remained.
The student whose turn it was, seemed very unsure about her ability to wrangle it back into the
surf. “Here, let me show you how to put it to sleep,” said the teacher. Together they flipped the
crab onto his back and the student began to rub the crab’s belly. Instantly it became docile and
the student carefully placed it back into the sea.
In this experience, which I have seen repeated over many summers, each student comes
away empowered. This empowerment springs from understanding and respect for the creatures
that live in the sea, and also for each individual’s place within a larger whole. The students look
at the teacher and think, “Yes! I want to be like you. I want to know what you know. I will care
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for and about these creatures just like you.” Even though an understanding of some of the more
complex layers of ecosystem dynamics will not be intellectually available to them for several
years, the students firmly grasp what I am calling the aesthetic piece; the subjective sensory
experience, which is brought into focus by their cognitive understanding; there is a symbiosis
between the cognitive and subjective aspects of experience in such moments. It has been my
observation, watching 100s of these students over 30 years, such experiences never leave them
and for many students, they shape what becomes their life’s work. In this chapter I examine
investigations of aesthetic learning in order that my theorizing may add to the conversation
around this topic.
Learning and Knowing
In chapter 1, I refined a definition of “aesthetic,” that is helpful to my investigation of an
ecofeminist vision of learning as aesthetic, embodied, and connected. ‘Subjective sensory
experience, informed by objective understanding,’ is useful for my purpose because it comprises
the dialogical nature of the aesthetic that I wish to develop in this dissertation. In this chapter, I
look closely at the idea of aesthetic experience and aesthetic learning. Before I proceed, I present
some thoughts about what constitutes learning, in a general sense, and how learning is
manifested in practice.
Learning As Meaning Making
According to the Oxford Online Dictionary, learning is “the acquisition of knowledge or
skills through study, experience, or being taught” or “knowledge acquired through study,
experience, or being taught” (“Learning”, 2017). We can see the multiple understandings of
learning revealed as the process of acquiring knowledge, or the knowledge itself. According to
Carol Leaman (2016), “If learning is a recipe, then knowledge is the cake” (p.1). This definition
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equates learning with the act of acquiring knowledge or skill, rather than the knowledge or skill
itself.
In The Meaning of Learning and Knowing (2010), Van Rossum and Hamer, interviewed
college students to investigate attitudes towards learning. They determined five conceptions of
learning, which they deemed developmental. The first, most basic level, learning as the increase
of knowledge, involves individuals who “equate knowledge with … discrete units of information,
or simply ‘facts’, and learning is consequently the transfer of these discrete units into the head of
the learner” (Van Rossum & Hamer, 2010, p. 3). At this first level, the responsibility for the
learning/knowing process is on the teacher. Level two, or learning as memorizing, involves the
learner committing to memory the contents narrated by the teacher for the purposes of making a
good grade (Van Rossum & Hamer, 2010). Here, more responsibility is placed on the learner yet
still learning is understood as memorizing facts. Level three is learning as the acquisition of facts
and procedures, which can be retained and utilized in the future, as opposed to those acquired for
a test (Van Rossum & Hamer, 2010). In each of the first three conceptions on Van Rossum and
Hamer’s scale, the concern is with information committed to memory and the information is
highlighted, though used in different ways at each level. Level four takes a leap because now
learning [is seen] as the abstraction of meaning, in which the individual no longer conceives of
learning as an activity of reproducing, but instead as a process of abstracting meaning; the
objective of reflection here is to understand the subjects studied (Van Rossum & Hamer, 2010).
Level five is learning as an interpretative process aimed at the understanding of reality, in
which the learner has the expectation that what he or she learns should help him or her interpret
the reality in which they live; such learning secures personal meaning (Van Rossum & Hamer,
2010). In their conclusion, the researchers were surprised to find graduate students who did not
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report a level five approach to learning. After completing their research, Van Rossum and Hamer
(2010) later added a sixth category, entitled self-realization, which they defined as “changing as
a person” (p. 7). This same idea is found in Dewey, (1934/2005) as a willingness to be changed.
I find their research helpful but limited. Reflecting back on the story of Elliot Eisner’s
(2002b) one-man show in his fourth grade classroom, as he relates, what students have actually
learned may not come to the surface until years later, when lessons of which the individual was
consciously unaware emerge. This can also include what they have learned about ‘learning.’ In
Autocrat at the Breakfast Table (1891), Oliver Wendel Holmes offers a helpful description of
such a learning process:
Put an idea in your intelligence and leave it there an hour, a day, a year without
ever having occasion to refer to it. When, at last, you return to it, you do not find
it as it was when acquired. It has domiciled itself, so to speak, - become at home
- entered into relation with your other thoughts, and integrated itself with the
whole fabric of your mind. (p. 134)
I think of it as percolating; some lessons must percolate before they are learned or before we are
aware of knowing them. As Parker Palmer (2007) relates, learning that results in knowing,
emerges best from "a complex interplay of the inner and the outer" (p. 207).
Van Rossum and Hamer’s (2010), conception of the levels of learning as developmental
is troubling for me; even the conception of levels, which implies hierarchy is troubling. As
illustrated in the story at the beginning of this chapter, the young children with the science
teacher were able to interpret the reality in which they found themselves and thereby secure
personal meaning from their experience of fish at the beach. Based on my own experience as a
teacher, I surmise that attitudes about what type of learning to employ vary with the task at hand,
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rather than being strictly developmental; they are in part dependent on prior knowledge and
ability which are developmental. Malmberg, Jarvela and Kirschner (2013) concur that task-type
does matter for students’ strategic learning. What if Van Rossum and Hamer are partially correct,
and the ability to interpret reality and secure personal meaning is situational and frequently held
by the very young? What if infants can and do operate at level five? This is an interesting
question though not within the purview of my dissertation.
Perhaps the study’s college-aged participants rarely reported learning as a means of
securing personal value and interpreting reality, because of the heavy focus schools place on the
intellectual operations of learning such as the acquisition of facts, problem solving, and
deductive thinking. I would argue that securing personal meaning and interpreting reality require
imagination and also what I would call subjective energy; Van Rossum and Hamer’s (2010)
study allowed for neither. According to Harry Broudy (1994), the raw material for all types of
reasoning is the imagination, which is neglected in schools. The imagination, Broudy (1994) says
is wild and difficult to tame, it does not naturally impose limits on itself nor are all its products
constructive or creative. The goal of what Broudy (1994) calls "value education," is to help
learners maximize the power of imagination in partnership with physical, spiritual, and cognitive
abilities. Accordingly, within the individual learner, life experience and prior knowledge interact
with new learning uniquely, therefore, while the structure of teaching, learning, and knowing can
be understood discretely, as they function, they are intertwined. My dissertation attempts to peel
out the learning portion, while appreciating that learning functions within a system of interaction.
Human beings bring both the objective and the subjective to their knowing, though affective
knowledge is difficult to measure and frequently eludes our cognitive understanding, learning
that is completed in knowing requires the total experience; the subjective and the objective, to
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make meaning. For Liston (2001), when we view learning as meaning-making, we begin to see
that we cannot learn outside of community with others (Liston, 2001). The space between my
self as separate and the other, who is also separate, is where meaning making occurs (Liston,
2001). This space, Martin Buber (1947/2002) describes as a narrow ridge. With recognition of
the narrow ridge comes a responsibility to myself and to my students to create a world “in which
beauty and Joy is recognized and present” (Liston, 2001, p. 100) and where we meet the other
and yet maintain our unique separateness. When I preserve the alterity of whatever I place at the
other end of my personal binaries, I can allow that Other to change, entangle, and educate me as
I traverse “the narrow ridge, where I and Thou meet, …[in] the realm of ‘between’” (Buber,
1947/2002).
The Community of Learning
Historically, in what is characterized in physics as the Newtonian era, the metaphor of
community that predominated was atomistic (Palmer, 2007). This conception considers separate
particles as the basic nature of reality (Palmer, 2007). In our current understanding, we
acknowledge that subatomic particles are altered even as they are observed, demonstrating that
relationships create the substance of the sub-atomic community (Palmer, 2007). Today, "nature
is understood to be relational, ecological, and interdependent; …[in such a setting], reality is
constituted by events and relationships rather than separate substances or separate particles"
(Palmer, 2007, p. 100), and yet, the power of the atomistic metaphor to shape educational culture
persists.
According to Parker Palmer (2007), three models characterize the majority of
communities found in the current educational landscape. What he names the therapeutic, the
civic, and the marketing models for educational communities have qualities that prevent their
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ability to animate a vigorous culture for educating students (Palmer, 2007). The first, or what
Palmer (2007) calls the therapeutic model for community, demands a high level of intimacy,
which sounds close-knit and accommodating, however, when intimacy is the norm, the group
cannot connect with the strange, or the other. Since in civil society, we deal with disagreements
through mechanisms of democracy: negotiation, bargaining, and compromise, the second, or the
civic model for community sounds worthwhile. However, in any sort of group, we live within
relationships, which are not determined through democratic means but through the give and take
of dialogue, so the civic model does not build a strong or nurturing learning community (Palmer,
2007).
The third model of community that Palmer critiques is the marketing model. The norms
of this model are straightforward: "educational institutions must improve their product by
strengthening relations with customers and becoming more accountable to them" (Palmer, 2007,
p. 95). This model also fails because good education is always more process than product. If the
student receives a packet of information at the end of their education, has the school been
accountable? No, because we want learners who are producers as well as consumers of
knowledge and who are able to critically analyze information from those who claim to know
(Palmer, 2007). Additionally, "it can take take years for a student to feel grateful to a teacher
who introduces a dissatisfying truth" (Palmer, 2007, p. 97), and as I expressed earlier, it can also
take years for the worth of some lessons to be revealed to the student (Eisner, 2002b).
Liston (2001) utilizes metaphors of the factory, the journey, and the garden for defining
the discourse in the field of education in Joy as a Metaphor of Convergence: A
Phenomenological and Aesthetic Investigation of Social and Educational Change. The first
metaphor of the factory relates to Palmer’s (2007) marketing metaphor. As Liston (2001)
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describes, the purpose of the educational factory is to “mass produce competent workers for
business and industry, [since] the development of skills requisite to maintaining a job is the
paramount purpose of schooling” (p. 200). Ideas such as customer relations and accountability
weave into this model. The factory model feels reassuring in its efficiency and because it offers a
sense of equity, since all students must meet the same standards, therefore this model may be
considered fair (Liston, 2001). Though, as teachers understand, treating every student the same is
the antithesis of fairness, since what is required is an understanding of each student’s unique
needs. Liston’s second metaphor, the journey, describes an educational setting that has more
flexibility yet, even so, only certain destinations are acceptable; “high school diploma,
vocational-technical school, college, or university study” (2001, p. 202). In a sense the journey is
taken over by the factory, allowing for only minor detours and not taking into account, the modes
of transportation students engage are not equal (Liston, 2001). In the garden model, which
evokes images of individual growth, such qualities are actually left behind in favor of mass
production (Liston, 2001). Thus, the corporate farm displaces the garden, and once again we note
the overwhelming presence of the factory model (Liston, 2001). For Liston (2001) a metaphor of
Joy transforms education by allowing a shift from a focus on skill and knowledge development
to the exploration of ideas, thereby making students’ experiences meaningful and allowing for
interpretation of their unique worlds.
Rather than embracing a therapeutic, civil, marketing, factory, journey, or garden model
of community for learning, Palmer (2007), proposes instead an ecological model in which the
subject is placed at the center. When we move away from the thinking which frames learning as
linear and hierarchical, we begin to see that the roles of teacher and student can be
interchangeable (Liston, 2001); offering a shift from the idea of the learner as a passive recipient
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of knowledge. Palmer (2007) agrees such a shift is required. For Palmer, centering the subject of
attention transcends both the student-centered and teacher-centered approaches to education.
Modeled on the community of truth, this approach "holds both me and thee accountable to
something beyond ourselves" (Palmer, 2007, p. 119). A genuine learning community does not
collapse under the weight of the egos of the students or the teacher. Since the subject at hand is at
the center, students and teacher are accountable to the subject (Palmer, 2007). Liston (2001)
finds a metaphor of Joy helpful for describing what is created within such a setting. As I related
in chapter 1, Liston’s (2001) vision of Joy “provides experiential understanding of the nondualistic interrelatedness of each of us to each other of us, along with the continual exchange of
matter and spirit incorporated within our living selves” (p. 14). Joy appears as we experience
connectedness; which can transform education by allowing a shift from a focus on skill and
knowledge development to exploration of ideas (Liston, 2001). Liston’s (2001) vision of Joy as
“non-dualistic interrelatedness” fits nicely with my ecofeminist vision of learning as nonhierarchical and interconnected which I will explore more fully in the next chapter.
For Liston (2001), learning communities provide us with a vision of Joy as a metaphor of
convergence. Some examples of learning communities within the educational setting and beyond
are: learning circles, support groups, friendship networks, and consciousness raising groups
(Liston, 2001). Within these groups, individuals discover as they learn about each other, they
learn even more about themselves (Liston, 2001).
I offer two glimpses of exemplary learning communities, one from Liston (2001), who
relates the experiences of a group of educators who “engage in self-reflexive dialogue about
education, learning, and … being together” (p. 211), as related in the book Toward Curriculum
for Being: Voices of Educators, (Berman, Hultgren, Lee, Rivkin, Roderick, & Aoki, 1991). The
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second is from Palmer (2007) who describes the work of the “clearness committee” where
members practice “the discipline of only asking questions … [in order to] open an inner space to
receive another person” (p. 159).
Citing the example of a learning community offered by Berman, Hultgren, Lee, Rivkin,
Roderick, and Aoki (1991), Liston (2001) highlights the authors’ exploration of curriculum and
education in the context of being and meaning-making. For these authors the use of metaphor
had a profound effect on the creativity of the group, allowing them to sharpen and extend their
thinking. According to one group member, Mary Rivkin, “What we name the world shapes how
we see it. As women gain more power to name, we will gain new visions” (Berman et. al., 1991,
p. 74) illustrating the importance of metaphor in shaping an individual’s consciousness of their
own experience.
In Palmer’s (2007) example, the learning community created within the clearness
committee allows for a relational space where members meet themselves as well as the other.
Those engaged in a clearness committee may opt for a questions only approach, which involves
members of the group asking questions of the “focus member.” In such a case all the individuals
involved delve more deeply into their own truth by providing no advice, no overidentification
(e.g. “I had that problem once”), and no agenda on the part of the questioner. The focus member
can also ask for mirroring which involves the group reflecting back things they said in the course
of the conversation. This offers the focus member the opportunity to “retrieve verbal and nonverbal clues to the resolution of … [his or her] own dilemmas from a text of … [his or her] own
making” (Palmer, 2007, p. 160).
For Liston (2001), learning is meaning-making which arises from within a community of
learning. For Palmer (2007) as well, the learning community is key, offering a shift from a
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previously atomistic view in which the idea of separate particles forms the basis for the
conception of community, to a view of community as “relational, ecological and interdependent”
(p. 100). Though, as I previously stated, I found the developmental aspects of Van Rossum and
Hamer’s vision troubling, they point out useful and varied conceptions of learning. As their
research indicates, learning occurs at a variety of “levels” from learning as memorizing to
learning as an interpretative process aimed at the understanding of reality or even learning as
self-realization resulting in a willingness to be changed (2010, pp. 3-7).
Knowing- The Heart of Understanding
To “know” according to the Oxford Online Dictionary (2017) is to “be aware of through
observation, inquiry, or information.” To become aware of something whether we observe it,
seek answers to questions about it, or receive information in some form, requires that we learn
about it. Learning and knowing are so connected in function; only as we consider them
intellectually can appreciate their separateness (Van Rossum & Hamer, 2010). With that in mind,
in this section I explore knowing.
Epistemology is branch of philosophy devoted to knowing, specifically, “the study of the
nature and scope of knowledge and justified belief,” concerned with the necessary and sufficient
conditions of knowledge, its sources, its structure, and its limits (Oxford Online Dictionary,
2017). Van Rossum and Hamer (2010) suggest what they term an ecological epistemology which
advances the view that how an individual comes to “know” is the result of a complex interplay of
a logically consistent, interrelated set of beliefs and conceptions about knowledge. These beliefs
and conceptions are manifested in behaviors of the students and teacher and include: the
teachers’ epistemological perspective, the culture of the educational institute, the conceptions
held by students and teachers of a particular discipline, the assessment practices, the students’
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self-concept, students’ motivation, and study strategies of students, to name but a few (Van
Rossum and Hamer, 2010). Thinking of these as aspects of an ecology of epistemology offers an
explanation for why change strategies within schools result in such diverse effects and why
researchers offer such diverse suggestions for educational improvement (Van Rossum & Hamer,
2010). Van Rossum and Hamer suggest that often, choosing to change only one aspect within a
particular educational setting upsets the local balance, resulting in trauma, rather than
improvement.
For Parker Palmer (2007), to know a thing is to form a relationship with it. In order to
enter into a relationship with what we want to know, be it corn DNA or another human being, we
must be open to what that organism has to say; this is a form of love that allows for "intimacy
without the annihilation of difference" (Palmer, 2007, p. 57); such knowledge cannot be
achieved through objectivity. According to Palmer (2007) there are two problems with
objectivism, first by distancing the self from the thing known, it deforms the relationship that
defines the knowing, that is the relationship between the self and the object (person, thing, or
feeling) (Palmer, 2007). Secondly, objectivity fails to take into account how knowing actually
happens. "Knowing of any sort is relational and animated by a desire to come into deeper
community with what we know" (Palmer, 2007, p. 55). Such relational knowing that seeks
community sounds very much like Liston’s (2001) vision of Joy.
Often, when we are presented with new information, it feels dangerous, so we either
attack the new idea, or run away, before it can leave us vulnerable. Palmer (2007) suggests,
instead, adopting the aikido practice of "soft eyes," which requires training in order to defeat the
reflexive fight or flight action and involves turning toward the stimulus, taking it in, and being
changed. This quality is reflected in “the marine biologist who can pick up a seashell and,
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through careful listening, learn much about what happened in the lifetime of its inhabitant and in
the evolution of its species” and additionally in the ability of “the geologist who hears the rocks
speak, telling tales across gaps of time far wider than recorded history, stories we would not
know if human vocalizations were the only speech we could hear” (Palmer, 2007, p. 113).
Liston (2001), agrees the ability to take in what is offered by the “other” is found in the
paradox of distance and relation:
The primal setting at a distance is a prerequisite for entering into relation.
Establishing both distance and relation are necessary in order to meet …[the
other]. It is only by establishing and maintaining the distance between one’s self
and the other that one is then able to choose to enter into relation with the other. (p.
55)
If I am not separate, then I cannot have a genuine relationship with another. Rather than offer a
sacrifice of my unique selfhood, I must prize it in order to then have a relation with another.
Eastern thinking provides a platform for understanding this reasoning as Liston describes with
the idea of the empty space inside a clay pot.
We shape clay into a pot,
But it is the emptiness inside
That holds whatever we want (Carter, 1989, p.11, cited in Liston, 2001, p. 69).
Western thinking focuses on the external pot and does not consider the emptiness (Liston, 2001).
Eastern thinking sees the “void as definitive to the pot” (Liston, 2001, p. 70). Exemplifying the
power of metaphor, the Western mind can utilize the metaphor of a pot’s simultaneous emptiness
and solid form to assist it in accepting the human need for distance and relation as part of the
same wholeness. Without community, solitude becomes loneliness and without solitude,
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community becomes an alienating crowd of too much noise (Palmer, 2007). Thus we find
another example of paradox in action within the human need for both distance/solitude and
relation/community (Liston, 2001; Palmer, 2007). For both Palmer and Liston, the ability to
embrace life paradoxically is key to knowing.
We split paradoxes so reflexively that we do not understand the price we pay for
our habit. The poles of a paradox are like the poles of battery: hold them together,
and they generate the energy of life; pull them apart, and the current stops
flowing. When we separate any of the profound paired truths of our lives, both
poles become lifeless specters of themselves - and we become lifeless as well.
(Palmer, 2007, p. 67)
When we 'wrap our life around' unresolved tensions, either within our lives in general, or within
teaching specifically, we grow in our ability to hold paradoxes together (Palmer, 2007).
When we can love the contradictions and love the tension they create, then we can
tap their energy as a creative force. When we separate head from heart, the result
is minds that do not know how to feel and hearts that do not know how to think.
(Palmer, 2007, p. 68)
This vision of existence as at once individual and collective is what Liston (2001) names a selfcontradictory unity. Joy is an example of a self-contradictory unity; it is separateness in unity.
In The Heart of Understanding: Commentaries on the Prajnaparamita Heart Sutra
(1997), Thich Nhat Hanh explains self-contradictory unity through what he terms “inter-being.”
He utilizes the oppositional concepts of immaculate and defiled to show how each is a part of the
existence of a rose:
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Defiled or immaculate. Dirty or pure. These are concepts we form in our mind. A
beautiful rose we have just cut and placed in our vase is immaculate. It smells so
good, so pure, so fresh. It supports the idea of immaculateness. The opposite is a
garbage can. It smells horrible, and it is filled with rotten things, but only if you
look on the surface. If you look more deeply you will see that in just five or six
days, the rose will become part of the garbage. You do not need to wait five days
to see it. If you just look at the rose, and you look deeply, you can see it now. And
if you look into the garbage can, you see that in a few months its contents can be
transformed into lovely vegetables, and even a rose. If you are a good organic
gardener and you have the eyes of a bodhisattva, looking at a rose you can see the
garbage and looking at the garbage you can see a rose. Roses and garbage interare. Without a rose, we cannot have garbage; and without garbage, we cannot
have a rose. They need each other very much. The rose and garbage are equal.
The garbage is just as precious as the rose. If we look deeply at the concepts of
defilement and immaculateness, we return to the notion of inter-being. (p. 31-32)
As individuals and teachers, we have gifts and limits. The idea is not to fixate on correcting our
limitations, but to understand and accept both our gifts and limits and to live gracefully within
our wholeness (Palmer, 2007). This gracefulness involves the ability to embrace the paradoxical
idea of wholeness within oppositions. If we could interpret the information received from our
senses through the metaphor of Joy, then we could see in a way that is nonlinear and nondualistic
(Liston, 2001). To that end, Liston (2001) suggests some ways to incorporate Joy into the
educational setting: we should recognize that there are many ways to interpret experience; Joy
must be recognized as being always already present - it cannot be forced into being; nondualistic
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Joy resists hierarchy and oppression - I am at once independent and dependent; each learning
environment must be continually reinterpreted by those who create it; making meaning together
requires a sharing of the self with others – this is what constitutes a learning community;
meaning-making is purposeful, helping those who engage it to create and interpret their worlds;
and a learning community is created by individuals with shared interests, no other notable
characteristic is necessary for inclusion except for a desire to participate (Liston, 2001, p. 216)
Looking back at the science teacher and students on the beach, we see these qualities of
Joy exemplified. Each student was free to interpret the experience for him or herself. Each
individual learner was unique and discrete yet also a part of the learning community and
additionally, connected to the greater community of creatures on the planet. The students were
encouraged to experience the web of connection and absorb the value of respect for the earth’s
systems, resisting the impulse to dominate other creatures. In such a setting, a sense of
connectedness mitigates the Western impulse toward hierarchical thinking. As the students and
teacher made meaning together, they engaged with and through each other to interpret their
natural world. Such an engagement continues past the actual time of being together as, upon
reflection later, each revisits their own experience through the other within their imaginations
(Eisner, 2002b; Greene, 1995).
Being torn by the tension between the poles of a paradox (such as discipline and
freedom) does not break the heart; instead, it makes it larger (Palmer 2007). For Palmer (2007),
in the educational setting, paradoxes are held together in the teacher's heart, and the inability to
do so is not a failure of teaching technique but results from a gap in the inner life of the teacher
(Palmer, 2007).
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Embracing the self-contradictory unity (Liston, 2001) of inter-being (Hanh, 1997) and
understanding the self as at once individual and connected to community (Liston, 2001; Palmer,
2007), frames an ecofeminist epistemology that honors knowledge as structured by the
conditions created within communities of learning. In the next chapter, I frame these ideas into
what I call an ecofeminist vision that unites environmental and human interactions. It informs an
understanding of learning as meaning-making, in which the learner is able to interpret the reality
in which they live and embrace change, resulting in self-realization. As John Dewey (1934/2005)
relates, through reflection the one engaged becomes cognizant of a shift in understanding, and by
drawing a distinction between the old and new understanding, the individual is transformed. The
students and teacher on the beach made meaning together within the experience. The students
moved from a mindset of fearful anxiety toward the “other” creatures that live in the sea (which
had the capacity to injure them), to a new understanding and respect for those creatures. This was
aided by a heartfelt sense of empowerment that sprang from their ability to physically and
intellectually be in community with the sea and its inhabitants.
For me, this type of learning and knowing can be approached and understood through an
ecofeminist lens as aesthetic, embodied, and connected. In the next sections, I explore the
research that centers on aesthetic experience as it applies to learning.
The Field of Aesthetic Learning
The research into learning aesthetics grows out of philosophy, culture, psychology and
even learning styles (Austring & Sorensen, 2012). Traditionally, we associate aesthetic
experiences with works of art, but Dewey (1934/2005) argued that aesthetics taken from the term
aesthetikos (capable of sensory perception) refers to sensory experiences had in all aspects of
life—including learning (Moroye & Uhrmacher, 2009).

68
We have an innate human need to discern structure, order, and coherence, which Ross
(1984) describes as the "restless seeking after meaning" (p. 145), and Liston (2001) characterizes
as "epistemic hunger." Our aesthetic sense is the basis for all our perceptions of coherence (Ross,
1984). Additionally, we have a “mind-brain imperative to detect pattern and connect those
patterns generating more complex or novel models or metaphors” (Liston, 2001, p. 129). In this
way we relate to all we meet, the delightful and the disgusting, in order to understand them and
assimilate them into our own personhood (Ross, 1984).
According to Liston (2001), the rational mind understands a thing or concept by
distinguishing it from other things. These distinguishing qualities are not inherent in that which
is known, rather they help us to know by differentiating one thing from another (Liston, 2001).
As the individual acts on the world, the world acts on the individual and accordingly each is
changed by the other (Hohr, 2002). Conceptual knowledge is incorporated into aesthetic
learning in a way that holistically impacts the learner by integrating emotions and values with the
conceptual knowledge and skills (Girod & Wong, 2002). Consequently, when learning includes
the sensory and enlivened we can say learning is aesthetic (Hohr, 2013; Uhrmacher, 2009). For
Hohr (2013), the ability to engage such holistic, aesthetic learning is dependent upon cultivation.
Naming this type of aesthetic learning ‘enliving’, Hohr (2013) describes it as “the object of
continuous negotiation and struggle in art, play, rite and celebration, just to name some of the
areas of meaning production, which holds our lifeworld together and develops it” (p.37); such
learning is a mode of experience within which moral choices are made.
Contexts of Aesthetic Learning Experiences
Whether in the classroom, on the stage, or at the art museum, the situation and
circumstances of the experiential environment are important. One group of educators looking at
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the application of John Dewey’s ideas within educational settings at the K-12 and college level,
is known as The Dewey Ideas Group, at Michigan State University. Some members of the group
whose research is highlighted in this section are David Wong, Kevin Pugh, Mark Girod, Todd
Twyman, Steven Wojcikiewicz, and Shane Cavanaugh. The Dewey Ideas Group examines
Dewey’s work in aesthetics to conceptualize what they termed “transformative experience” in
the educational environment (Wong & Pugh, 2001). In order to investigate the contexts and
qualities that invite transformative learning experiences Girod, Twyman, and Wojcikiewicz
(2010), compared two approaches to teaching science. The first, which they termed a ‘cognitive
rational approach’, involved students learning to use the tools, terms, and methods of scientific
inquiry, was compared with a second approach, which they termed a ‘Deweyan aesthetics
pedagogy’ that sought to spark imagination, and insights, and to inspire fruitful action. The
traditional approach included student goals of building vocabulary and conceptual models,
utilizing inquiry skills, and utilizing science process skills like measuring and graphing. In the
transformative, aesthetic approach the teaching focused on science's powerful and important
ideas, helping students re-see the world in order to see it differently than before, creating a sense
of wonderment, emphasizing personalized experience which included asking students to "try on"
ideas, the teacher modeling passion and enthusiasm for the subject of science, and scaffolding
the aesthetic experiences in a meaningful way (Girod, et al., 2010)
The researchers found that in the traditional, cognitive approach, the student outcomes, as
hoped, included conceptual understanding, along with a greater proficiency with the tools, terms
and method of scientific inquiry. In the aesthetic, transformative approach, students did learn to
see the world differently, and to act differently as a result of the new learning. Additionally, they
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gained a conceptual understanding of the content that matched that of the students in the first
group and interestingly, they seemed to forget less over time (Girod, et al., 2010).
The big ideas of any field are not dry facts but instead, they are those ideas that are
compelling and motivating (Hohr, 2002). To that end, the teacher’s use of metaphor can be a tool
for enabling students to engage with science topics in effective ways (Girod & Wong, 2002;
Cavanaugh, 2014). As noted earlier in this chapter, metaphor acts as a lens through which
learners can make sense of what they are learning (Girod & Wong, 2002); it assists
understanding by explaining something complicated using the likeness of another thing that is
familiar. Our perception of the world is accessed through our senses- sight, sound, touch - and
these perceptions are interpreted through metaphors (Liston, 2001). The act of constructing
metaphors is a mark of our humanity, since through those constructions we ascribe meaning to
the world, define its boundaries and endow symbolic interpretation on all we encounter (Liston,
2001). When utilizing metaphor as a aesthetic learning tool, the teacher must "unpack" the
metaphoric image by deciding where it fits and where it falls short as a descriptor for a subject
(Girod & Wong, 2002). In the classroom setting, the metaphor used by the teacher to ascribe
meaning to the subject must be sufficient to engage the students' attention and interest, and the
teacher must "formalize the language" which is to translate the metaphor into the formal
language of field of study being engaged (Girod & Wong, 2002). Metaphor’s ability to engage
the subjective, sensory properties of experience is what gives it power within an aesthetic
experience.
Just as a metaphor paints a mind picture, the still and moving images found in
photographs and videos can also be helpful (Cavanaugh, 2014). According to Cavanaugh (2014)
powerful images can highlight what she calls the scientific sublime by “calling attention to what
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is astonishing, terrifying, or unifying about the content" (p. 66). As a result of experiences of the
scientific sublime, which draw heavily on Dewey’s explanations of aesthetic and educative
experiences, the learner begins to see with new eyes and therefore be in the world differently
(Cavanaugh, 2014; Dewey, 1934/2005). In an aesthetic experience, the learner is driven forward
by anticipation, which leads to a sense of drama or excitement that is a natural motivation for
learning (Cavanaugh, 2014). Through anticipation “learners get a sense of what might be and
are inspired to move forward. Thus, learning not only results in understanding, it is also
compelled by it” (Girod & Wong, 2002, p. 204). Additionally, according to Cavanaugh (2014),
the teacher must model the affective qualities of the material, allowing herself to be swept up,
eager, moved, appreciative, and inspired.
Utilizing the professional art world as their setting, Csikszentmihalyi and Robinson
(1990) interviewed fifty-seven art curators about encounters with works of art. They found the
responses described could fit into one of four categories: emotional, sensorial, intellectual, and
communicative reactions (Csikszentmihalyi & Robinson, 1990). In similar research into museum
experiences Latham (2007) and Falk (2010) found that rather than dull the emotions, frequent
repeated exposure to works of art seemed instead to evoke a high level of emotional response.
This confirms the strong connection between the intellectual or cognitive dimension, which
includes the viewer’s understanding of the work and its cultural and historical significance, and
his or her emotional response (Csikszentmihalyi & Robinson, 1990; Falk, 2010; Latham, 2007).
Further, the researchers noted that communication with a work of art could involve all the
dimensions previously mentioned: emotional, sensorial (in this case visual) and intellectual, or it
could rest more heavily on one (Csikszentmihalyi & Robinson, 1990; Falk, 2010; Latham, 2007).
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Our interactions with art objects epitomize what it means to undergo an experience
(Pugh, 2002). “The arts do more than provide us with fleeting moments of elation and delight.
They expand our horizons. They contribute meaning and value to future experience. They
modify our ways of perceiving the world, thus leaving us and the world itself irrevocably
changed” (Dewey, 1934/2005, p. 33). In an experience, a person comes to see some aspect of the
world in a new way, to find meaning in this newly realized aspect of the world, and to value this
new way of seeing (Pugh, 2002). To enable museum visitors to approach art works through
multiple doorways, Latham (2007) envisions museums providing tools to highlight the
perceptual and emotional aspects of works, rather than solely providing historical information.
Paralleling museum visitors’ multifaceted approaches to engage with works of art,
Moroye and Uhrmacher (2009) found that learners approach a body of knowledge in similar
ways. While some may be engaged in a topic intellectually from the start, others need to be
emotionally engaged. Still others need to bond by feeling a communicative connection with a
person, a particular time period or a cultural style, or some combination of these (Moroye &
Uhrmacher, 2009). In addition, many students require a sensory connection (Moroye &
Uhrmacher, 2009). So, whether they are emotional, intellectual, or sensorial, aesthetic learning
experiences require attention to multiple modes of connection with the topic (Moroye &
Uhrmacher, 2009). According to Pugh (2002) and Uhrmacher (2009), the use of themes provides
an additional context that can enhance the ability of learners to connect with concepts through
emotional, intellectual, and/or sensory experience.
As the research indicates, pedagogy and the situations and relationships engendered in
the educational space structure many of the important frameworks for aesthetic learning. Within
the individual, where the boundaries of self and society are permeable exists a space that can
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present an equally important context for aesthetic learning (Hohr, 2013: Austring & Sorensen,
2012). This space is known as the potential space (Winnicott, 1971).
According to Winnicott (1971), when an infant is born, his or her external experience
begins in play, expands into creative living and from there into cultural life. Between inner
psychic reality and the actual external world is the potential space, where experience is located
(Winnicott, 1971). Potential space is highly variable and individual and in this space, each
person gradually acquires the norms and characteristics of a culture (Winnicott, 1971). The
potential space can also be thought of as an oasis in which the individual can develop an
understanding of the self, the other, and the world that we are all a part of, while learning to
share inner, subjective experiences with the other (Hohr, 2002; Winnicott, 1971). Thus, play and
aesthetic expressions becomes an arena for development of experiences that help the individual
establish her or himself in a balance between the inner and the outer world (Hohr, 2002;
Winnicott, 1971). A relationship between the self and the other is the basis of all forms of
knowing (Hohr, 2002; Winnicott, 1971). The potential space is not reserved for the small child,
but accompanies the individual throughout his or her life (Hohr, 2002; Winnicott, 1971). Rather
than simply describing polarities, the space between is that which defines our humanity (Hohr,
2002; Winnicott, 1971). Human beings are natural and spiritual; they are individual and
simultaneously part of a community (Hohr, 2002; Liston, 2001; Palmer, 2007; Winnicott,
1971). This is why different ways of knowing have a synergistic, dynamic effect when they are
brought together; they utilize the potential space (Hohr, 2002; Rasmussen, 2014; Winnicott,
1971).
Just as within lived, three-dimensional spaces we can explore contexts for aesthetic
learning, within the potential space we can explore imagination as a context for aesthetic
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learning (Hohr, 2002). “The potential space between baby and mother, between child and family,
between individual and society, depends on experience that leads to trust. It can be characterized
as something sacred to the individual, as this is where the individual experiences its creative
force” (Austring &. Sørensen, 2011, p. 110). This location of symbolic play is where all creative
activities are founded, and where the individual establishes him or herself in a balance between
the inner and the outer world (Austring &. Sørensen, 2011; Hohr, 2002;Winnicott, 1971).
In a child's development, the emergence of play signals a leap from actions that are
reflexive to those than indicate an ability to formulate a reasoned response (Hohr, 2002).
Through play, the child develops a passion for rules because by suspending morality within play,
the child may then try out moral law and thus see its usefulness (Hohr, 2002). Utilizing mind and
body, imaginative play can take many forms that allow for communication and reflection (Hohr,
2002).
As the research I have shared indicates, aesthetic learning is fostered within both
educational and cultural contexts. Additionally, the potential space is an intermediate, congruent
space in which boundaries are permeable and which serves as an important context of aesthetic
learning.
Qualities of Aesthetic Learning Experiences
Aesthetic learning is emotional, and situated; it engages the whole person and it arouses a
willingness to be changed or transformed (Biscotte, 2015; Csikszentmihalyi & Robinson, 1990;
Moroye & Uhrmacher, 2009; Uhrmacher, 2009; Wong, 2007). A sense of emotion arises from
aesthetic learning experiences since within them there is passion, sensation, and an anticipation
of what is to come that cannot be separated from the doing or making (Biscotte, 2015).
According to Dewey (1938), emotion is what holds the aesthetic learning experience together as

75
first the learner becomes excited to do or know something and then feels anticipation, which acts
to carry the experience along (Biscotte, 2015; Dewey, 1938). These experiences are non-dualistic
in that they involve the whole person as exemplified by the way that wonder and interest involve
the senses and the intellect working in tandem (Biscotte, 2015; Wong, 2007). Aesthetic learning
is at once rational and irrational, cognitive and emotional, individual and collective (Biscotte,
2015; Wong, 2007).
By enabling the learner to weave together a rich network of conceptual knowledge with
appreciation for the beauty and power of subject matter, aesthetic learning experiences lead the
student to engage further and more holistically in the world (Girod et al., 2010; Girod & Wong,
2002; Moroye & Uhrmacher, 2009). “A person who truly learns exists transformed, not just of
mind, but of heart, eye, and body. Education should leave us different, understanding more,
seeing differently, and willing to act in accordance with those differences” (Girod et al., 2010, p.
804). The result is the metamorphosis of the learner’s perceptions of the world and of self (Girod
& Wong, 2002).
Educative, aesthetic learning experiences are framed by anticipation, continuity, and
consummation (Dewey, 1934). As previously stated, emotion is what holds aesthetic experience
together as the learner decides that she is excited to do or know something and feels anticipation.
She then utilizes prior experience and builds upon that with the new experience; this is continuity
(Dewey, 1938/1997). The aesthetic experience is consummated when she reflects on what has
transpired (Biscotte, 2015; Dewey, 1938/1997; Wong, 2007). Embedded in the transformation is
a willingness to be changed or transformed (Csikszentmihalyi & Robinson, 1990; Falk, 2010;
Latham, 2007; Moroye & Uhrmacher, 2009; Uhrmacher, 2009), and finally, there is a sense of
venturing into the unknown, of opening oneself to something new or to understanding the
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experience of another (Moroye & Uhrmacher, 2009; Uhrmacher, 2009). Aesthetic learning
experiences reside on a continuum from short but memorable to life changing (Biscotte, 2015).
For my purposes, I am referring to those experiences that are generative rather than destructive
as aesthetic experiences.
Rasmussen (2010) uncovered the qualities inherent in aesthetic learning experiences
through utilization of the unfolding of the ‘good enough’ drama within a practice-led research
paradigm. This research design allowed qualities to develop and be revealed in a way that
overcame the deductivist, empiricist ideal. It also offered a way around a black and white,
'following-a-prescribed-route' type of thinking, allowing both researchers and participants to hold
many truths or perspectives in mind (Rasmussen, 2010). Divergent problems, as exemplified in
the many paths available within an unfolding drama, force participants to strain themselves to
arrive at a place that feels beyond themselves; holding many truths at once allows opposites to be
reconciled in the living situation, and thus seen as parts of the same whole (Rasmussen, 2010).
This type of applied theater research builds on the relation or reconnection of sensuous
experience and propositional knowing that historically has been marginalized by the dominance
of a perceived split between the two (Rasmussen, 2014). Such an approach embraces a radical
epistemology in which knowledge is not a given, but instead is generated through encounters
with practice, participants, and materials (Rasmussen, 2014). Through applied theater research,
Rasmussen (2014) sought to answer the question: “What epistemological thinking is embedded
in the arts and how do we understand such thinking as it relates to an embodied form of sensory
thinking/knowing?” (p. 22). He found that generated knowledge exemplifies the qualities of
aesthetic learning inherent in Dewey’s (1934/2005) concept of experience, which stresses the
balance between doing and undergoing.
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Hohr (2002) also finds “balanced interaction between doing and undergoing … makes the
aesthetic quality a prerequisite of true experience" (p.59). For him, beauty is the bridge that
connects doing and undergoing, characterized by a working together of instinct and spirit (Hohr,
2002). This idea of beauty is revealed in the way that aesthetic activity softens clear-cut
concepts, making them fluid and open to revision, and allowing for the integration of subjectivity
and will (Hohr, 2002). When reason and feeling are reconciled, the result is a state of grace,
wherein the individual has achieved the beautiful soul (Hohr, 2002).
Final Thoughts
The fine arts hold no exclusive rights to aesthetic learning as it can be found in many
different contexts. In fact, rather than ascribing the context of aesthetic learning to any “where” it
may be more appropriate to assign it to the potential space which characterizes the acceptance of
the connection between the subjective inner self and the external other (Austring & Sørensen,
2012; Hohr, 2012; Winnicott, 1971). As I stated previously, this space, the space between,
defines our humanity (Buber, 1947/2002; Austring & Sørensen, 2012; Liston, 2001; Palmer,
2007). As human beings, we are simultaneously natural, spiritual, individual and connected to
others (Hohr, 2002).
While the physical spaces that surround aesthetic learning experiences may vary greatly,
the pedagogical context is impactful since presenting the powerful ideas of a subject, helping the
student re-see the world in order to see it differently, creating a sense of wonderment,
emphasizing personalized experience, modeling passion and enthusiasm for the subject, and
scaffolding the aesthetic experiences in a meaningful way all help create the setting that
encourages aesthetic learning (Girod, et al., 2010; Pugh & Girod, 2007). Tools like metaphor and
visual images add to the teacher’s ability to communicate the beauty and power enfolded within
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a body of knowledge (Cavanaugh, 2014; Csikszentmihalyi & Robinson, 1990; Latham, 2007;
Girod & Wong, 2002).
Though Liston (2001), Palmer (2007), and Van Rossum and Hamer (2010) were not
theorizing about aesthetic learning per se, I claim their thinking as threads in the fabric of what
constitutes such experience. Meaning-making, generated within the learner’s community of
learning, resonates as subjective sensory experience. Even when the learning takes place
completely within the imagination, as when a learner “builds a castle in the air” (Dewey,
1938/1997, p. 44) the sensory effect can be the same as with a physical experience. Parker
Palmer (2007) offers the example of his own mentor, his college philosophy professor whose gift
for narrative was so great, he was able to bring Marx, Hegel, Durkheim, Weber and Troeltsch to
life for his students:
The passion with which he lectured was not only for his subject but also for us to
know his subject. He wanted us to meet and learn from the constant companions
of his intellect and imagination, and he made those introductions in a way that
was deeply integral to his own nature...
Through this teacher and his lectures, some of us joined a powerful form of
community marked by the ability to talk with the dead. This is not a mark of
madness but of an educated person. Learning to speak and listen in that invisible
community of history and thought makes one’s world immeasurably larger and
forever changes one’s life. (p. 140)
A direct physical experience is not mandatory for an aesthetic learning experience to result.
Through a medium of some sort, we can learn through the experience of others. The arts - drama,
dance, music, poetry, prose, architecture, and the visual arts – can provide such a medium. In
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Palmer’s example provided above, the teacher’s use of dramatic narrative brought historic
figures to life for his students. In the same way, music, art, and performance have the ability to
translate the artist’s experience to others in a way that is more sensorily direct than if that
experience were simply described. In my own life, books have provided me with an
understanding of human nature that eluded me in direct experience. In my work as an art teacher,
I appreciate the ability of students to communicate, through their own art, ideas for which they
lack verbal skills. Whether the art of a skilled adult or a young student, to one who is open to
receive what the work communicates about the experience of the artist, there is an opportunity to
be changed.
We access this radical epistemology of generated knowledge (Rasmussen, 2014) or
meaning making (Liston, 2001) through aesthetic learning. Aesthetic learning has the ability to
access symbolic modes of expression that enable communication about that which is
unspeakable, or less dramatically stated, at least difficult to put into words (Austring & Sørensen,
2012). Aesthetic learning is engaged throughout our lives, building on our primary, empirical
experiences by providing a medium for those experiences to dialectically interact with symbolic
learning (the learning we acquire once we have language) (Austring & Sørensen, 2012).
“Aesthetics are a sensuous symbolic form that contain an interpretation of ourselves and the
world and which are particularly capable of communicating from, to, and about emotions”
(Austring & Sørensen, 2011, p. 68). Standing in contrast to conceptual learning, aesthetic
learning embraces anything that can be sensed or experienced and through which a type of
sensory knowledge is gained, (Austring & Sørensen, 2012).
Interactions with works of art can provide aesthetic learning experiences but they are not
the only catalyst of such experiences. As the science teachers in the Dewey Study Group at
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Michigan State University discovered, a teacher can provided aesthetic learning opportunities by
modeling passion for their subject, creating a sense of wonderment, connecting the experience to
other cognitive knowledge, presenting the powerful ideas of the subject, and helping students to
re-see the world in order to see it differently (Girod et al., 2010). As my story of the science
teacher and students on the beach at the beginning of this chapter illustrates, the teacher’s
understanding of the intellectual and emotional situation of the students worked in dialogue with
his conceptual and emotional knowledge of marine ecology to frame the experience for the
students. He shared his passion for the subject through word and action, demonstrating that
human beings can interact without fear with such fearsome creatures, inspiring a sense of
wonderment. Communicating love and respect for the sea and its inhabitants in a way that the
children could “read” more effectively than spoken language, the teacher presented the powerful
ideas of the interconnection of all creatures, with the formidable, generative forces within our
vast oceans. As a result, the students could re-see the world and were changed in the re-seeing.
The subject was centered in that small community of learning and webs of connection and circles
of living and dying became metaphors to shape the students’ understanding. This exemplifies the
radical, ecofeminist epistemology in which students and teacher made-meaning together and
which I characterize as aesthetic, embodied, and connected.
It seems that in today’s educational climate, those aspects of learning that are easily
measurable, like skill development, overshadow those aesthetic qualities which increase
emotional engagement and thereby increase the meaning for the learner. In an ironic twist,
because of the increase of emotional investment inherent in aesthetic learning, such engagement
can assist in the development of skills, though such an approach is under-utilized (Hohr, 2013).
Within the field of education, the acquisition of facts and ability to memorize has had the main
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focus and we tend to think of emotion simply as an aspect of motivation (Hohr, 2013). Such
thinking falls short of appreciating the richness of the role emotion plays in learning. Emotion is
not just what makes us learn, but deeply woven into our evolved selves, it inspires us to learn
(Hohr, 2013). A sense of emotion arises from aesthetic learning experiences because within them
there is passion, sensation, and anticipation of what is to come that cannot be separated from the
doing or making (Biscotte, 2015).
Because an aesthetic learning experience arouses a willingness to be changed or
transformed, it cannot be simply handed to another, instead the learner must seek it (Biscotte,
2015; Csikszentmihalyi & Robinson, 1990; Moroye & Uhrmacher, 2009; Uhrmacher, 2009;
Wong, 2007). This suggests an epistemology in which knowledge, or meaning-making (Liston,
2001) is not a given but is generated through encounters (Rasmussen, 2014). Aesthetic learning
allows students to access ways of knowing that are connected to the subjective dimensions of
human experience (Ross, 1984). It has been said that knowledge begins when we are intrigued
about something, but that intrigue, that epistemic hunger (Liston, 2001), begins as a result of a
subject calling out to us, as a result of that subject's action on us (Palmer, 2007).
While we might look at aesthetic learning as separate from conceptual, cognitive learning
for purposes of understanding how learning is structured, as learning functions in reality, the two
aspects are intertwined (Girod et al., 2010; Girod & Wong, 2002; Moroye & Uhrmacher, 2009).
The conceptual and the affective are interwoven; they “color” each other and function together
(Girod et al., 2010; Girod & Wong, 2002; Moroye & Uhrmacher, 2009).
In this chapter I have developed the idea of learning as an aesthetic endeavor. When we
look beyond learning as the acquisition of memorized facts, or as problem solving, or the ability
to reason deductively, we can see that while these are important within the learning process, they
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are partial. Not wrong, just incomplete. By tapping into an ecofeminist epistemology that views
knowing as a paradoxical wholeness within the oppositions of each human being’s unique
abilities, experience, intellect, emotions, and spirit, we make-meaning, bringing our wholeness to
bear on new thoughts and experiences. Rather than deductively picking the cloth of learning
apart to its individual threads and stopping there with a tattered, pitiful, bit of nothing, as
educators, we must become adept at wholeness: the wonder of big ideas, the passion we feel for
the subject, and the Joy that results from embrace of paradoxes. Aesthetic learning can be
understood as learning that involves the whole individual, arising from a subjective, sensory
engagement, in interaction with prior experience and knowledge to leave the learner transformed.
The dialogical nature of the interaction of subjective experience and objective knowledge
working to create the wholeness of aesthetic learning is exemplified within our human
physiology in the way the wired and hormonal aspects of our brains interact dialogically as they
function (Chatterjee, 2014a). These similarities highlight a physiological potential for
approaching aesthetic learning, which I investigate further in Chapter 5 (Austring & Sørensen,
2012; Chatterjee, 2014a).
In the next chapter I lay out an ecofeminist framework to provide the basis for critiquing
the ‘logic of domination’ (Warren, 2000) that animates our current approach to education in
which the mind is dominant over the body. An ecofeminist framework assists me with
encouraging an ecological epistemology in which knowing is not simply a function of conceptual
understanding, but is integrated into the whole person, body, mind, and spirit, and which honors
the individual’s unique cultural location.
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CHAPTER 3
WE CAN’T SEE UNTIL WE’RE READY:
AN ECOFEMINIST THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
It was a warm spring day; perfect for taking my fourth grade elementary art students
outdoors, to our school’s butterfly garden to paint en plein air, just like the impressionist painters
whom we had recently studied. Our work required students to utilize easels, and as I handed
them out I said, “Let me know if you need help carrying your easel, since they are heavy.” The
only student to ask for help was a boy and in the moment before I replied to him, my teaching
life of more than thirty years flashed before my eyes. I pictured myself as I was before my
doctoral journey, saying something like, “Wh a-a-t? Let me see your muscles!” Or worse, “Wha-a-t? Show me your man-card!” I realized that the idea ‘a man must be strong,’ was animating
the impulse to correct my student. A huge feeling of sadness descended on me as I thought of all
the children I must have tried to normalize over the years. What should ‘new-me’ say, I
wondered? Even as that question entered my mind, I spoke, “Excellent job asking for help, let’s
carry this together.”
At another time, as I helped students out of their cars at morning carpool, I caught myself
complimenting the girls for their pretty hair bows or something do to with their appearance. Oh
no! How many times per day did my students hear the message ‘girls must be pretty?’ Once
again, I was forced to confront my own complicity in the normalizing of my students. I had been
subtly conveying the messages ‘girls must be pretty’ and ‘boys must be strong’ for all these
years. It was a stunning revelation.
As someone who has first hand knowledge of being overlooked or underestimated
because of my gender, it would seem to make sense that I should naturally look critically at
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normalizing for traditional gender roles, and yet, I did not. To open my eyes, required the reading
and writing I have done toward my doctorate. This suggests to me that, because they are subtle
and frequently non-verbally communicated, cultural norms are very powerful; they are difficult
to become aware of and even when such awareness is our desire, difficult to weed out. Ideals like
male strength and female beauty are woven in to our unconscious from an early age, and thus, as
my example indicates, women cannot be exonerated from the creation of patriarchy (Li, 2007).
Though I identify as a woman, I have been colonized within my own culture and cultural
tradition (Li, 2007).
I know that I am not finished ‘chewing on’ the experiences I related above. They will
continue to reveal lessons about mindset and learning, and about my own journey, but for the
purposes of my theoretical framework, they demonstrates the idea that when confronted with a
new way of seeing the world, a way that differs from how we have been socialized, we cannot
‘see’ until we are ready. The picture that ecofeminism paints enables me to interrogate my own
‘girls-must-be pretty and boys-must-be-strong’ mindset, and therefore, my hope is that such a
lens will prove helpful to my others. I have chosen to utilize an ecofeminist framework in this
dissertation in order to illuminate how interconnection and mutuality can bring clarity to the
manner in which hierarchy and dominance impact learning.
For most Americans, ideas of student and teacher accountability, standardized testing,
merit pay for teachers, vouchers, and charter schools seem sensible in their embrace of the
market model of reform (Ravitch, 2016). In this chapter I demonstrate that a “logos logic”
metaphor of hierarchy rather than “lemma logic” web of connection (Jun, 2014) underlies our
collective Western consciousness. According to Jun (2014) these two ways of knowing gain their
names from the Greek “logos” which provided the link between rational discourse and the
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world's rational structure, and “lemma” derived from the Chinese characters which mean to take
hold of, or grasp intuitively. Thus, Lemma logic honors an epistemology of the “dynamic
paradoxical unity of opposites” (Jun, 2014, p. 321).
What I suggest is a paradigm shift in the framework that structures our approach to
education and our view of what constitutes learning (Chircop, 2008). I theorize that how we
behave toward other humans and the earth is informed by the same logic that informs our
thoughts about learning (Chircop, 2008). An ecofeminist theoretical framework makes these
connections visible. Relevant beyond a nature-gender connection, for purposes of framing my
dissertation, an ecofeminist theoretical framework provides a means of analyzing oppressive
conceptual frameworks that embrace hierarchy and domination, which lack an appreciation for
meaningful difference (Chircop, 2008).
Early Ecofeminism
From the 1870s through the beginning of the twentieth century, the industrial revolution
in the United States had the result of dividing gender relations in a way that an agricultural
economy had not. Baca-Zinn, Eitzen, and Wells (1993) termed this the "doctrine of separate
spheres" indicating that women who once needed to produce bread, butter, soap, or clothing
could now purchase those items, though the ability to purchase commodities was limited by the
income of that household (Mann, 2011). The doctrine of separate spheres freed those women
who were well off to participate in environmental activism, yet, to be socially acceptable these
activities were defended as extensions of their traditional roles (Mann, 2011). Environmental
activism that was undertaken by these well-to-do women was therefore called "municipal
housekeeping" (Mann, 2011). Thousands of women participated in the "housekeeping" issues of
ensuring clean water, air, and food for their families (Mann, 2011; Merchant, 2016).
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During this era, as long as women related environmental interests to those of their cities
or their children or homes, such activities were deemed proper by society (Mann, 2011). Early
Ecofeminists included Chicago's Mary McDowell, who studied waste disposal in Europe in order
to transform Chicago's unhealthy system (Washington, 2005), and Jane Addams and the Hull
House women's club who used scientific data to enable reforms that improved the incidence of
typhoid and other "filth diseases" (Merchant, 2016).
Ellen Swallow Richards (1843-1911), the founder of the municipal housekeeping
movement, is most often credited as the "mother" of ecofeminism (Gottlieb, 2005; Hayden 1985;
Merchant 2016; Yudkin 1982). She championed clean water quality, food inspection, and
workplace ventilation (Mann, 2011). Her field eventually morphed into home economics
obscuring her connection to the environment (Mann, 2011).
Black Women's clubs also engaged in municipal housekeeping activities, though in the
early 20th century these women lacked the access to social services that were utilized by the
white women's clubs (Lerner, 1979). Yet even with limited resources, black women undertook
home and neighborhood clean-up activities and worked to ensure clean air and water (Lerner,
1979; Mann, 2011). According to Fannie Barrier Williams (1855-1944) “The club movement
among colored women reaches into the sub-social conditions of the entire race. . . .[while]
among white women the club is the forward movement of the already uplifted” (1900, p. 383).
Writing in the mid to late 20th century, novelist Zora Neale Hurston noted the prevailing
stereotypes which negatively depicted African Americans as insensitive to nature had changed
little from the early 20th century, “it [would] remain impossible for the majority to conceive of a
Negro experiencing a deep and abiding love and not just the passion of sex. That a great mass of
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Negroes can be stirred by the pageants of spring and fall; the extravaganza of summer, and the
majesty of winter . . . is ruled out” (1998, p. 171).
Beautifully characterizing the deep connection between black women’s experience,
aesthetics, and nature, and standing in contrast to the racist thinking of the day are the words of
the first published black poet in the United States, Phyllis Wheatley (c. 1752-1784), who praised
the sunset in her poem "An Hymn to Evening" (1773): “Through all the heav’ns what beauteous
dyes are spread! / But the west glories in the deepest red: / So may our breasts with ev’ry virtue
glow, / The living temples of our God below!”
As Merchant (2016) describes, “[t]he rationale for women’s involvement lay in the effect
of waterways on every American home: Pure water meant health; impure meant disease and
death” (p. 116). While most of these women did not challenge traditional gender roles and
therefore were not by definition "feminist," they did use networks of other women and women's
clubs to solidify political support for these early environmental movements (Mann, 2011). In the
mid-twentieth century, French feminist Françoise D’Eaubonne coined the term ‘ecofeminism’
(Glazebrook, 2002). In her work, Le Féminisme Ou La Mort, she established the connection
between the exploitation of women's reproductive capacity and the exploitation of natural
resources for material production (D’Eaubonne, 1974).
When ecofeminists insist that feminism and environmentalism are inherently connected,
their claim is not so much that feminist worries are environmentally grounded, though sometimes
they may be, but rather that "environmental issues warrant feminist analysis" (Glazebrook, 2002,
p.13). If we accept that, "nobody starts with a sum zero, and ... everyone’s circumstances are
rooted in past events" (Chircop, 2008, p. 144), we can see that history is told from the
perspective of the one telling it. Remembering this, we must embrace a history, or herstory, of
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pluralities in which perspectives of gender, race, class, ethnicity, and religion are interwoven
(Chircop, 2008). "Ecofeminism, as a philosophical and political movement, aims to reveal
oppressive ideologies, practices and structures within patriarchal social systems that support
these interconnected exploitations, and seeks their elimination; as such, it is diagnostic and future
oriented" (Chircop, 2008, pp. 138-139). Western environmentally destructive practices have
always taken place in the context of patriarchy; the connection among women, people of color,
children, the poor, and nature, is their experiences of oppression within these patriarchal
structures (Chircop, 2008; Glazebrook, 2004).
An Overview of Ecofeminism Since the Early Days
Ecology is the study of natural communities, how they function to sustain a healthy web
of life, and how this web can become disturbed and disrupted (Odum & Barrett, 2005; Reuther,
1997). Feminism can be studied in terms of culture and consciousness, “charting the symbolic,
psychological, and cultural connection between the definition of women as inferior mentally,
morally and physically, and male monopolization of knowledge and power” (Reuther, 1997, p.
73). To understand, criticize, and ultimately overcome the hierarchy of male over female, it can
be helpful to do the same with the humans over nature hierarchy since principles of patriarchy
still animate both (Reuther, 1993; Spretnak, 2011). The Oxford dictionary defines ‘patriarchy’
as, “a system of society or government in which men hold the power and women are largely
excluded from it” (“Patriarchy”, 2017).
Power, which is exercised as control of individuals, operates in three terrains:
consciousness- what people do inside their heads; relationships- what goes on as people interact
socially; and in their bodies and behaviors- what people do with their physical presence as they
live (Fiske, 1993). Power is normalizing, in that it seeks to make society members conform; as I
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illustrated in the stories at the beginning of this chapter, patriarchal power is also invisible,
pervasive, difficult to locate, and therefore, hard to resist (Covaleskie, 1993).
As symbolic forms, both femaleness and nature are ambivalent, that is, they both
encompass opposites (Reuther, 1993). The cultural symbol of woman can comprise devalued
portions of personhood and the roles that support those (Reuther, 1993). Alternately, ‘woman’
also represents a source of life (Reuther, 1993). In the same manner, nature can be understood as
beneath humans, therefore within the realm of what must be controlled and fought against,
while simultaneously, a location of blessed abundance (Reuther, 1993).
Ecofeminists note a symbolic and structural link between how a society treats women and
how that society treats nature (Reuther, 1993). They seek to analyze the male monopolization of
knowledge and power underlying the domination of women and the environment within
patriarchal cultures, and by exposing the interconnection between these two types of domination,
thus reveal a more complete picture (Kings, 2017). The dualistic conceptions of nature/culture or
man/woman seek the preservation of both humans as ecologically superior and men as culturally
superior (Mallory, 2010; Spretnak, 1990). Such conceptions are historically rooted as both
ancient Hebrew and Greek cultures promoted this thinking (Reuther, 1993; Spretnak, 1990).
Because ecofeminism uncovers how issues of oppression and domination are
interconnected, it becomes a helpful tool for interrogating the idea of a hierarchy in which the
mind is dominant over the body and for weaving in metaphors of emergent growth, holism, and
connectedness throughout my dissertation (Glazebrook, 2002; Warren, 2000). Additionally,
because ecofeminism is by definition, multidisciplinary, it suggests solutions that are
interconnected and multifaceted rather than isolated and one-dimensional (Glazebrook, 2002). At
its best, ecofeminism is a focus term for philosophies that “integrate human society and nature
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and aim for an entirely new intellectual/perceptual/sensate/experience of self and world” (Lahar,
1991, p. 43); thus ecofeminism provides an excellent framework to illuminate a holistic view of
learning. An ecofeminist analysis allows for looking at educational issues in a way that is rich
and multifaceted; therefore this approach can offer solutions that reflect interconnected solutions
rather than those that result from linear, cause and effect, thinking (Chircop, 2008).
According to Warren (2000), ecofeminist theory connects the environment, oppressive
social structures, and women's experience. The current educational paradigm belongs in that triad
since its failure to meet the learning needs of students springs from the same institutional
structures of power and privilege that fail women and the environment (Chircop, 2008; Warren,
2000; Ravitch, 2016).
Ecofeminism is a philosophy that is action oriented in that it seeks not only to describe
and theorize around issues of exploitation and oppression but also to reconstruct a more just,
viable social order which, at its best promotes an intellectual, perceptual, and sensate
understanding (Chircop, 2008; Lahar, 1991). For the ecofeminist, recognition of an
interrelatedness and interconnection that incorporates difference and distinctness is key (Chircop,
2008; Glazebrook, 2004; Plumwood, 1996; Warren, 1996).
There are connections between the ways a society views women and nature and that
society's approach to education including the domination of what constitutes "good” knowledge,
as well as how that knowledge should be imparted (Chircop, 2008). "The power of ecofeminism
can be seen in its analysis of oppressive conceptual frameworks as they relate to the treatment of
women and nature, and the acknowledgement of meaningful difference that does not sanction
domination" (Chircop, 2008, p. 136). Ecofeminist philosophy advances the idea that "all forms
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of unjustified domination in the west are based on the same western, patriarchal logic of
domination" (Chircop, 2008, p. 138).
King (1989) frames ecofeminism as the practice of hope that believes the future can be
created by intentional human beings who will take responsibility for it. When we recognize our
interconnection, the result is compassion and a heightened ability to feel for, and identify with,
other beings (King, 1989). Ecofeminism seeks to confront the fallacies of biologically
determined gender roles and value-laden polarizations to find connection (Lahar, 1991). When
we understand ourselves as situated within a site of relations that extends beyond our skin,
beyond our humanity and beyond our time, within a symbiotic field of exchange, we can come to
understand ourselves as part of an extensive field of "relationsinprocess” that can never be
claimed as completely our own (Polk, 2003). Additionally, contrary to our notion of the self as
masterful and autonomous, the symbiotic self is characterized by cooperation and negotiation
(Polk, 2003).
Ecofeminism is useful beyond its ability to analyze treatment of women and nature, since
shining a light on patriarchal domination illuminates marginalization because of race, class,
sexual identity, and religion and thereby, learning environments (Chircop, 2008). This
dissertation benefits from highlighting these overlapping foci to illuminate the role patriarchy has
played in establishing ideas of learning.
Sites of social change can frequently indicate sites of struggle over gender relations
(hooks, 1989), so when we link dominations by understanding, for example, that raced and
gendered concepts of nature "naturalize social inequalities and ecological crises” (Sturgeon,
1997, p. 19), we can see how, along with concepts of nature, attitudes toward education and
approaches to learning are raced and gendered as well. According to Kristin and Hipfl (2012):

92
The classroom is a racialised and gendered location of cultural production and
identity formation, where we learn to understand the world around us, to assess
who can belong and who never truly will, who rules and who does not. At a more
personal level, by attending school we can become somebody, an educated,
respected person. Or rather learn to see ourselves as a failure, not up to standards.
Schools hurt those who do not fit in easily or those who are perceived to embody
otherness. Teachers have the formidable task to be aware of the promises and
dangers of the schooling project to which they are often deeply committed.
Unfortunately, teachers often shun this task, being part of the privileged white
middle classes themselves (p. 62).
Because it makes visible interrelated systems of oppression, ecofeminism helps us to recognize
those systems of domination so that they can be dismantled (Selam, 2006). An ecofeminist
theoretical framework provides for: an epistemology that recognizes knowing as embodied and
thereby connected to an individual’s environment and culture; an ethic that is caresensitive and
rooted in the aesthetic; an analysis of oppressive conceptual frameworks; and insights into
mitigating those aspects of current approaches to education which teach children who are not
white or middle class that they are ‘other’ (Harvester & Blenkinsop, 2010; Kristín & Hipfl,
2012).
By definition, as a framework and philosophy that is an expression of shared identity,
ecofeminism is situated outside of easily definable categories and outside of the "you are not
this parameter" (Salem, 2006, p.76). It challenges the logic of domination by first seeking to
make that logic visible and once visible, to provide a direction to overcome it (Harvester &
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Blenkinsop, 2010). By framing an ecofeminist vision of learning as aesthetic, embodied, and
connected, I seek to illuminate an overlooked vista.
"Too often ignored in education...is the fact that culture and environment, or humans and
nature, are inextricably connected and that our educational policies, structures, theories,
traditions, and academic journals continue to operate as if this were not the case" (Gruenewald,
2003, p. 206). Recognizing our interdependency is a necessary component of a commitment to
biological as well as cultural diversity and a desire to end oppression of any kind (Harvester &
Blenkinsop, 2010).
...we think of intellectual knowledge as separate from sensual knowledge, and the spirit
as belonging to a different realm entirely...our experience of the world is fragmented.
Using the scientific method scientists attempt to be above the sensual experience. But
instead of being above experience, they are perceiving partially. They see the pieces
clearly, with no feeling for the whole. (Griffin, 1990, p.87)
When discourses from multiple disciplines come together, their power to communicate meaning
and thereby affect change is enhanced (Sedgwick, 1990). Ecofeminism offers a means of linking
"social and environmental justice in an educational context" (Harvester & Blenkinsop, 2010, p.
121). This ability to connect multiple disciplines makes ecofeminism useful for my purpose; to
illuminate learning as not simply an aspect of cognitive functioning but connected to culture,
environment, the body, and aesthetic experience.
Ecofeminism and Intersectionality
Within ecofeminism, essentialism debates dominated the 1980s and 1990s (Kings, 2017).
“Attempts to romanticize the relationship between women and nature by first universalizing the
experience of ‘one kind of woman’ and then appealing to some essential ‘essence’ or necessary

94
connection, leads into a trap whereby one becomes blinded to the multitude of ways in which the
concept of ‘womanhood’ is implicated in the continued constraints and exploitations experienced
by women and the natural environment” (Kings, 2017, p. 77). One important means of framing
the essentialist debate is found in intersectionality.
The term intersectionality is attributed to Kimberle Crenshaw (1989), who sought a
metaphor and conceptual framework to capture what a single axis framework could not, that is
the lived experience of black women. The metaphor of the traffic intersection, representing the
multiple, complex oppressions encountered by black women, has stood the test of time
(Crenshaw, 1989: Kings, 2017). Intersectionality can also allow for disparate approaches to
contribute to ecofeminism, encouraging the cross-examination of questions from different
theoretical viewpoints, utilizing a variety of methodological approaches (Kings, 2017). The
"intersectional project" has provided ecofeminism with the opportunity to challenge ideas of
essentialism and exclusion (Kings, 2017). While it was first used to describe the experiences of
black women, it has since expanded as an analytic tool to discuss differences among all women
(Mallory, 2010; Kings, 2017).
Despite its history of highlighting the interconnected nature of social categories such as
gender, race, and class and their impact on an individual's relationship to the natural environment
as well as that individual’s culturally derived anthropocentric modes of thought, it is not correct
to characterize early ecofeminist work as intersectional (Mallory, 2010). A conflation of
intersectionality with the imprecise use of intersectional concepts to which early ecofeminists
ascribed, “risks over-simplifying the important and often original theoretical and practical
contributions, which intersectionality has made to academia” (Kings, 2017, p. 72).
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Intersectionality is a complex, multilayered conceptual device and for that reason it can
be difficult to discuss in non-metaphorical terms (McCall, 2005; Kings, 2017). For Kings, the
metaphor of a spider web maintains the complex structure of intersectionality and the potential
sensitivity of cultural categories (Kings, 2017). By revealing how gender, race, class, sexuality,
age and other aspects of an individual's life interact in combination, rather than highlighting one
aspect alone, intersectional analysis helps to illuminate the complex relationships between
humans and the natural world, (Kings, 2017). Gendered impacts of approaches to education
influence what becomes accepted as learning; these include the way we address the educational
process, what constitutes curriculum, and how subject matter is taught. An intersectional
ecological feminist approach can highlight how the same gendered thinking that affects climate
impacts education.
Ecofeminism and intersectionality are both theories in progress, rather than static
methodologies; as such, they take into account the “mutually shaping nature of social categories,
the multi-leveled structures of power and their influence on identity and discrimination” (Kings,
2017, p. 83) and they enable us to interrogate our assumptions as we undertake research.
Ecofeminist analysis, which does not utilize intersectionality as way of examining a variety of
oppressions, can miss the understanding that discrimination is a factor of a variety of social
identities and thereby miss the opportunity to give voice to the marginalized (McCall, 2005;
Kings, 2017).
Matsuda (1991) utilizes the technique of 'asking the other question,' to further investigate
intersecting oppressions. For example, when confronted with something racist, she might ask,
'Where is the patriarchy in this?' When confronted with something that appears sexist, she might
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ask, ‘Where is the racism in this?’ (Matsuda, 1991, p. 1189). This technique allows for exposure
of hidden oppressions and prejudices, disadvantages and privileges (Matsuda, 1991).
McCall (2005) identifies the main three approaches or ‘complexities’ of intersectionality
as anticategorical, intracategorical, or intercategorical (p. 1773). Anticategorical intersectionality
attempts to deconstruct the categories themselves, and in doing so, McCall (2005) posits it as the
most complex and thus most successful form of intersectionality. An intercategorical approach,
which inaugurated intersectionality, requires that researchers temporarily adopt pre-existing
categories so that they may document the inequalities along the many axes of power (McCall,
2005). This approach falls between the two other, one of which rejects categories and the other,
that uses them strategically. An intracategorical approach focuses on particular social groups at
“neglected points of intersection” (McCall, 2005, p. 1774), and is typically used in case studies. I
find it useful to acknowledge the existence of social categories, while simultaneously
acknowledging the oppressiveness of such categories, so an intercategorical intersectional
approach provides another helpful layer in my framework.
Ecowomanism
An ecowomanist perspective "centers the religious, theological, and spiritual perspectives
of black women and women of color as they confront multilayered oppressions such as racism,
classism, sexism, and environmental injustice" (Harris, 2016, p. 27). It names black women and
women of color as an intimate part of divine existence (Harris, 2016). Ecowomanism considers
a race-class-gender analysis in combination with a environmental justice paradigm; it examines
religious ideas that promote interconnectedness, resist hierarchical value dualism, and embrace
the understanding of nature as sacred (Shantu Riley, 2003). Taking into consideration earth
ethics from women in communities of color, ecowomanism understands human, natural, and
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spiritual realms are connected and one cannot honor the self by dishonoring community (Kings,
2017; Shantu Riley, 2003).
While ecofeminism expresses the thinking that the degeneration of the earth's systems
springs from the same source as the subordinating and bullying of women, ecowomanism
expresses this burden on women of color (Kings, 2017; Shantu Riley, 2003). Within
ecowomanism there is a focus on changing patriarchal structures and adapting more feminist
views of community and relationality by adding a womanist approach to environmental justice
that includes an analysis of race-class-gender (Kings, 2017). Additionally, an ecowomanist
analysis reveals how religious and moral values can be a part of an ethic that honors the earth
and voices that speak for the earth (Kings, 2017).
Ecowomanist theorists reframe the Christian idea of domination of the earth and women
by men, moving beyond the notion of dominion and control toward a notion of stewardship and
interconnection (Baker-Fletcher, 1998). This view includes loving the earth as we love our own
bodies since as embodied beings we are connected to the earth (Baker-Fletcher, 1998; Shantu
Riley, 2003; Kings, 2017). In this way, an ecowomanist approach can critique the interlocked
oppressions of patriarchy, classism, racism, and homophobia and suggest the equal status that
plants, animals, and humans share (Kings, 2017).
An ecowomanist analysis highlights intersectional lines of oppression suffered by women
of color, and the earth, to reveal how racism, classism, and sexism shape the moral realities and
theological and ethical perspectives of African American women and women of color and
how pollution, overuse of resources, and general exploitation intersect with the ways women of
color have been exploited (Baker-Fletcher, 1998; Shantu Riley, 2003; Kings, 2017). An
ecofeminist lens can offer Western, white, affluent, Christian, feminists an opportunity to be
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more fully aware of how they profit from systems of colonialism and neocolonialism (Reuther,
1997). Western, white, affluent, Christian, feminists can repudiate these same systems by
utilizing the benefits privilege provides to empower those women who have been exploited by
these systems (Reuther, 1997).
Criticisms of Ecofeminism
As I indicated earlier in this chapter, the primary criticism of ecofeminism is that it is
grounded in an essentialist conception of women as nurturing caretakers who are natural or
closer to nature because they give birth, thus reinforcing harmful gender stereotypes
(Glazebrook, 2004). Additionally, through metaphors, women are identified with nature (e.g.
chickens, cows, hare-brained) and nature is identified as female (e.g. barren and needing to be
penetrated); in this way women are naturalized and nature is feminized and therefore, both
women and nature must be dominated (Chircop, 2008; Merchant, 1989; Warren, 1996).
Essentialism equates women with nature rather than understanding all women are not the same,
and no one set of values can be assumed to benefit all women equally (Li, 2007). According to
Li (2007), essentialism can take three forms. The first attributes women's psychological
experiences to fixed traits in their physiology, the second takes patterns visible in a single time
and place to be universal, and a third unifies groups of descriptors into a single set of attributes
labeled "man" or "woman" (Li, 2007). While some ecofeminists state the capacity of women to
give life is a powerful thing in alignment with reverence for the mother-child bond of caring
(Swanson, 2015; Noddings, 2002), others argue “such associations were created by patriarchal
and patricentric cultures to debase women” (Biehl, 1991, p. 13). I support Glazebrook’s
suggestion of combining Warren's (2000) view of strategic commonalities with Heidegger's
(1977) notion of essences to form "the conceptual insight that women’s experience is
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underwritten by a politics of location in culture and history" (Glazebrook, 2002, p. 21). Our view
of gender in the U.S. seems to be hopelessly binary in its embrace of logos logic - I am a woman,
which means not a man – rather than lemma logic– I identify as a woman, which means I am one
part of the whole of humanity (Jun, 2014). Given the binary metaphor that frames our collective
experience of gender, the challenge becomes framing women’s experience as an aspect of
cultural location and history as much as biology.
For my purpose, I reject an essentialist view. For me this means I do not identify women
with nature, nor do I think that women’s experience is monolithic, or that there is a finite set of
issues belonging to women (Li, 2007). As my easel story at the beginning of the chapter
illustrates, given my position in history and culture – a white female raised in the southern U.S.
in the twentieth century - I must continually check myself, to ensure my life and actions reflect
this viewpoint. An ecowomanist thread which adds an analysis of race, class, and gender (Kings,
2017) enables me to embrace the broadest possible understanding of all women’s experience as
springing from location in culture and history (Glazebrook, 2002); and, an intercategorical
intersectional thread which acknowledges the existence of social categories while simultaneously
acknowledging their oppressiveness (McCall, 2005), is also helpful. While I incorporate these
multiple threads, I elect to use the term ecofeminism to identify the context for my dissertation
because of ecofeminism’s ability to expose the logic of domination as an oppressive conceptual
framework, offering insight into mitigating current unsuccessful approaches to education which
spring from such a framework (Harvester & Blenkinsop, 2010).
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Oppressive Conceptual Frameworks
At its core, an oppressive conceptual framework features some type of domination that
legitimates the subordination of one aspect of the world over another (Chircop, 2008; Warren,
1996). Oppressive conceptual frameworks:
…value hierarchical thinking, encourage oppositional value dualisms, see power
over relationships as necessary and positive, create and maintain the practice of
privilege for those at the top of the hierarchy, and sanction a logic of domination
that justifies subordination of those lower down in the hierarchy. (Harvester &
Blenkinsop, 2010, p. 124)
For example, when "'mind', 'reason', and 'male' are portrayed as opposite of [and superior to]
'body', 'emotion' and 'female'", they comprise an oppressive conceptual framework (Chircop,
2008). An important feature of such frameworks is their ability to establish exclusiveness and
opposition rather than interconnection as the prevailing value norm (Chircop, 2008; Collins,
2000; Warren, 1996).
An ecofeminist framework provides a lens for highlighting those oppressive hierarchical
structures and for identifying solutions (Chircop, 2008; Warren, 2000). According to Warren
(2000), ecofeminism is a “theoryinprocess” (p. 66) that she compares to a quilt in which the
bounding edges provide that “nothing that is knowingly, intentionally, or consciously naturist,
sexist, racist, or classist—which reinforces and maintains ‘isms of domination’—belongs …” (p.
67).
The Domination of Nature
In Western culture, the conception of the world as alive, organic and female was first
found in Greek thought and persisted through the Renaissance (Merchant, 1989). According to
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Merchant (1989), beginning with the invention of the clock, a paradigm shift occurred and while
some portions of the organic philosophies of nature were transformed and retained, many were
criticized and rejected, allowing for the adoption of a passive, non-living and mechanistic view
of the cosmos (Merchant, 1989). This “process of mechanizing the world picture removed
controls over environmental exploitation that were an inherent part of the organic world view
that nature was alive, sensitive, and responsive to human action” (Merchant, 1989, p. 111). In the
mechanistic view, as those who bore children and were associated with nurture and childrearing,
women were seen as closer to nature and thus their social role was lower than that of men
(Merchant, 1989). Christianity further established this thinking since in the Christian vision, God
authorized men to have dominion over both the earth and women (Merchant, 1989). The
machine metaphor also established a nature/culture dualism in which culture was set “above and
apart from all that was symbolized by nature” (Merchant, 1989, p. 143).
Peering through a different lens, Vandana Shiva (1993) utilizes monoculture, which is the
growth of a single crop or organism, as a metaphor for a reductionist, linear, ultimately
destructive, worldview. She proposes leaving behind uniformity, and homogenization and
instead making “diversity the logic of production” (Shiva, 1993, p. 147), resulting in resilient and
sustainable agriculture and resilient and sustainable communities.
As I previously stated, Western efforts to master nature were propelled by the scientific
revolution in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and enforced the power of scientific
narratives to fashion the earth and its resources into objects for human use (Merchant, 1989;
Selam, 2006). "This tension, between technological development and the organic images of
nature, only heightened through time” (Selam, 2006, p. 76). In his writings in the late sixteenth
and early seventeenth centuries, Francis Bacon used a courtroom metaphor to advocate the idea
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that nature should be interrogated (Merchant, 2006). As Merchant (2006) relates, Bacon
probably meant this as a benign means of securing knowledge but it reveals “a legitimation for
the domination of nature" (p. 518). Within both Greek philosophy and Christian doctrine we find
the idea of the dominion over the earth, but it wasn't until the scientific revolution that this
domination metaphor spread beyond the religious sphere to permeate the social and the political
(Merchant, 1989; Selam, 2006). “The domination metaphor actually spread to its own loss of
origin to become the only (read "natural") way to see nature, the outside, and ourselves" (Selam,
2006, p.78). As the view of nature morphed from nurturing and benevolent to chaotic and
dangerous, Mother Earth had to be tamed (Selam, 2006). At the same time, industrial capitalism
marked a shift in the role of women to that of a more narrowly defined "reproductive machine"
(Merchant, 1989; Selam, 2006). In general, the body became something that one could fix and
thus was a "machine" (Merchant, 1989; Selam, 2006). This worked against a vision of
wholeness, by fragmenting the world and the body into knowable bits and pieces (Merchant,
1989).
The Logic of Domination
The logic of domination insists that those at the top of the hierarchy, white males of
western European descent, must logically manage, regulate, and exploit all those beneath them
on the hierarchy including women, non-European races, children, the elderly, and nature
(Harvester & Blenkinsop, 2010). The logic of domination can also be characterized as
“superiority justifies subordination” (Warren, 2000, p. 47).
For Burns (2008), Warren’s (2000) thinking on the logic of domination stands in
opposition to ideas of hierarchy. As she explains:
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This logic, which turns “diversity (or difference) into domination and …[justifies]
that domination” (Warren, 2000, p. 49), is behind problems such as racism,
sexism, and naturism, defines as “the unjustified domination of non-human
nature” (Warren, 2000, p. 1). Thus unlike some feminists who claim that the
oppression of women stems from hierarchical thinking, Warren holds that the logic
of domination is the underlying problem of the Western conceptual framework, …
rejection of the logic of domination is what links feminism (which focuses on the
domination of women by men) and ecological concerns (which focus on the
domination of nature), as Warren posits that it is this same logic that is used to
justify both kinds of domination. Overcoming the logic of domination is a key
aspect of her ecofeminist ethic. (Burns, 2008, p. 103)
For me, the logic of domination emerges from the idea of superiority, which IS hierarchical
thinking. Unlike Burns (2008), I do not think of the logic of domination as opposed to
hierarchical thinking, instead, each helps reveal the other.
Ecofeminism has two principal goals: to expose the logic of domination (Warren, 1987;
2000) and to seek alternatives to destructive ways of relating to other humans and to the natural
world (Harvester & Blenkinsop, 2010). By challenging root metaphors and the epistemological
understandings and relations to power they engender, an ecofeminist framework can disrupt the
logic of domination (Barrett, 2005; Gough & Whitehouse, 2003; Harvester & Blenkinsop, 2010;
Kheel, 1993; Warren, 2000). Additionally, by exposing this logic, which places the mind over
the body and the cognitive over the aesthetic, and by encouraging alternative ways of
understanding all of these as connected, ecofeminism provides a useful theoretical framework for
my exploration.
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Framing An Ecofeminist Theology
Christianity, which grew out of ancient Hebrew and Greek cultures, has been cited as a
prime source of cultural symbolic patterns that seek to render women and nature as inferior
(Reuther, 1997). The patriarchal God of the Hebrew Bible, defined as outside and over against
the material world as its creator and lord, when fused with Greek philosophical dualisms of spirit
and matter, are seen as the prime identity myth of the Western ruling-class male who made this
God in the image of his own aspiration to be both separate from and ruling over the material
world, as land and animals or non-human resources and as subjugated groups of humans
(Reuther, 1997). As a Christian and an ecofeminist, rather than declaring the two mutually
exclusive, Eaton (2001) seeks connections. To that end, she points to a need to clarify both the
oppressive and liberating aspects of the Christian faith including the destructiveness that results
from religious traditions (Eaton, 2001). Also necessary, is an awareness of the negative legacy of
the Christian faith including predatory practices toward nature and issues related to domination
(Eaton, 2001). Developing a critical appraisal of the past is imperative in order to acknowledge
the socially and politically situated roots of Christian thought (Eaton, 2001). For Reuther (1993),
analysis of the liberating and oppressive aspects of Christianity involves adopting a feminist
Christology. Such a lens reveals Jesus as representative of a humanity liberated from social
hierarchy, calling us to complete the incomplete vision of human liberation (Reuther, 1993). A
feminist Christology reveals sexism as a sin; it separates us from God and from God's vision for
humanity (Eaton, 2001). Images of vine and branches, metaphors that Jesus used, evoke a
conception of generative growth (Reuther, 1993). In this vision, the maleness of Jesus, like the
femaleness of the outcasts who respond to him, is socially and symbolically important, though
ultimately insignificant (Reuther, 1993). Instead, maleness and femaleness are used to highlight
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and unmask the "idolatrous system of patriarchal privilege...[that has] no connection with favor
with God" (Reuther, 1993, p. 137). In an ecological-feminist theology, man is not placed over
woman, humanity is not placed over the nonhuman, and God (non-material spirit) is not placed
in hierarchy over nonspiritual matter; in this view "spirit and matter are not dichotomized but are
the inside and the outside of the same thing" (Reuther, 1993, p. 85). This theology provides a foil
for the cycle of guilt and self-denial resulting in ethical conduct that forms the basis for morality
in theologies that hold sin at the center (Spretnak, 2011).
The criticism of religious and social hierarchy, characteristic of Jesus in the synoptic
gospels, parallels feminist criticism; this is not a way of saying, "Jesus was a feminist" (Reuther,
1993, p. 135). Instead, since he called into question the hierarchical systems of his day, Jesus is
compatible with feminism (Reuther, 1993). The Gospels do not promote a dualism of masculine
and feminine in the traditional Western sense, instead they speak to social realities of which
gender is but one (Eaton, 2001). "The reversal of social order doesn't just turn hierarchy upside
down, it aims at a new reality in which hierarchy and dominance are overcome as principles of
social relations" (Reuther, 1993, p. 136). Similar to the prophets, Jesus did not validate the
existing social order, instead he proclaimed the marginalized and outcast were able to hear and
understand his message while the religious and social elite were not (Eaton, 2001). Jesus sought
to reject and to change the ways that societies define and endow privilege and deprivation by
engendering a vision of human existence as one of mutuality and service (Reuther, 1993).
Within the messianic vision, as “the oppressed of the oppressed,” women are seen in a singular
way as "the last who will be first in the kingdom of God (Reuther, 1993, p. 137); as such they are
not seen as the ‘feminine.’
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An ecofeminist theology assumes a dynamic unity between creation and redemption
(Eaton, 2001; Tucker, 2003). This redemption is not a finished, final result, but rather an ongoing, unbreakable dialectic uncovered in the search for the good self within a good society
(Reuther, 1993). For patriarchal cultures, the bodily, natural world is both inferior and evil. For
these cultures the spiritual, male world offers escape from the bodily world and as an inferior
world, the natural bodily world must be dominated (Eaton, 2001; Tucker, 2003). The idea of
domination fails in the face of understanding our interdependence with the ecological community
(Reuther, 1993). "The notion of dominating the universe from a position of autonomy is an
illusion of alienated consciousness" (Reuther, 1993, p. 89). When we accept our interdependence
with the natural world, we can then use our intelligence to create harmonies and balances
(Spretnak, 2011). Linear, dichotomized thinking is exaggerated by dominant social roles, and recreating our relation with nature can mitigate this ultimately destructive bias (Spretnak, 2011).
According to Reuther (1993), there are levels of subjugation instigated by the vision of
humanity as fallen; these are 1) control over the womb so no woman may control access to her
body; 2) exploit labor so women become property to be bought and sold; 3) rape of the earth and
its peoples so women and the poor provide the laboring bodies through which the earth is
violated; and 4) promoting the ‘Big Lie’ so the previous levels of subjugation are not questioned
and enlightened man must put himself in charge thereby restoring order to the disorderly cosmos.
As Reuther (1997) describes, the Big Lie is an underlying philosophical view that humans are
disconnected from one another and from the earth; that our flesh, blood, and instincts for
survival, are our enemies and therefore we must spend our lives “suppressing our hungers and
thirsts and shunning our fellow beings” (p. 264- 265).
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Along with sacramental cosmology, covenantal ethics also critiques the individualism,
chauvinism, and escapism within biblical thought (Reuther, 1997); thus, together they provide
helpful components of an ecofeminist Christology. “Covenantal ethics gives us a vision of an
integrated community of humans, animals and land that seeks to live by a spirituality and code of
continual rest, renewal and restoration of just, sustainable relations between human and other
humans, humans and the land, in one covenant under a care-taking God" (Reuther, 1997, p. 8182). Such an ethic may be understood as rejecting the patriarchal aspects of the covenant while
embracing those aspects that envision reclaiming community by continually seeking to right
relationships that may be distorted by domination or exploitation; by allowing the land to lie
fallow and thus be renewed; by allowing humans and animals to have rest; by emancipating the
servant; and by forgiving debts and restoring land to the landless, enables covenantal ethics to
build generative, sustainable communities (Reuther, 1997).
For many Western Christians, God is revealed in biblical texts and nowhere else (Eaton,
2001). Within an ecofeminist spirituality there is a sense of the mystery of the divine in nature
and a commitment to a holistic understanding of each other and the natural world, so that a
violation of any other is a violation of self (Eaton, 2001; Spretnak, 2011). “A deep and
nourishing sensitivity toward life engenders reverence, and this is a profound resource for
religious awareness and activism” (Eaton, 2001, p. 87). In this sacramental cosmology, the
cosmos is seen as alive; the embodiment of the Holy Spirit, where God is not a 'detached male
ego' but a source of renewal in which we "live and move and have our being" (Reuther, 1997, p.
82).
Ecofeminist writers approach this theological framework through a variety of disciplines
such as philosophy, sociology, science, anthropology, economics, etc. and through a variety of
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religious traditions (Christian, Jewish, Goddess, Wiccan, Buddhist, Indigenous and womanist)
(Eaton, 2001). Ecofeminist theology is interpreted and appropriated in different ways depending
upon individual social and cultural situations (Berry, 2009; Eaton, 2001). Western Christian
feminists should study the ability to mine indigenous beliefs for threads to weave together with
Christian ideology that Christian feminists in non-Western countries employ, in order to enhance
life for women at the bottom of society in particular (Berry, 2009; Eaton, 2001). Such a ‘weaving
together’ of types of wisdom can become a powerful tool for letting go of the overweening
individualism so pervasive in American culture (Spretnak, 2011).
The Western world-view considers the individual as discrete and distinct (Pulliam & Van
Patten, 2013). Individualists value self-reliance and the individual apart from the group and they
promote the accomplishment of one's goals and desires (Brown, 2003). Viewpoints can range
from the “existential individualists,” who are committed to freedom for individuals as freely
choosing agents, to the “instrumental individualists” who are committed to freedom for
individuals as competitors for resources (Brown, 2003).
As a society moves toward instrumental individualism and fails to account for the good
of the entire community, that society can become toxic (Reuther, 1997). Weaving those wisdoms
that are not mainstream into Western wisdom is key and additional help for this process may be
found in Asian spiritualities of Taoism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Confucianism, particularly in
the visions of the harmonizing of dialectical forces within society and the cosmos (Tucker,
2003).
Christianity tends to place itself at the pinnacle of a hierarchy of world religions (Eaton,
2001). Instead, Eaton (2001) advocates for a pluralist-correlational model in which Christianity
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see itself as but "one thread within a tapestry of revelations" (p. 87). This view centers the idea of
theology or the study of the nature of God, rather than centering Christianity (Eaton, 2001).
The Trinitarian order assumes a linear scheme of salvation history (Reuther, 1993). If we can
reject such a view of theology and instead see religious symbols as circular rather than linear
representations of history, it becomes easy to begin where we are, rather than thinking in terms
of beginnings and endings (Reuther, 1993). In the Christian view, the fact that Adam and Eve
were once equal does not cause believers to reevaluate the subjugation of women; instead, it
highlights woman's sinfulness and need for subjugation (Reuther, 1993).
In this way, feminist theology finds a starting point in cognitive dissonance (Reuther,
1993). Cognitive dissonance is a type of psychological distress that occurs when an individual
simultaneously holds two or more contradictory beliefs (Reuther, 1993). For Reuther (1993) an
individual can learn to recognize and utilize her own cognitive dissonance as an instrument for
analysis of social context and experience. She suggests beginning with what we identify as good
and evil. How do we characterize human nature? Ultimately, questions arise about the origins of
the cosmos and about God (Reuther, 1993).
The acknowledgement of the congruence between the Gospel and liberation from sexism,
leads to an experience of isolation from existing churches for many individuals (Berry, 2009).
For Reuther, (1993), the Hebrew word, Shekinah, or the dwelling of the divine presence of God
with us, provides a vision of "new relations; simpler, more harmonious, more just, more
beautiful patterns of life" (Reuther, 1993, p. 259); thus freeing woman/body/nature from its role
as the representative symbol of carnality, sin, and death, and instead, establishing it as symbolic
of these beautiful, harmonious patterns. “An ecological ethic must always be an ethic of ecojustice that recognizes the interconnection of social domination and domination of nature”
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(Reuther, 1993, p. 91). Our human intelligence privileges us with the responsibility to become
caretakers of the ecological community upon which our existence depends, rather than simply to
dominate it (Berry, 2009).
Framing An Ecofeminist Epistemology
We can trace the double crisis of eco-justice (climate change and corporate globalization)
to the Western dualistic habit of knowing (Jun, 2014). Logos logic, which derives from ancient
Greece, is related to reason and speech, and is rooted in the thinking that what something is
maybe be understood by identifying what it is not (Jun, 2014). Lemma logic derives from
Buddhism and in this logic, what something is encompasses what it is not (Jun, 2014). Lemma
logic is symbolized by the lotus blossom and is related to intuition and silence rather than speech
(Jun, 2014). The Western dualistic habit of knowing has shaped human knowledge, values,
beliefs about gender roles, and our approach to learning as well as our attitudes towards the
earth's biotic community (Jun, 2014). Gender is not a minor element in an oppressive framework
since it often manifests itself alongside other oppressions (Salem, 2006).
Ecofeminism examines this epistemological context and by exposing these oppressive
conceptual frameworks, including that of mind over body, it provides a lens for understanding
and mitigating educational inequalities (Warren, 2000). We come to know the natural
environment by experiencing and forming a relationship with it through our bodies and not
simply through observation or reflection (Chircop, 2008; Warren, 2000). A masculine social
construction of gender identity stems from a split between productive labor and reproductive
labor, which reflects the separation between humans and nature (Chircop, 2008; Salleh, 2003).
Warren (2000) promotes seeking an alternative to the rationality of objectivity and instead
embraces new ways of thinking that respect rather than assault; and the understanding that much
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of what we are socialized to see as oppositional – man/woman or nature/culture – are really part
of a whole.
The traditional understanding of knowledge transfer is as follows: "Hierarchized,
competitive, and built on an epistemological metaphor that understands knowledge to be held in
particular places or by particular individuals, transferred successfully in whole or in part, and
returnable and examinable for its specificity and completeness" (Harvester & Blenkinsop, 2010,
p. 128). Applying Lemma logic means embracing my dependence as simultaneous to my
independence. Thus, knowing becomes "a conversion to relationality in which the dialectics of
human existence are converted from opposites into mutual interdependence" (Jun, 2014, p. 319).
An ecofeminist epistemology rejects the rationality of objectivity and embraces knowing as
simultaneously cognitive, emotional, spiritual, and embodied (Jun, 2014).
A Framework for Learning
Today, from the way we study subjects in school to the way we rationalize our ethical
choices, reductionist thinking, outlined by Rene Descartes (1596-1650) in 1637, still animates
much of the Western worldview (Inwood, 1993). First presented as a means of obtaining
knowledge, reductionism consists of dividing the object to investigate into parts and proceeding
from the simplest to the most complex in order to understand it. Ideas of hierarchy and dualism
(good/evil, male/female, man/nature) proceed from reductionism (Collins, 2000). In such
thinking difference is understood as oppositional and “one element is objectified as the Other”
(Collins, 2000, p. 70).
Even in areas such as environmental education, educators can inadvertently further what
they seek to change when they do not explore the root metaphors and cultural assumptions that
underlie their practice (Harvester & Blenkinsop, 2010). For example when educators focus on
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technical approaches such as the management of ecosystems and their resources, they fail to
move beyond the goals of school achievement and economic well-being to interrogate the
disciplining power of dominant discourses as shaped by root metaphors (Furman & Gruenewald,
2004; Harvester & Blenkinsop, 2010). Failure to explore root metaphors makes it difficult for
teachers to enable students to achieve education’s broader goals of becoming lifelong learners
who find passion (Garrison, 1997), joy (Liston, 2001), and beauty in what they learn.
An ecofeminist pedagogy requires a change in the traditional educational relationship
where teacher and student (the human) come together with the natural world (the
more-than-human) to engage in a way that is more robust and genuine than is currently the norm
(Harvester & Blenkinsop, 2010). These genuine relationships can take place in environments that
take into account the hidden curriculum that architectural structures bestow and include the
outdoors and natural environments (Orr, 2004; Louv, 2008). In this way there is not only a shift
in the relationship between teacher and student, but also an intentionality and thoughtfulness for
the “place” of education, allowing for the natural world to play a prominent role as coteacher
(Orr, 2004; Louv, 2008). So, even within environmental education, which ought to be the
starting place of learning, “the dominations of women, other human Others, and nonhuman
nature are interconnected, are wrong, and ought to be eliminated” (Warren, 2000, p. 155), this
vision has not been fully achieved given that environmental education is situated in an
anthropocentric paradigm that focuses heavily on "school achievement and economic well-being,
and employing the narratives of the Western Enlightenment tradition" (Harvester and
Blenkinsop, 2010, p. 121). According to Plumwood (1996), “both men and women must
challenge the dualised conception of human identity and develop an alternative culture which
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fully recognizes human identity as continuous with, not alien from, nature” (p. 36). In this way
emergent, holistic growth forms the foundation of an ecofeminist perspective.
Root metaphors give life to our deepest cultural assumptions (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980;
Liston, 2001). Prior to the scientific revolution the prevailing metaphor was the organism, which
presupposed simultaneous interdependence and independence (Selam, 2006). Within this
conceptual framework “nature was a caring, loving, and ordered "mother," but also wild,
uncontrollable, and the creator of chaos” (Merchant, 1989, p. 2). As part of a "linear mentality of
forward progress" (Merchant, 1989, xxi), a market-based economy that valued production over
reproduction shifted the prevailing conceptual framework to create a vision of nature and women
as something exploitable.
A care-sensitive ethic minimizes reductionist bias by giving legitimacy to voices on the
margins (Chircop, 2008; Warren, 2008). An ecofeminist ethic of care is a framework that moves
beyond the dualistic malefemale paradigm (Swanson, 2015). For Cuomo (1998), “a central
position grounding ecofeminism is the belief that values, notions of reality, and social practices
are related, and that forms of oppression and domination, however historically and culturally
distinct, are interlocked and enmeshed” (p. 1).
Noddings’ (2002) ethic of care ties in with an integrative ecofeminist perspective by
laying aside gender and focusing attention on the space between people; the relationship, which
is the wellspring of an ethic of caring. Values of care are underrepresented and thus have a place
in an ecofeminist ethic since “relationships are not something extrinsic to who we are; they play
an essential role in shaping what it is to be human” (Warren, 1996, p. 33). An ethic of care in the
educational setting suggests a shift in pedagogy to one that cherishes the intertwining of

114
seemingly paradoxical viewpoints; inviting reciprocity, nurturing, and cooperation (Spretnak,
1990).
According to Garrison (1997), ethical and aesthetic appreciation have much in common
since expansive caring necessitates skills that we usually characterize as aesthetic: constructive
criticism and discriminating judgment.
One of the earliest discoveries of morals was the similarity of judgment of good
and bad in conduct with the recognition of beauty and ugliness.... The sense of
justice, moreover, has a strong ally in the sense of symmetry and proportion ... a
harmonious blending of affections into a beautiful whole, was essentially an
artistic idea ... The Greek emphasis upon Kalokagathos (the good life), the
Aristotelian identification of virtue with the proportionate (golden) mean, are
indications of an acute estimate of grace, rhythm, and harmony as dominant traits
of good conduct. (Garrison, 1997, p. 271)
When we perceive the needs of others we rely on a sympathetic capacity that is in itself, a
creative response to the needs, interests, and values of others (Garrison, 1997).
For John Dewey, life grows out of transitions that include equilibrium, disequilibrium
(including loss), and back to equilibrium again (Garrison, 1997). Within those transitions
"science and art, scientific law, and aesthetic form emerge out of the rhythms of nature and art in
identical reality" (Garrison, 1997, p. 63). An individual’s commitment to growth as an ideal for
living means accepting vulnerability and risk since as one grows some aspects of their previous
understanding are necessarily pruned away. The emergent (growth) model of the mind and self is
reciprocal; that is, in order to receive one must give and vice versa (Garrison, 1997). "Bestowing
value, generating love or creating goodness enhances others while affirming and expanding

115
ourselves" (Garrison, 1997, p. 40). Thus ecofeminism enables me to utilize a lens of caring,
connection, growth, and holism in my theorizing.
Ecofeminism and Embodied Learning
A feminist ethic is necessarily pluralistic rather than unitary or reductionist (Warren,
1996; Swanson, 2015). The mind is not the master of all lived experience because the body and
the natural world contribute to our human lives (Levy, 2012). Though conceptions of "body" and
"nature" are socially constructed as oppositional, an embodied knowing grants knowledge to our
bodies and to nature (Chircop, 2008; Twine, 2001). Culture weaves in as well, and we see
gender, race, and class as social structures that inform lived, embodied experience (Glazebrook,
2002). Ethically and epistemologically, the proposition that our bodies and the natural world are
continually communicating provides a lens for seeing and experiencing the world (Levy, 2012).
In order to challenge the conception of the mind having mastery over the body and to
illustrate the idea that our minds and bodies are continually conversing, Levy (2012) uses the
example of how her own body felt when her mother was in the emergency room. She could not,
through effort, make her heart stop pounding or her limbs stop feeling twitchy or on edge. Her
body had "agency" which was different than the human type of agency that refers to an
autonomous subject (Levy, 2012). This embodied agency "is not predicated on the humanist
model of the free individual" (Alaimo, 2008, p. 248), but instead is performative or
"intra-active." This vision of intra-activity refers to Barad's (2003) vision of a constant state of
relating. Levy (2012) offers the example of the ill body that is constantly interacting with
environmental factors like food, sleep, and stress. Our bodies and their environment are
conversing; they are shaping and influencing each other despite any attempt to suppress this
relationship, and our lived experience confirms this (Levy, 2012).
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Levy (2012) uses the body's surprisingly unpredictable agency to invoke feelings of
pleasure or panic as a means of transgressing the boundaries of mind/body. “Nature... is part of
our own being, ....we are continually breathing in and exchanging the particles of the
environment with the cells of our own bodies...[thus] harming the environment is an assault upon
our own humanity" (Levy, 2012, p. 18). Our experiences are shaped cognitively, socially,
culturally and by the material world (Levy, 2012). In the next chapter I explore the idea of
embodiment in greater depth.
Final Thoughts
In this chapter I have presented an ecofeminist theoretical framework for enabling an
epistemology that: recognizes knowing as embodied and thereby connected to an individual’s
environment and culture; includes an ethic that is care-sensitive and rooted in the aesthetic;
provides an analysis of oppressive conceptual frameworks; offers insights into mitigating those
current approaches to education which embrace a market model of reform and remain
unsuccessful in their ability to improve student learning (Harvester & Blenkinsop, 2010; Ravitch,
2016); and offers insights into mitigating approaches to learning that teach non-white, nonmiddle class students they are other (including the consideration of race, class, and gender)
(Kings, 2016).
An ecofeminist lens assists me in making the unconscious conscious (Warren, 2000), to
facilitate the union of the mind and body. This dissertation, which frames an ecofeminist vision
of learning as aesthetic, embodied, and connected, benefits from highlighting these overlapping
foci to illuminate the role patriarchy, through the logic of domination has played in establishing
ideas of learning. Such a vision offers suggestions for changing the underlying metaphors, which
shape our collective consciousness (Harvester & Blenkinsop, 2010). I propose a metaphor that
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evokes the significance of webs of connection over lines of hierarchy. Ecofeminism invites the
understanding of lived experience, at once individual and collective. It rejects the hierarchical
logic of domination in which whatever is conceived as superior must logically dominate
whatever is conceived as subordinate (Warren, 2000). A web of connection does not allow for
hierarchy. Drawing on Charles Darwin’s (1859/1964) image of the tangled bank, I envision the
ecofeminist tangled bank which incorporates the interconnection and complexity of Darwin’s
biotic tangled bank but includes human-to-human relationships, as well as each human’s
relationship with his/her/their own body-mind.
In the next chapter I continue to explore the body-mind’s ability to know, including how
embodied experiences of learning offer an important and often overlooked key to learning.
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CHAPTER 4
THE BODY-MIND: AN ECOFEMINIST PERSPECTIVE
To further my ecofeminist vision of aesthetic, embodied learning, I begin this chapter,
which investigates how, for the individual, the body is the center of experience, with a
description of ‘way-finding’ by Mary Evelyn Tucker (2008). In a chapter entitled “Learning to
See the Stars: The Earth Charter as a Compass for the New Century” Tucker (2008) tells of a
presentation by a young Hawaiian sail master, Nainoa Thompson, to a group of academics
attending a history conference in Hawaii. As Thompson related, since the time he was young, it
had been his desire to recreate the South Pacific voyages that took place from approximately 700
AD to 1400 AD; he wished to construct and sail original canoes, bringing only traditional foods
for the voyage (Tucker, 2008). At the time – it was the 1970s - this was not an easy task since
knowledge of the ancient ways of canoe building and navigation were thought to have been lost,
especially among those who were adept at using modern tools of navigation (Low, 2007). After a
great deal of searching Thompson found Mao Pilaug on the Milanesian island of Satawal, who
helped him and other members of a sailing society build traditional canoes; he also shared his
knowledge of how to sail them (Low, 2007; Tucker, 2008). Under the direction of Mao, slowly
Thompson and the others began to read the flotsam and plankton on the surface of the sea and
they began to notice the pattern of the bird’s flight and the currents in the ocean; they “felt the
voyage being born within [them]” (Tucker, 2008, p. 41). When the sailors eventually set sail
without compasses or other modern technology, they literally and figuratively sailed the paths of
their ancestors (Low, 2007; Tucker, 2008). As Thompson related, on cloud filled nights, when no
stars were visible, Mao would lie in the hull of the canoe,
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[F]rom both knowledge taught by his elders and instincts absorbed as a child he
could discern the movement of the currents. He would navigate direction based on
these ancient indigenous ways of knowing that had been learned and transmitted
across the centuries. … [Thompson and his colleagues] were deeply moved in
witnessing this. (Tucker, 2008, p. 42)
This indigenous way of navigating challenges models of learning that separate the cognitive and
experiential, suggesting that for such learning, the individual combines cognitive with visual,
auditory, and kinesthetic information into an integrated whole (Feinberg & Genz, 2012). This
holistic approach to spatial orientation or ‘way-finding’ demonstrates the manner in which
certain ways of learning and forms of knowing are not easily expressed in words, as with the
kinesthetic knowledge of a canoe’s motion (Feinberg & Genz, 2012).
In this chapter I explore what the body has to do with learning; employing an ecofeminist
lens to reveal how cognitive, visual, auditory, and kinesthetic learning exist as intertwined- in
dialogue one with the other- each shaped by the other.
According to Twine (1993) and Young (2002), ecofeminism encourages respect for the
cultural and natural elements that codetermine our corporeal subjectivity. Given that the livedbody acts and experiences within in a specific social, cultural, and geographic context, it can be
considered a body-in-situation – a unified idea (Young, 2002). The ecofeminist body-in-situation
physically manifests consequences of the human domination of nature while allowing for a
politics of locatedness and accountability (Fields, 2000). Going further, ecofeminism provides an
additional lens for critiquing socially and culturally invented ideas about the body, particularly
the ways in which bodies become marked and devalued; and then pointing toward various
unexpected and creative solutions (Twine, 2000). Such a respect for the-body-in-situation
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illuminates those approaches to learning that teach non-white, non-middle-class students they are
‘other’ (Harvester & Blenkinsop, 2010; Young, 2002).
Beyond its usefulness as a metaphor for kinesthetic navigation, way-finding is an apt
metaphor for the process of embodied learning through experience. As our first teacher,
experience leads us to understanding before we are able to understand abstract or intellectual
concepts (Stolz, 2015). According to Lakoff and Johnson (1999), prior experience undergirds
later experience and understanding, because it lays the groundwork, both metaphorically and
actually, for understanding subsequent experiences. “...[W]e can only think the world because
we have already experienced it; it is through experience that we have the idea of being, and it is
through experience that the words ‘rational’ and ‘real’ receive a meaning simultaneously”
(Merleau-Ponty, 1964/2012, p. 17). The idea that experience is the precursor to understanding
holds true, even when the experience involves imaginatively constructing castles in the air
(Dewey, 1938/1997). As William James (1890/1950) remarked:
The body is the storm-center, the origin of coordinates, the constant place of
stress in [our] experience-train. Everything circles round it, and is felt from its
point of view...The world experienced, comes at all times with our body as its
center, center of vision, center of action, center of interest. (p. 86)
Experience takes the form of a never-ending dialogue between self and world; therefore the
world is what I live through before I can understand or ‘think’ the world (Merleau-Ponty,
1964/2012; Stolz, 2015). Our experience becomes meaningful and transformative when we relate
it to other actual or possible experience, pointing beyond it to connect and transform past,
present, and future experience (Dewey, 1934/2005).
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As I discussed in previous chapters, the idea that knowledge is fixed and eternal began
with Plato and is exemplified by his belief in a hierarchy of fixed and eternal Forms or
metaphysical truths (Garrison, 1997). In such a view, knowledge already exists, apart from the
knower (Garrison, 1997). Western thinking, which began with Plato, sees a divide between mind
and body; in such thinking the two are separated - as with cognition and emotion, knowledge and
imagination, and thought and feeling (Johnson, 2007). Additionally, in Western thinking, ends of
a dichotomy are seen not only as separate, but also contradictory and oppositional (Collins, 2000;
Johnson, 2007).
In contrast to such a polarized view of mind and body, French phenomenological
philosopher, Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961), whose foremost interest was the constitution
of meaning in human experience, thought it was impossible to understand cognition without
reference to the lived body (van Manen, 1997). Since the body is not simply a passive vehicle for
the mind but engages with the world in concert with the mind, the body plays a crucial part of the
cognitive process (van Manen, 1997). Phenomenology is the philosophical study of the structures
of experience and consciousness, embracing the notion of the knowing body (Groth, 2016;
Merleau-Ponty, 1964/2012). A phenomenological perspective stands in contrast to the Western,
Cartesian, dualistic and hierarchical view of the mind and body; asserting an individual's
understanding of the world is the product of his or her situated body, and emphasizing
perception’s foundational role for an individual who seeks to understand and engage with the
world (Merleau-Ponty, 1964/2012; van Manen, 1997). Phenomenology asks what is a particular
experience like? What is the quality of the experience and what does it mean? This process may
involve description and it may also include interpretation of a lifeworld (van Manen, 1997).
Because humans are beings-in-the-world, whose bodies function in the world, our thinking self
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cannot be separated from our sensing self; instead, our experiences and ways of knowing spring
from unified minds and bodies (Merleau-Ponty, 1964/2012; Stolz, 2015).
Learning that is transformative arises from subjective, sensory engagement in interaction
with prior experience and knowledge (Wong & Pugh, 2001). For the educational establishment
to embrace such a vision requires a paradigm shift in the framework that currently structures our
approach to education and our view of what constitutes learning (Chircop, 2008). I propose a
framework that embraces an ecofeminist epistemology, which recognizes knowing as embodied
and thereby connected to an individual’s environment and culture (Harvester & Blenkinsop,
2010); and that exposes how the embodied knowledge of women, children, the poor, and people
of color, reveal shared experiences of oppression and oppressive socioeconomic structures
(Chircop, 2006). When we understand ourselves as situated within a site of relations that extends
beyond our skin, beyond our humanity and beyond our time, within a symbiotic space of
exchange, we can come to understand that we are part of an extensive field of
"relationsinprocess” that can never be claimed as completely our own (Polk, 2001).
The Knowing Body
To comprehend how the body is crucial to cognition requires an understanding of
consciousness and the foundational role of experience. Consciousness, or the awareness of
myself or of something external to myself, requires the joint operation of brain, body, and world.
Indeed, consciousness is “an achievement of the whole animal in its environmental context”
(NoeÌ, 2009, p. 10); consciousness is dependent on what is happening in my brain and also on
my history, my environment, and my experience with the wider world. My ability to think and
reason likewise relies on my experiences and cannot be wholly separated from my body and its
processes (Shusterman, 2006). Reasoning, therefore, is not something that human beings
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logically come to, rather reasoning is the result of embodied experience and the prototypes,
framings, and metaphors which result from that experience, therefore, human beings are not in
conscious control of, or even necessarily aware of their reasoning (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999).
We think and feel with our bodies, especially with the body parts that constitute the
brain and nervous system. Our bodies are likewise affected by mental life, as when
certain thoughts bring a blush to the cheek and change our heart rate and breathing
rhythms. The body-mind connection is so pervasively intimate that it seems
misleading to speak of body and mind as two different, independent entities.
(Shusterman, 2006, p.2)
For Liston (2001), to separate the body from the mind or the spirit from the physical body is like
separating taste from an apple. The term body-mind, first used by John Dewey (1928/1996), is an
appropriate term to express and experience these interconnections because it preserves the ability
to distinguish between the mental and the physical aspects of lived experience as well as between
lived experience and performance (Shusterman, 2006). Utilizing the term ‘body-mind’ therefore
encourages us to be more mindful of our bodies and the manner in which they live and
move within an environment that they simultaneously contribute to (Dewey, 1938/1997; Liston,
2001; Shusterman, 2006). According to philosopher and psychologist William James (18421910):
Mental facts cannot be properly studied apart from the physical environment of
which they take cognizance. The great fault of the older rational psychology was to
set up the soul as an absolute spiritual being with certain faculties of its own by
which the several activities of remembering, imagining, reasoning, and willing,
etc. were explained, almost without reference to the peculiarities of the world with
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which these activities deal. But the richer insight of modern days perceives that our
inner faculties are adapted in advance to the features of the world in which we
dwell, adapted, I mean, so as to secure our safety and prosperity in its midst.
(James, 1890/1950, p.3)
Meaning emerges as we engage in experiences, make sense of them, and in so doing, transform
and transcend them to create something new and to become something new as a result (Dewey,
1938/1997; Johnson, 2007). Johnson (2007) proposes what he calls, the “embodied theory of
meaning" (p. 10), which involves the cognitive skills of conceptualizing and reasoning utilizing
sensorimotor experience and emotions in a naturalistic way that aligns with Dewey's
(1938/1997) ideas of continuity and James’ (1890/1950) ideas of adaptation. This theory springs
from psychology, linguistics, and physiology and proposes that the body is a physical entity that
is animated by organic processes (Johnson, 2007; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 2016). These
animating organic processes include sensations and movement, which are overt, as well as
processes, like metabolism, of which the individual is not aware; additionally, the body is
socially constructed in that it responds consciously and nonconsciously to its social environment
(Johnson, 2007; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 2016), as demonstrated by the story of my own
participation in the normalizing of my student, which I shared at the beginning of chapter 3. In
what is for the most part, nonconscious, social norms are inscribed in the body in ways that are
both generative and oppressive (Shusterman, 2006). Ethical behavior is formed somatically
through ritual and music, and by inspiring love and the desire to emulate; conversely, oppressive
norms can be somatically inscribed, as bodily habits, which we accept as normal (Shusterman,
2006). This is exemplified in the expectations of women in many societies to speak softly, or
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lower their eyes; such norms are difficult to identify and root out, when they are so deeply
absorbed, they become inscribed on the body (Shusterman, 2006).
Looking past ethics to epistemology, the body further demonstrates our human
ambiguity; being the source and the limit of our perception (Shusterman, 2006). Human
ambiguity is also manifested in the body ethically, as demonstrated by our freedom to choose
and act (Shusterman, 2006). Willed actions such as raising our hand or moving our legs
exemplify our freedom to choose (Shusterman, 2006). Conversely, our lack of ability to move as
we wish, our human needs, and even death, epitomize our lack of freedom (Shusterman,
2006). Bodies express the ambiguity of human experience in another way as well. While they
unite us, our bodies also divide us into genders and ethnicities, by our physical structure, and
how we function with them (Shusterman, 2006). An ecofeminist epistemology recognizes
knowing as connected to an individual’s environment and culture through the body (Harvester &
Blenkinsop, 2010).
Conceiving of learning as a process that springs naturally from experience illuminates
how reasoning, experience, and emotion are aspects of embodied meaning. The idea that
thinking and the body are intertwined aligns with this dissertation’s ecofeminist framework.
Such a framework is helpful to me since shining a light on patriarchal domination illuminates
marginalization of all kinds, and therefore, it can illuminate the Western proclivity for placing
the mind and body in opposition (Chircop, 2008). By challenging root metaphors and the
epistemological understandings and relations to power they engender, an ecofeminist framework
can disrupt the logic of domination, which is understood as “superiority justifies subordination”
(Warren, 2000, p. 47). The idea of the knowing body challenges the notion of the body as simply
a vessel for holding the brain, in which is located the essence of an individual (van Manen,
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1997). The theory of embodied knowing (Johnson, 2007) critiques the logic of domination that
places mind and body in an oppositional, hierarchical relationship to each other. Additionally,
the same gendered thinking that affects climate impacts education (Kings, 2017). An ecofeminist
lens helps to focus on connections between mind and body as aspects of the whole person as well
as how that individual interacts within their culture and environment.
Embodied Learning
Real human experience is subjective and multifaceted and as such, it has consequences
for learning (Stolz, 2015). Critical reflection and attention to the embodied sensation of learning
result in a 'feel' for the kind of knowing that anticipates future requirements, preparing an
individual to think on his or her feet (Ord & Nuttall, 2016). Through experiences with other
things or objects, the individual comes to know and understand herself and her abilities and
limitations, as well as to understand the other (Dewey, 1958; Johnson, 2007; Merleau-Ponty,
1964/2012). Ord and Nuttall (2016) theorize that knowledge is located within practice in a
dynamic manner, rather than as something that is applied to practice or found in the Cartesian
separation between mind and body. As Nainoa Thompson’s experience of “way-finding”
exemplifies, our human organism's process of forming meaning is multilayered and can take
multiple web-like pathways on its journey. Conscious and nonconscious (outside cognitive
awareness) physical interactions within our world, are aspects of meaning formation that are
powerful (Johnson, 2007; Sheets-Johnstone, 1999). According to dancer/choreographer turned
philosopher, Maxine Sheet-Johnstone (1999), as infants we begin making sense of the world by
first making sense of our bodies:
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We make sense of them in and through movement, and in and through animation.
Moreover, we do so without words. This primordial sense-making is the standard
upon which our sense-making of the world unfolds. (p. 148)
Human thought and meaning have a bodily basis which begins with this primordial sensemaking (Johnson, 2007; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Sheets-Johnstone, 1999).
Learning about self and world through movement occurs in a particular environment; this
learning happens at a visceral level that does not separate subject and object and the experience
of both (Johnson, 2007). Through the movement of the body the individual gains knowledge of
the world and insights into her nature; much of this type of learning through experience occurs
beneath the level of consciousness (Johnson, 2007).
In the beginning, we are simply infused with movement -- not merely with a
propensity to move, but with the real thing. This primal animatedness, this original
kinetic spontaneity that infuses our being and defines our aliveness, is our point of
departure for living in the world and making sense of it.... We literally discover
ourselves in movement. We grow kinetically into our bodies. In particular, we
grow into those distinctive ways of moving that come with our being the bodies we
are. In our spontaneity of movement, we discover arms that extend, spines that
bend, knees that flex, mouths that shut, and so on. We make sense of ourselves in
the course of moving. (Sheets-Johnstone, 1999, p. 136)
When we think of movement as primary to meaning, this refers to both our phenomenological,
felt experience and our nonconscious bodily interactions (Johnson, 2007).
To 'meaningfully grasp' a thing, as when we come to understanding it deeply, we do so
because we have experienced it (Stolz, 2015). Such experience is subjective and objective since
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it involves a synthesis of emotional, practical, aesthetic, cognitive, and theoretical information
that is simultaneously embodied and intellectual (Stolz, 2015). If we simply seek the ends
without considering means, and without considering the messages our body is sending us, the
result is frustration (Shusterman, 2006); this ‘feel’ for learning and the somatic information our
body communicates is marginalized if not ignored in schools (Palmer, 2006).
When educating children, complex concepts are more easily taught when they are
connected with "biologically primary knowledge" (Araya, 2016, p. 169), which can also be
called intuitive and embodied knowledge. As Nainoa Thompson discovered, certain ways of
learning and forms of knowing have a kinesthetic basis. By connecting new information with a
student's innate, embodied knowledge, utilizing perceptual, motor and cognitive systems,
teachers can enable students to gain understanding at a deep resonant level (Araya, 2016).
Feelings also carry information, which in most school settings, students are not taught to
‘read’ (Palmer, 2006). Palmer (2006) offers an example, with the perception that within
academia, emotions are seen as the enemy of objectivity and therefore, must be suppressed. As a
result, many educated people compartmentalize their feelings; regarding them as dangerous to
professional life (Palmer, 2006). To overcome this prejudice, and as part of an ecofeminist vision
of learning, students must be taught to mine their emotions for information, to access “affective
knowledge that eludes our instruments and intellect” (Palmer, 2006, p. 209).
For Oakeshott (1967):
Learning is the comprehensive activity in which we come to know ourselves and the
world around us. It is a paradoxical activity because it is doing and submitting at the
same time. And its achievement can range from merely being aware, to what may be
called understanding and being able to explain (p. 156)
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Stoltz (2015) argues that psychological discourses, which are disconnected from the role the
body plays in learning that is "grasped meaningfully," provides only a partial vision of the
learning process. For Dewey (1938/1991), "The idea that any knowledge in particular can be
instituted apart from its being the consummation of inquiry, and that knowledge in general can
be defined apart from this connection is, moreover, one of the sources of confusion in logical
theory” (p. 16). Dewey's (1938/1991) claim is that thinking of learning as disconnected from our
action in the world is illusory. People learn in multiple ways and such learning can take a variety
of forms and occur in a variety of settings. The problem with peering through a narrowly
psychological lens at learning is that such a view focuses on mental and behavioral processes to
the exclusion of other factors (Stolz, 2015).
Theories of learning that spring from psychology describe aspects of learning that are
"empirically discernible" (Stolz, 2015, p. 476). These theories can most often be characterized as
behaviorist in that they confine themselves to aspects of behavior that are observable and
quantifiable (Stolz, 2015). One of the most enduring legacies of behaviorism in the field of
education are behavioral objectives within curriculum planning (Stolz, 2015). As a teacher of
many years I have found, in matters of classroom management as well as for organizing
informational instruction, objectives do have usefulness in the everyday life of the school. But
for the most part, those who promote behaviorism make no distinction between behaviors that
arise from personal agency, in other words, what an individual does consciously and deliberately,
and those that arise because an individual is behaviorally conditioned to do so (Stolz, 2015).
Additionally, behaviorism fails to provide a means of advancing those processes by which
students come to understand or make sense of something in a meaningful way (Carr, 2003; Stolz,
2015).
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Embodied learning theory draws on philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science to
investigate the role of the body in learning (Stolz, 2015). This paradigm does not seek to separate
the body from the mind but rather understands a body requires a mind to function (Stolz, 2015).
An ecofeminist lens reveal a disembodied/embodied divide within school settings, which
privileges theory over practice and assumes the body plays no role in cognition (O'Loughlin,
2006). We understand something because we have experienced it; our being (our body and mind
together) is present and involved in this experience and therefore, we understand (Stolz, 2015).
The meaning of a thing is tied up in how it connects to what has gone before and what it offers to
present or future experiences (Dewey, 1938/1997; Johnson, 2007).
According to Piaget (1950), children develop sequentially through stages from concrete
at the youngest age to more abstract as they age. In such thinking, perception and experience are
reduced to their cognitive aspects, making no allowance for the integral role embodiment plays
in our perceptions of ourselves, others, and of the world around us (Stolz, 2015). “Merleau-Ponty
(1964) recognized that psychology distorts how we come to learn because it remains faithful to
realism and to causal thinking and only provides atomistic accounts of learning" (Stoltz, 2015, p.
476). When we acknowledge our human engagement with the world is cognitive and also
emotional, practical, aesthetic, imaginative and so forth, it illuminates fallacy of dividing the
object from the subject; since within the interaction of object and subject - in this case the
human and the world, is where meaning is made (Merleau-Ponty, 1964/2012; Stolz, 2015). The
experience of learning is much more rich and embodied than simply thinking about a subject
with our minds (Merleau-Ponty, 1964/2012; Stolz, 2015). An acceptance of meaning-making as
experientially derived, obliges us to critically interrogate the contribution of cultural world to
those modes of thought we uncritically absorb, particularly around ideas of race, class, and
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gender, as well as those which are anthropocentric (Mallory, 2010; Kings, 2017). An ecofeminist
vision of learning as embodied experience invites us to question the cultural curriculum.

Embodied Expression
I have taught art to elementary students for more than 30 years. In that capacity, I
frequently observe my students creating works of art which express ideas that they cannot share
with words. According to my observations, this lack of ability for putting words to what is in
their minds can be either developmental, in that they do not yet possess the words, or it can be
emotional; they cannot possess the words because some sort of trauma prevents it. In both cases,
the students may draw or paint what they want to communicate. The arts can illuminate how
humans express ideas that are beyond words; demonstrating that the body-mind (Dewey,
1928/1996) holds on to memories, thoughts, and understandings, both beautiful and traumatic,
which are not easily spoken (Chatterjee, 2014; Chaplin, 2005; Vander Kolk, 2015).
According to Langer (1957/1976), art expresses human feeling in the broadest sense. "In
a work of art we have the direct presentation of a feeling, not a sign that points to it" (p. 134). I
would add along with Dewey (1934/2005), that a work of art sets up a dialogue in which the
percipient, who is the synthesis of his or her life experience, is in 'conversation' with what the
artist seeks to express. This artistic dialogue most frequently does not involve words, though
through reflection it may be put words. Such a dialogue involves one person's life experience in
conversation with another's in a sensory language.
As humans, we project our own bodily feelings like fear, hope, or desire, onto objects;
such emotional reactions involve more than simple biological functioning though they may have
started as such (Chaplin, 2005). By drawing together "a complex web of culturally mediated
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embodied encounter with the world" (Chaplin, 2005, p. 13), aesthetic reactions are both ignited
by metaphoric meaning and feed more complex metaphoric meaning.
Art’s unique ability is to communicate directly, expressively, and affectively the
experiences that give shape and form to the world (Chaplin, 2005). This non-discursive
communication can resonate with the affective experience of others, thus expanding the lived
(bodily understood) experience of another (Chaplin, 2005). By emphasizing similarities between
art and phenomenology, Chaplin (2005) argues, Merleau-Ponty failed to differentiate "prereflective, bodily sense-experience" (p. 14), and artistic vision, which can be consciously and
reflectively shaped. As he states, this failure to differentiate may also suggest that everything that
is not philosophical or scientific is, by default aesthetic, perpetuating the art/science and
thinking/emotion dichotomy (Chaplin, 2005).
When we make and/or respond to art, we rely on habitually embodied actions and
reactions (Chaplin, 2005). Yet as both artist and responder move past the habitual, motormemory, behavioral response to a symbolic transformation, the resulting nondiscursive
dialogue articulates the artist's experience of the world in a way that lends itself to metaphoric
interpretation (Chaplin, 2005).
My conscious self utilizes my body's habits and so does my unconscious self. Therefore,
I am those things I decide to do as well as those things I do without deciding at all; my body is
the constant in both cases (Shusterman, 2006). By attending to the signals my body sends, I can
expand my ability to understand my own being (Shusterman, 2006).
As human thought would not make sense without the embodiment that places the
sensing, thinking subject in the world and thereby gives her thought perspective
and direction, so wisdom and virtue would be empty without the diverse, full-
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bodied experience on which they draw and through which they manifest
themselves in exemplary embodied speech, deeds, and radiating presence.
(Shusterman, 2006, p. 17)
The idea that the body is necessary for perception, action, and thought is taken for granted by
those of us in the humanities. The arts can help to forge a connection between what is
consciously and what is unconsciously known. Because of its ability to stimulate bodily
responses, art in all its form, can disrupt usual sensory patterns, thereby contributing to an
individual’s capacity to bodily see and perceive, breaking through the ‘I’ve already gotten this
figured out, no need to look further’ mind set (Tait, 2018).
Practice theories offer an alternative to our current, binary view of knowing versus
practice, because they provide a powerful lens for looking at knowledge, meaning, and
discourse, "with knowledge understood as existing in a dynamic relationship between social,
psychological, material, and embodied realities" (Ord & Nuttall, 2016, p. 357). The divide
between theory and practice encourages an epistemological distinction between ways of knowing
as a mental process and doing as a physical process (Clandinin & Connelly, 1988a; Ord &
Nuttall, 2016). This dichotomy between ways of knowing, establishes two erroneous ideas, first
that knowledge is an object, and second that knowledge is easy to transfer to another which
implies a separation between 'knowing' as formal, procedural, or abstract and 'doing' as practical,
perceptual, or informal (Ord & Nuttall, 2016).
Finnish artist and researcher Camilla Groth (2016) wanted to understand how embodied
cognition is enacted within artistic practice; to shine a light on the relationship between the
embodied mind and artistic practice. In her work with blind potters, she found that "sensory
experiences are key to sense-making" (Groth, p. 16, 2016). What we can see, touch, and learn by
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experiencing can shape our mind and emotions and thereby, seeing and touching play an
important role in learning (Groth, 2016). Additionally, she determined that emotions she
characterized as "low spirits and stress" proved to be helpful in "heightening alertness, ...
[providing] extra sensitivity and attunement to the material" ... thereby "aiding concentration and
focus on the problem at hand" (p. 13). Although research literature on design cognition does
include reflective conversations with material or reflecting-in-action and reflecting-on-action
(Groth, 2016; Schön , 1983), the literature does not explicitly include the body as a contributor
to knowledge.
An ecofeminist vision of learning includes tacit knowledge which, as described by
Polyani (1966) is unwritten, unspoken, and hidden; tacit knowledge is held by practically every
human being, based on his or her emotions, experiences, insights, intuition, observations and
internalized information. Any skill or practical knowledge involves tacit knowledge, which for
the most part is inexplicable, or at least very difficult to explain (Groth, 2016). For Groth (2016),
design thinking, or methods of design practice used to create solutions for design problems, can
help to clarify understanding of embodied cognition by illuminating how the material based act
of making can be an integral aspect of embodied thinking, encompassing subjective bodily
experiences.
The Invisible Body
The common sense notion of the body sees only the biological object called "my body."
But, within the environment, an integral aspect of the flow of interaction that defines our reality,
the body is also ecological; the body is phenomenological, as we live and experience it; the body
is social through our intersubjective relations; and the body is culturally composed of practices,
rituals, and institutions (Johnson, 2007).
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The body’s own tendency toward self-concealment allows for the possibility of its
neglect or deprecation. Our organic basis can be easily forgotten due to the
reticence of the visceral processes. Intentionality can be attributed to a
disembodied mind, given the self-effacement of the ecstatic body. As these
disappearances particularly characterize normal and healthy functioning,
forgetting about or "freeing oneself" from the body takes on a positive
valuation. (Leder, 1990, p. 69)
Looking at the example of fear, we know that the amygdala play a major role in the
processing of fear in an individual (Johnson, 2007). The amygdala controls the release of
hormones that increase heartbeat and respiration as well as other defense responses (Ledoux,
2000). We do not have a felt awareness of our amygdala doing this, we have a felt awareness of
a feeling - in this case of fear; thus illustrating that our 'recessive body' functions behind the
scenes allowing us to focus on the objects of our emotions rather than on our body's processes
(Johnson, 2007). Michael Polyani (1966) calls this the "from-to" nature of human perception
which is directed to what is perceived, from the body doing the perceiving. As he states:
Our body is the only assembly of things known almost exclusively by relying on
our awareness of them for attending to something else ...Every time we make sense
of the world, we rely on our tacit knowledge of impacts made by the world on our
body and the complex responses of our body to these impacts. (Polyani, 1966, p. 5)
Shaun Gallagher (2006), uses the contrasting ideas of body image, involving “perceptions,
attitudes, and beliefs pertaining to one's own body" …versus body schema which is "a system of
sensory-motor capacities that function without awareness or the necessity of perceptual
monitoring" (p.24), to differentiate between those aspects of our body of which we are aware,
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and those which function without our awareness. In other words, "We are aware of what we see,
but not of our seeing. The bodily processes hide in order to make possible our fluid, automatic
experience of the world" (Johnson, 2007, p. 5).
In much of an individual’s experience, the body is transparent, that is to say, while my
body is the source of my perceptions, I move through life unaware of my body's contribution to
my perceptions (Shusterman, 2006). "Rather than a mere mechanical corpse" (Shusterman, 2006,
p. 3), the sentient body, enables us to feel and thus to perceive. Revealing a fundamental human
ambiguity; that is we are both object and subject - I have a body and I am a body (Shusterman,
2006).
The Body-Mind
Our perceptual ability forms the basis of our ability to think abstractly and intellectually
(Stolz, 2015). Since our experience of the world comes to us through the 'lens' of our eyes, ears,
arms and legs, the categories and concepts we form are inseparable from our experience (Lakoff
& Johnson, 1999). In this way, our biological makeup creates the context for the categories that
we form (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). In other words, we come to truth through our bodies. As we
have experiences, we form concepts; thus concept formation is the stuff of experience (Lakoff &
Johnson, 1999). Additionally, each concept is actually a neural structure, which allows the
individual to "mentally characterize ... categories and reason about them" (Lakoff & Johnson,
1999, p. 19). These categories are typically conceptualized in terms of prototypes (also neural
structures) that allow for reasoning (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999).
Conceptualization, or, the ability to conceive and form concepts, arises from
our interactions with the world (Johnson, 2007; Tucker, 2007). Within the brain, conceptualizing
"recruits structures of sensorimotor processing..." that operate "within a motivational framework
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that evolved to help us function successfully within our complex environments" (Johnson, 2007,
p.101). In simplistic terms, the human brain developed through evolution by adding to the
primitive layers we share with other animals (Johnson, 2007). So, our primitive inner core
contains the limbic structures, which are responsible for monitoring our physiology, for
emotions, and for motivation, and the outer, cortical layer is responsible for reasoning, action
planning, perception, and movement (Johnson, 2007; Tucker, 2007). Interestingly, the structures
in the core region are very interconnected and those in the cortical layer are less so;
consequently, in the cortical shell there is more functional differentiation, where isolated parts
are responsible for different functions (Johnson, 2007; Tucker, 2007). Expressed in another way,
within the brain connections stay at their own level (with the exception of adjacent connections),
but for the most part connections within one level are made with other areas within same level
(Tucker, 2007). Additionally, the limbic core possesses the greatest density of connections and
there is a decrease in connections out toward primary sensory and motor modules...
In fact, the primary sensory and motor cortices can be accurately described as
modules because each is an isolated island, connected with the diencephalic
thalamus but with no other cortical areas except the adjacent unimodal association
cortex of that sensory modality or motor area. The exception is that the primary
motor cortex does have a point-to-point connection with the primary sensory
cortex. (Tucker, 2007, p. 78)
Whether an idea fits our preconceptions or challenges them, that conception is given importance
only by integrating with what is already there, whether it integrates by enlarging or changing
what preexists. What James (1911/1979) interpreted as a feeling of logical inference comes into
play as we "feel" a situation; a feeling of logical inference discredits the view of logic as
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superior. In this view, which I claim for my ecofeminist vision, logic is an embodied,
aesthetic sense, which "has a satisfying emotional quality because it possesses internal
integration and fulfillment reached through ordered and organized movement" (Dewey,
1928/1996, p. 38).
In Western thinking, human reason is seen as the capacity that differentiates us from
other species; reason is seen as autonomous from bodily capacities like perception and
movement (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). Rather than being autonomous from such abilities,
neuroscience supports instead, an evolutionary view in which reason grows out of bodily
capacities (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). This idea is demonstrated by the simple amoeba which
approaches what is beneficial to itself and avoids what is not by utilizing its sensing system and
ability to move and manipulate objects (Chatterjee, 2014a; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). Here we
see, at its most basic, how bodily capacities contribute to reason.
As an example, when we see a cup, we do not just have a visual experience, we also
become aware of what we might do with the cup, perhaps pick it up or drink from it; as the
process of seeing the cup unfolds, scientists observe the activation of canonical neurons which
are part of the sensorimotor system (Jeannerod, 1994). Mirror neuron phenomena indicate that
watching another do something, or even to imagine doing it ourselves - as with imagining
picking up a cup, activates some of the same sensorimotor areas as if we were actually
performing the activity. Mirror neuron research proposes that understanding is a form of
simulation (Johnson, 2007; Kosslyn 1994).
There is evidence to suggest that sensorimotor areas of the brain play a role in the
processing of abstract concepts (Johnson, 2007). What this could mean is that when we "grasp"
an idea, the neurological structure of grasping the cup is made available, or activated (Johnson,
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2007). We do not know if the brain actually does recruit motor schemas for abstract reasoning,
but this theory does suggest a "certain evolutionary economy" (Johnson, 2007, p. 173) that the
brain would utilize sensorimotor circuits for abstract cognitive functioning.
The brain evolved to regulate the motivational control of actions, carried out by
the motor system, guided by sensory evaluation of ongoing environmental events.
There are no "faculties" -- of memory, conscious perception, or music
appreciation -- that float in the mental ether, separate from the bodily
functions...When we study the brain to look for networks controlling cognition,
we find that all of the networks that have been implicated in cognition are
linked in one way or the other to sensory systems, to motor systems, or to
motivational systems. There are no brain parts for disembodied cognition emphasis added. (Tucker, 2007, p. 58)
Our meaning is human meaning, which means it is grounded in our bodies. What if, like moths,
we had wings and could follow scent trails, what would our view of the world, or truth be then?
It would be based on our bodily experience of the world. This illustration directs us to some
things we know about the human mind: the human mind coevolves with the human body; human
meaning is embodied, since even at the beginning of our lives we sense and feel our way to an
understanding of the vast complex of meanings; understanding and reasoning are embodied
based on our sensorimotor capacity; we are metaphorical creatures, forming our understanding of
one thing based on how we understand another thing, beginning with our simplest, earliest
understandings (Johnson, 2007).
The theory of embodied cognition proposes that cognition involves a deep connection
between perception and action (Stolz, 2015). Springing from philosophy, psychology, and
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neuroscience, the key assumption of embodied cognition is that “the body functions as a
constituent of the mind rather than a passive perceiver and actor serving the mind" (Leitan &
Chaffey, 2014). The theory that cognition is embodied presumes that the body has influence over
aspects of cognition, such as decision-making (Richter & Kennedy, 2017). Neuroscientist
Antonio Damasio (1994) offers an example with the story of a man who lost the ability to make
decisions when a tumor destroyed the portion of his brain connecting the frontal lobes. Rather
than become more rational, after losing the connection between reason and emotion, the patient
became paralyzed when required to make decisions (Damasio, 1994; Richter & Kennedy, 2017).
This example supports the idea that emotions provide an essential piece of human decisionmaking. It also supports my ecofeminist vision of embodied cognition, which rejects the
dichotomies like reason/emotion, perception/action, physical/mental, and mind/body, instead
finding that all are intertwined aspects of the cognitive process (Leitan & Chaffey, 2014). An
ecofeminist vision of embodied cognition aligns with Dewey's naturalism and Merleau-Ponty's
phenomenology because they share the view that the body experiences the world directly, rather
than as a passive vehicle for the mind; and cognition emerges from the individual's position in
the world (Leitan & Chaffey, 2014). In many ways, we are at the mercy of our life experiences,
and there is no pure reason, it springs from our bodily experience of the world (Lakoff &
Johnson, 1999).
Those whose bodily experiences teach them they are ‘other,’ including women, children,
the poor, the non-white, and those who are LGBTQ, are at the mercy of those messages that
diminish rather than extend their understanding of themselves as productive and significant. If
we make the first step, which is to honor bodily experience, we must immediately ask the other
question - whose experience (Matsuda, 1991) An ecofeminist lens can enable the ability to first
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perceive and then honor all types of bodily knowledge as we begin a shift towards valuing the
richness inherent in diversity, including diversity in ways of knowing. An exemplar for an
epistemology that honors all bodily experience can be found in indigenous ways of knowing. As
my story of Nainoa Thompson at the beginning of this chapter illustrates, indigenous ways of
knowing combine the cognitive and experiential into an integrated whole (Feinberg & Genz,
2012).
For William James, when we learn, we begin with experience and pluck from it those
aspects that are salient for us (Johnson, 2007).
The great difference between percepts and concepts is that percepts are
continuous and concepts are discrete. Not discrete in their being, for conception as
an act is part of the flux of feeling, but discrete from each other in their several
meanings. Each concept means just what it singly means, and nothing else… The
perceptual flux as such, on the contrary, means nothing, and is but what it
immediately is. No matter how small a tract of it be taken, it is always a much-atonce, and contains innumerable aspects and characters which conception can pick
out, isolate, and thereafter always intend. (James, 1911/1979, p. 32)
Such a view helps us to avoid the dualistic trap of seeing perception and conception or percepts
and concepts in opposition. Instead, like James (1911/1979), we can see them as aspects of
perceiving/conceiving, a single, rich process. According to Tucker (2007), both James and
Dewey were correct when they argued that an individual's all-encompassing grasp of a situation
is what engenders the ability to form concepts, within which the individual may distinguish the
distinct qualities of a particular perception (Johnson, 2007). Finding a home in an ecofeminist
vision of learning, the theory of embodied cognition locates the body in sense-making; finding
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that human cognition is dependent on interaction with the environment, therefore action,
perception, and emotion are important threads in knowledge formation (Groth, 2016). As Groth
(2016) discovered in her research with blind artists, bodily experience shapes our mind; the
cognitive and emotional are intertwined, both contributing to our conception of ourselves.
The Metaphoric Conceptual System
Lakoff and Johnson (1999) draw on the thinking of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and John
Dewey around the idea of experience, for their thoughts on embodiment. For Merleau-Ponty
(1964/2012) "flesh" expresses our primordial embodied experience and how our physical body
lives in the world. As recent neuroscience seems to uphold, Dewey (1934/2005) postulated that
bodily experience is the basis for everything we know. Human beings acquire primary
metaphors, not through effort or by being directly taught, but unconsciously, through ordinary
existence in our earliest years (Johnson, 2007; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 2016). We have no
influence on this acquisition as our neural connections are formed during the "period of
conflation" (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999,p. 47). In this period our infant brains do not distinguish
between sensorimotor and subjective (nonsensorimotor) experiences and judgment (Johnson,
2007). Hence, in the period of conflation, affection becomes joined with a feeling of warmth or
being held (Johnson, 2007). Additionally, as we learn a concept, for example, the color red, our
brains compensate for changes in reflected light as when a red balloon moves around in various
lighting conditions, thus having different reflectance, yet we still perceive it as red, revealing that
our perception of color arises from the interaction of these aspects (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch,
2016). We can therefore say color concepts are interactional, in that they arise from the
interactions of our embodied brains and the reflective properties of objects (Lakoff & Johnson,
1999; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 2016).
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The three aspects of mind that Lakoff and Johnson (1999) investigate are the cognitive
unconscious, the embodiment of mind, and metaphorical thought. All of these are exemplified in
our system of primary and complex metaphors (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). To discern and
demonstrate the importance of metaphor for framing our understanding of various ideas, Lakoff
and Johnson (1999) offer the example of the conception of love. It would be difficult to
understand love if we take away the metaphor of physical force which includes attraction,
electricity, and magnetism (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). Without these we are left with a skeletal
understanding of love, which is bereft of richness (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999).
Humans conceptualize our most important abstract concepts (love, causation, morality)
through metaphors (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). Each complex metaphor is built from primary
metaphors that are formed through bodily experience in the world. When sensorimotor
experience and subjective experience are regularly simultaneously activated or coactivated over
and over, permanent neural connections are forged (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). In this way we can
see that love and warmth may activate the same neural pathways, thus their meaning is joined in
the body (embodied) (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999).
Conceptual metaphors can be useful, crucial, or misleading to our thinking, and therefore
we must study them carefully (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). As in my story of the boy and the easel
at the beginning of chapter 3, when I was acting under the normative conception that men must
be strong, I was perpetuating a misleading metaphor. Understanding the aptness of a
metaphorical concept requires an embodied realism that depends on a body-based understanding
of basic-level experience within our world (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Tucker, 2007). Metaphors,
in turn, "supply the logic, the imagery, and the qualitative feel of sensorimotor experience to
abstract concepts" (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p. 128). These formations are unconsciously
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acquired and therefore we are not free to choose them (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). Metaphors
project patterns of inference from the primary, sensorimotor source onto a cognitive target
domain (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Tucker, 2007).
Complex metaphors are comprised of submetaphors or primary metaphors, which are
grounded in early experience as I described above with the primary metaphor love is warmth
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). So while there may be complex metaphors such a purposeful life is a
journey that are not directly grounded, they are built with primary metaphors - in this case
purposes are destinations and actions are motions - which are grounded, so in effect, the
complex metaphors are grounded (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999).
"Once we have learned a conceptual system, it is neurally instantiated in our brains and
we are not free to think just anything" (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p. 5). What a stunning thought!
There is no complete autonomy; we are at the mercy of our life experiences, and there is no pure
reason, it all springs from our bodily experience of the world (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Johnson,
2007). Reason is mostly unconscious; largely metaphorical and imaginative; is not dispassionate
but emotionally engaged; is not disembodied, but arises from our embodiment; is evolutionary
because it uses, rather than transcends the "perceptual and motor inference present in ‘lower
animals’” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p. 4); reason is universal in the way it springs from
embodied experience (Johnson, 2007).
In accordance with an ecofeminist vision of connection, we cannot think of reason and
concepts as transcendent once we realize their dependence on our bodies for their conceptual
structure (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). “Our bodies, our brains, and our environments together
generate a vastly meaningful milieu out of which all significance emerges for creatures with
bodies like ours" (Johnson, 2007, p. 31). For Johnson (2007), this generated milieu is immanent
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meaning. When we begin to see how abstract thinking and reasoning are grounded in immanent
meaning, we realize that such "higher" thinking is not disembodied as Western thought insists,
but instead leads to a richer understanding of thought (Johnson, 2007). For Johnson (2007)
"immanent, preconceptual, and nonpropositional meaning is the basis for all forms of meaning"
(p. 34).
In addition to revealing the bodily basis of reasoning and abstract thinking, an
understanding of our metaphoric conceptual system also reveals our empathetic ability as the
basis for our spiritual experience; through our aesthetic, (subjective sensory) experience,
empathy is our connection to an embodied spirituality that helps us find pleasure in the bodily
connection to earth, sky, plants, and animals (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). Lakoff and Johnson
(1999) define empathy as, "the focused imaginative experience of the other" (p. 566). From this
definition we can see that empathy links moral values and spiritual experience (Lakoff &
Johnson, 1999). Additionally, to simplify or find the essence of a thing, we appropriate our
physical awareness as we conceive something non-physical like moral uprightness (Johnson,
2007; Sheets-Johnstone, 1999).
The construction of metaphors is related to our ability to abstract. Abstraction is an
important tool for the furtherance of human inquiry, but because of the way it generalizes,
abstraction is also responsible for much of the loss of meaning that is available to us in any given
situation, thus it take us further from the situation's full meaning (Tucker, 2007).
Final Thoughts
Our bodies, the natural world, and our cultural environment are continually
communicating, providing each individual with a unique experience and a distinctive
understanding, arising from the interactions of our embodied brains within a cultural and natural
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environment (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Levy, 2012; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 2016). Our
earliest ways of learning are embodied (Sheets-Johnstone, 1999) and never leave us entirely,
though, as we age, we lose awareness of our understanding as interactional (Lakoff & Johnson,
1999; Levy, 2012; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 2016).
An ecofeminist vision of learning as embodied invites the interrogation of the Western
proclivity for viewing the head and the body as separate (Garrison, 1997). We see this separation
in the ways some schools deprive students of experiences within which they can “think the
world” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964/2012, p. 17).
As early childhood advocate, R. Clarke Fowler (2018) explains, at the current time in
American schools, we see a reduction in teacher autonomy along with a disappearance in childdirected activities in low SES (socioeconomic status) schools. This seems to suggest that
creativity, personal agency, and a sense of purpose are not deemed a necessary component of the
education of an individual who will not participate in a creative economy (Fowler, 2018). An
ecofeminist lens, suggests that patriarchy plays a role in this travesty. It reveals a social system
characterized by up–down relationships of domination and subordination, in which the downs
have difficulty getting their basic needs met (Glazebrook, 2002). In a patriarchal system, which
can be understood as an unhealthy social system in which men hold the power and women are
largely excluded from it, the downs can include women, other human others (in this case low
SES students), and non-human animals and nature (Chircop, 2006; Glazebrook, 2002; Warren
2000). The educational paradigm I described above utilizes an up-down conceptual metaphor (an
oppressive conceptual framework) that informs relationships within the educational system in a
powerful way. The logic of domination is a significant feature of an oppressive framework
because it legitimates subordination as logical since it assumes a relationship of hierarchy
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(Chricop, 2006; Warren, 2000). In Ecological feminist philosophies (1996), Karen Warren offers
this example of how the logic of domination works:
Humans do, and plants and rocks do not, have the capacity to consciously and
radically change the community in which they live.
Whatever has the capacity to consciously and radically change the community in
which it lives is morally superior to whatever lacks this capacity.
Thus, humans are morally superior to plants and rocks.
For any X and Y, if X is morally superior to Y, then X is morally justified in
subordinating Y.
Thus, humans are morally justified in subordinating plants and rocks. (p. 22)
When we do not institute a curriculum of rich experience for low SES students, we do not
prepare them to participate fully and creatively in the world. The low SES students are the
downs, destined to be low SES adults. The paradigm that Fowler (2018) describes utilizes the
application of the logic of domination to the perceived divide between mind and body. The
thinking might look something like this: The mind, where consciousness resides, is morally
superior to the body, where physical urges reside, so the mind (as characterized by seat-work)
must subordinate the body (as characterized by child-directed activities).
The root metaphor of hierarchy invigorates the logic of domination. I argue that webs of
interconnected would be more useful for characterizing the way the mind and body interact in
the learning process. As I related in chapter 2, according to Elliot Eisner (1998), knowledge is
not completely cognitive but instead much is tacit and therefore, intuitive, experiential, personal,
and secured in action (Eisner, 1998). Eisner (2002a) also promotes the idea that intrinsic
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satisfactions matter and form the basis for our passionate desires or eros (Garrison, 1997), which
is at the root of aesthetic learning experiences.
At the theoretical level, the conceptual analysis and argumentative
justification of the women–nature connection by the patriarchal logic of
domination is ecofeminism’s fundamental insight underlying all forms of
oppression (emphasis added). This insight will contribute to a better understanding
of the mechanisms underlying gendered educational inequities. (Chircop, 2006, p.
145)
Within an ecofeminist analysis, which reveals the oppressive hierarchies that characterize the
relationship of humans to the earth and to each other, our view of learning as a hierarchical
activity of the mind, is also illuminated (Kings, 2017). Additionally, it reveals the flaws in a
conception of learning that marginalizes knowledge that results from gender, race, and class
(Glazebrook, 2002).
In order to provide of vision of learning as meaning-making (Liston, 2001) or generated
knowledge (Rasmussen, 2014), I suggest engaging and ecofeminist epistemology to provide a
vision of learning as connected and embodied, in which body and mind work in concert to
engage with the cultural and environmental world. An ecofeminist epistemology embraces
knowing as simultaneously cognitive, emotional, spiritual, and embodied (Jun, 2014). Such a
framework suggests what the students Fowler (2018) describes need is more time devoted to
child-directed activities and greater teacher autonomy to ensure those activities are meaningfully
engaged. As the example of Nainoa Thompson demonstrates, indigenous ways of knowing can
offer examples to guide our reconnection with this holistic epistemology.
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In the next chapter I further investigate the aspects of the body-mind to uncover more
specifically how aesthetic learning is inscribed on the body.
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CHAPTER 5
CRITIQUING MIND OVER BODY: AN ECOFEMINIST PERSPECTIVE
My fifth grade students had been learning about the ancient Egyptian civilization for
several weeks. As part of their studies, they were each assigned a particular topic to research in
depth. One student, Petra, had been assigned the Nile River as her specific research area, and
therefore, she had heard and read repeatedly, “The Nile River floods every year, depositing rich
soil, which enabled the Egyptians to grow crops.” In art class, Petra had decided to make a paper
maché rendition of her topic, which included a topographical view of the sandy landscape of
Egypt, with a river running through it. As she painted the blue river, I asked if she would place
brown paint along the sides of the blue? “Why would I do that?” she asked. “Because the Nile
River floods and deposits rich soil. That’s where the Egyptians could grow crops.” This was
perhaps the seventh or eighth time Petra had heard similar statements, but now her eyebrows
went up, and the proverbial light bulb came on. I could almost see her thought process, “Oh… I
get it! That’s why everyone keeps saying that!” As much as I’d like to think that Petra’s light
bulb moment happened because I am a particularly gifted teacher and therefore my words are
powerful, in this instance, that is not the case. Instead, because she was physically engaged with
her own Nile River, these words Petra had heard so many times, “the Nile River floods every
year,” now had a place to live. For Petra, understanding required a subjective sensory (aesthetic)
experience that involved her body and her mind.
As we observed her project together, Petra and I comprised a learning community
(Liston, 2001). It was not the traditional, hierarchical model of teacher and student in which,
rather than asking her plan I would have directed, “you need to put brown paint beside the blue.”
Instead, we centered the subject (Palmer, 2007), which in this case was the Nile River. The
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experience was educative in that it connected to Petra’s previous experiences helping them
become available to be useful – to be continued (Dewey, 1938/1997). It was also an experience
in that Petra’s sensibilities and understandings were ordered or changed through her form’s
engagement with the matter of the experience (Dewey, 1934/2005). In other words in what we
often refer to as a ‘light-bulb’ moment, Petra could draw a distinction between her old and new
understanding of the Nile River as it impacted the development of the Egyptian civilization.
Though she did not reflect her thoughts in words, I saw them in her face. It was not an
experience of her mind alone; it engaged her body and mind, and she found it was pleasurable to
make that connection.
This story exemplifies an ecofeminist vision of learning as aesthetic, embodied and
connected, because it places these subjective sensory (aesthetic) experiences within a web of
interaction with cognition. It embraces the body-mind connection without hierarchizing either;
instead such a vision understands the body and mind work in dialogue. It presents a foundation
for an epistemology that recognizes knowing as embodied and connected to the learner’s lived
experience (Hatrvester & Blenkinsop, 2010; Selam, 2006). Such a vision helps critique
oppressive conceptual frameworks, such as mind over body, male over female, and human over
nonhuman other, which spring from the patriarchal metaphor of a vertical, discrete line that
currently invigorates the accepted view of what constitutes learning. An ecofeminist lens
suggests instead, a more holistic metaphor of a web of connection or as Darwin describes in On
The Origin of Species (1859/1964), a tangled bank:
It is interesting to contemplate a tangled bank, clothed with many plants of many
kinds, with birds singing on the bushes, with various insects flitting about, and
with worms crawling through the damp earth, and to reflect that these elaborately
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constructed forms, so different from each other, and dependent upon each other in
so complex a manner, have all been produced by laws acting around us…. There
is grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers, having been originally
breathed by the Creator into a few forms or into one; and that, whilst this planet
has gone circling on according to the fixed law of gravity, from so simple a
beginning, endless forms most wonderful have been, and are being evolved. (p.
429)
An ecofeminist lens illuminates a view of learning that recognizes, like the tangled bank, all
things are connected; it honors the capacity of aesthetic experiences, such as Petra’s, to both
theoretically and physically, inscribe themselves on the body-mind.
In order to theorize around the idea of learning as aesthetic experience that inscribes on
the body-mind, in this chapter I investigate the manner in which our bodies keep score of life
experiences. To that end Bessel van der Kolk’s, The Body Keeps the Score: Brain, Mind and
Body in the Healing of Trauma (2015) has proven to be a valuable resource. For my purpose, I
wish to flip his thesis to illustrate my theory that aesthetic experiences inscribe on the body, but
unlike trauma, in a way that resonates as beautiful rather than horrific. Such aesthetic, embodied
knowing, becomes a powerful wellspring for eros (Garrison, 1997), or those passionate desires
that give life meaning and purpose.
To frame my thinking, I will first explore the physiology of the brain as it relates to
understanding the body-mind. I begin the chapter presenting an overview of the relatively new
field of neuroaesthetics. Next, I investigate the effect of trauma on the body-mind and then
finally, offer examples of how aesthetic learning, in the form of subjective sensory experience, is
used to mitigate trauma’s effects. Agency, or the subjective awareness of initiating, executing,
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and controlling one’s volitional actions in the world, is a pre-reflective form of awareness, which
involves the sense of the self as in control rather than being controlled, and it applies to motor
movements and thoughts (Tsakiris, Schutz-Bosbach, & Gallagher, 2007). Such self-agency is at
play in the subjective awareness of initiating, executing, and controlling whether we approach or
avoid something. Lack of ability to control a devastating situation and the resulting inability to
weave that experience into a cohesive story create trauma (van der Kolk, 2015). Finding a sense
of self-agency is essential for resolving symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)
(Bremner, 2016). I theorize that the experience of self-agency plays an important role in learning
that is aesthetic, embodied and connected.
Neuroaesthetics
‘Neuroaesthetics’ is a term coined by vision neuroscientist Semir Zeki of University
College London in the 1990s (Chatterjee, 2014b; Zeki, 1993). Neuroaesthetics is defined as “an
emerging discipline dedicated to exploring the neural processes underlying our appreciation and
production of beautiful objects and artwork, experiences that include perception, interpretation,
emotion, and action” (Chatterjee, 2014a, p.1). This sounds very compatible with Dewey’s
(1934/2005) description of an experience. As he describes, an experience embodies certain
qualities: it satisfies an impulsion; is receptive and perceptive; it causes the one engaged to
reflect; and it achieves consummation. Though Chatterjee (2014a) is referring to aesthetic
experience that stems from looking at beautiful art objects, I claim his words for my purpose
which is to describe aesthetic experience in general; that is those experiences whether they
involve looking at art or adding a row of numbers, which invite “perception, interpretation,
emotion, and action” (Chatterjee, 2014a, p.1). Accordingly, aesthetic pleasure is rooted in basic
appetites, but it also extends beyond them because it utilizes part of our neural system that
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promotes liking without wanting (Berridge & Kringelbach, 2008; Chatterjee, 2014a). Liking and
wanting are, of course, different things. Liking is the pleasure we get from objects and wanting is
the desire we have for them (Chatterjee, 2014a). Liking is the core experience of pleasure and it
works by engaging the nucleus accumbens and the reward system (Berridge & Kringelbach,
2008; Chatterjee 2014a). This system utilizes natural brain cannabinoids and mu-opioids that are
similar to the chemicals found in cannabis and opium and the receptors for these drive our sense
of liking (Berridge & Kringelbach, 2008; Chatterjee 2014a). Wanting, or the desire to get the
things we like, is driven by dopamine rather than cannabinoid or opioids (Berridge &
Kringelbach, 2008; Chatterjee 2014a, 2014b).
It makes sense that liking and wanting work together since we like what we want and we
want what we like. However, these two things can and do become uncoupled from each other
through rewards (Berridge & Kringelbach, 2008; Chatterjee, 2014a). Dopamine is involved in
this type of learning because as we predict future rewards, dopamine neurons increase firing
when the reward is better than we expect and they decrease firing when the reward is less than
expected (Schultz, 2007). Our cortical systems (those that utilize the cerebral cortex) interact
with the nucleus accumbens and the reward system enabling humans to avoid becoming enslaved
to our wants, likes, desires, and pleasures (Berridge & Kringelbach, 2008; Chatterjee, 2014a). As
any first year teacher knows, rewards change behavior. One implication of this “is that we
constantly adjust our expectations as we confront reality, often without even being aware that we
are learning” (Chatterjee, 2014a, p. 106). Our reward system powers our basic appetites for
things like food and sex but it also helps us develop abstract notions like deciding whom we can
trust (Chatterjee, 2014a). So, the same brain system that guides us in choosing what to eat is
utilized as we evaluate something abstract like fairness or another person’s reputation
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(Chatterjee, 2014a). Our reward system allows us to experience pleasure, to evaluate that
pleasure, to plan how to get more pleasure, and to modify and restrain our methods; in other
words our reward system helps us learn (Berridge & Kringelbach, 2008; Chatterjee, 2014a).
As an artist, I find it helpful to visualize the brain in three parts: first to develop in an
individual is the reptilian brain that is located in the brain stem and controls life-sustaining
functions like breathing, sleeping, and peeing; next is the limbic region which is organized
during the first six years of life and continues developing in a use-dependent manner (also called
neuroplasticity) through life, it controls things like categorization, perception, and determining
emotional relevance; finally, the prefrontal cortex (part of the neocortex), develops last and is
responsible for planning, anticipation, sense of time, and empathetic understanding, and along
with the limbic system is vulnerable when it senses threat (Carter, Aldridge, Page, & Parker,
2014; Carter & Frith, 2010).
Besides being the first portion of the brain to develop as an enfant develops, the reptilian
brain is also evolutionarily the oldest portion (Carter et al., 2014; Carter & Frith, 2010). Because
it contains brain structures that humans share with creatures like birds and lizards, this portion is
given the name the reptilian brain (Al-Chalabi, Turner, & Delamont, 2008; Carter et al., 2014;
Carter & Frith, 2010). The ability to operate instinctively, to move reflexively, and to sense
environments are behaviors handled by the reptilian brain, which links the brain and body in
emotional experiences causing, for example, our eyes to dilate when we are excited and our
palms to sweat when we are nervous (Chatterjee, 2014a; Shimamura, 2012).
Above the reptilian brain is the limbic system, also known as the mammalian brain
because all mammals have one (Carter et al., 2014; Carter & Frith, 2010). This portion of the
brain advances after birth; the limbic system is important for dealing with the challenges of
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living in complex social systems, monitoring danger, pleasure, fear, and what is necessary for
survival (Carter et al., 2014). As Perry, Pollard, Blakley, Baker, and Vigilante (1995) first
described, this portion of the brain is ‘neuroplastic’, meaning it forms through use, so as certain
neurons are used they become the default, or the response most likely to occur. With this in
mind, we can see how some individuals who are safe and loved become adept at exploration and
play, and those who have experienced fright and rejection become adept at feeling alone and
fearful (Perry et al., 1995). Van der Kolk (2015) refers to the limbic system and the reptilian
brain together as the "emotional brain" (p. 57). The emotional brain is the heart of the central
nervous system, which reacts to both danger and opportunity with a squirt of hormone that
provides an individual with a visceral sensation that overrides any thinking the cognitive mind
was concerned with (van der Kolk, 2015). The emotional brain's job is to assess incoming
information quickly, by jumping to conclusions based on similarities rather than rationally
sorting complex options, as is the job of the neocortex, or the rational brain (van der Kolk, 2015).
Thus, the emotional brain's biochemistry is simpler than that of the younger, cognitive brain.
Continuing with our three part picture, the rational, cognitive portion of the brain takes up
about 30 percent of the brain's mass; this portion is concerned with figuring out how the world
works - including things and other people (LlinaÌs, 2002; Carter & Frith, 2010). The cerebral
cortex is the outer-most portion of the brain, completely covering it except for a small portion of
the cerebellum that sticks out in the back (Al-Chalabi et al., 2008). The neocortex, as previously
stated, is the most recent portion of the cerebral cortex to evolve and it comprises 90% of it (AlChalabi, et al., 2008; Bear et al., 2007; Carter et al., 2014; Carter & Frith, 2010).
The neocortex is divided into four parts or lobes: the frontal lobe is, as its name indicates,
in the front and it extends to the central sulcus (a groove or furrow in the brain is called a sulcus);
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the parietal lobe extends from the central sulcus to the occipital lobe, which is in the posterior or
back of the brain; and finally, the temporal lobe extends from the place where the occipital and
parietal lobes meet, to the anterior under the frontal lobe (Al-Chalabi, et al, 2008; Miller &
Miller, 2011). The neocortex enables most of the complex activities that we associate with being
human; including the acquisition of language, complex social and tool-making skills, and high
level-consciousness (Al-Chalabi, et al., 2008; Bear et al., 2007; Carter et al., 2014; Carter &
Frith, 2010). The neocortex is something we share with other mammals, though thicker in
humans, it begins to develop rapidly around 2 years old and around age 7 we begin to see
evidence of frontal lobe capacities such as understanding abstract ideas and planning ahead
(Carter et al., 2014; Carter & Frith, 2010).
An important aspect of brain physiology to understand is lateralization, which is the idea
that the two halves of the brain's cerebral cortex, left and right, execute different functions
(Chatterjee, 2014a; Shimamura, 2012). In general, the right side of the brain takes care of the left
side of the body and vice versa (Al-Chalabi et al., 2008). The concept of the dominance of one
side of the brain over the other is derived from the location of language functions (Chatterjee,
2014a). For example, almost all right-handed people are dominant for language function on the
left side of their brain (Al-Chalabi, et al., 2008; Bear et al., 2007). Interestingly, when there is
damage to the brain in the first two years of life, it can be possible for the brain to re-wire itself
(Al-Chalabi et al., 2008). Understanding this plasticity in order that people older than two years,
such as those who suffer a stroke, might be helped, is a goal that concerns many neuroscientists
today (Al-Chalabi et al., 2008). The two hemispheres of the brain are connected by the corpus
callosum (Bear et al., 2007).
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The various portions of the brain communicate with each other through extensions of
neurons called axons, we can think of this as the ‘wired’ brain (Al-Chalabi, et al., 2008; Bear et
al., 2007). Besides the neural circuits of the wired brain, there is an additional hormonal aspect of
the brain that uses diffuse-projection neurons called neuromodulation to modify the intensity of
neurotransmissions (Al-Chalabi, et al., 2008; Bear et al., 2007). Neuromodulation does not
change the nature of the connection between two neurons, but instead, it modified the intensity
of the transmission, giving it ‘color’ (Al-Chalabi, et al., 2008; Bear et al., 2007). Phenomena
such as attentiveness, pleasure, and anxiety require the coordinated efforts of the wired brain and
the hormonal brain, thus the nervous system and the hormonal system are independent but
actually control each other (Al-Chalabi, et al., 2008; Bear et al., 2007), or as I conceptualize
them, they work in dialogue.
The phrase “pleasure center of the brain,” first coined by Olds (1956), is for the most
part, a good way to describe the neurological substrates of rewards for behavior, but the term
“center” which indicates a single location has been replaced by the word “system,” which
stresses the involvement of multiple groups of neurons (Berridge, 2003; Wise, 1980). In our
daily lives, information comes to us in a variety ways as we hear, see, touch, taste, and smell the
world around us. Each sensory system begins with specialized receptor cells such as vibration
sensitive neurons in the cochlea of the ear, pressure sensitive neurons of the skin, or lightreceptive neurons in the retina of the eye (Al-Chalabi et al., 2008; Kandel, Schwartz, & Jessell,
2000). As an example, when we see something, visual processing commences in the brain. This
processing begins in the retina of the eyes and that visual information is then sorted in different
regions of the occipital and temporal lobes where complex objects like faces, bodies, or
landscapes have their own special region (Chatterjee, 2014a; Shimamura, 2012). The
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hippocampus plays an important role in our processing of complex objects as a critical
storehouse of meaning, where we gather our knowledge of the world that is tagged in time
(Chatterjee, 2014a; Shimamura, 2012).
As something beautiful captures our attention and we engage with it, we activate our
parietal and frontal lobes (Chatterjee, 2014a; Shimamura, 2012). As human beings, we are wired
to find pleasure in things that ensure our survival, so pleasure is deeply rooted in our
evolutionary past as well as in our integration with the natural world (Chatterjee, 2014; Gopnik,
1998). As I reported previously, all organisms, even amoebae, are driven to either approach or
avoid other organisms (Chatterjee, 2014a). As human beings, our ancestors who found pleasure
in an object or activity with survival value and who therefore approached it were the ones of
their era who lived to produce children (Chatterjee, 2014a; Gallup & Frederick, 2010). The
pleasure aroused by certain faces, places and even mathematical formulas can now be studied
with magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
technologies (Chatterjee, 2014a; Gallup & Frederick, 2010), allowing for the development of the
field of neuroaesthetics. Our reactions of pleasure cause us to continually seek out those objects
and experiences that we find aesthetic (Chatterjee, 2014a; Gallup & Frederick, 2010).
According to Chatterjee (2014b), aesthetic pleasure, or the pleasure we find in beauty,
extends beyond appetitive pleasure in at least three ways: first it taps into our neural system that
is biased toward liking without wanting; second, aesthetic pleasure is nuanced and involves a
mixture of emotions; and third, as Csikszentmihalyi and Robinson (1990) agree, aesthetic
pleasure is influence by our cognitive system which is colored by experience. We have evolved
to find things beautiful that extend our abilities to survive or procreate; finding aesthetic pleasure
in those things is then passed down both biologically and culturally (Chatterjee, 2014a; Prum,
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2017; Shimamura, 2012). Pleasure drives us to beauty and beauty produces different responses
within us for different reasons; it engages our sensations, emotions and meaning flexibly
(Chatterjee, 2014a; 2014b; Shimamura, 2012).
Trauma in the Body-Mind
An important task the brain performs is identifying danger. It does this with the help of
the amygdala and the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), which is an aspect of the frontal lobes
(Ratey, 2001; Carter & Frith, 2010). The amygdala, which is part of the limbic system is shaped
by experience (neuroplastic) and it reacts much more quickly to signals of danger than the MPFC
(van der Kolk, 2015). Van der Kolk (2015) has nicknamed the amygdala the ‘smoke detector,’
because of its speedy response time. Sensory information from eyes, ears, nose, and skin come in
to the thalamus, which is also within the limbic system (Chatterjee, 2014a). The thalamus, or ‘the
cook,’ then takes all the sensory input and stirs it into a soup which it then passes to both the
amygdala and MPFC (van der Kolk, 2015). When the 'soup' communicates danger, the amygdala
triggers the release of powerful stress hormones, including cortisol and adrenaline which prepare
the individual to fight or run away by increasing blood pressure, heart rate, and breathing rate
(Fisher, 2014; van der Kolk, 2015). Since it does its work more quickly than the frontal lobes do
theirs, it can happen that in fact, there is no danger at all and then the enflamed system must be
calmed (Fisher, 2014).
Once the 'smoke alarm' has been triggered, there are two ways to calm it; one is through
moderating messages from the MPFC and the other is through the reptilian brain by way of
breathing, movement, and touch (Fisher, 2014). Trauma increases the risk of misinterpreting
signals of danger and of an impaired ability to activate calming mechanisms (Ogden, Minton, &
Pain, 2006). Our early explorations as toddlers begin shaping the limbic structures, devoted to
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emotion and memory, but these structures can be modified significantly later in life for the better
by those experiences we find aesthetic such as love and friendship, or for the worse by
experiences that are traumatic, like abuse and neglect (Ratey, 2001; van der Kolk, 2015). Our
emotions color what we notice and how we experience those things we attend to (Chatterjee,
2014a; Shimamura, 2012). As an ecofeminist vision supports, we must not place emotion and
reason in opposition since emotions help the individual determine the significance of experiences
and therefore, they are the foundation of reason (Morgan, Romanski, & Ledoux, 1993). When
people are neurotic, extroverted, or laidback, these differences are written into differences in the
frontal lobes and their connection with the limbic region, which is responsible for happiness and
pleasure as well as our fear and disgust area (Chatterjee, 2014a; Shimamura, 2012). The basal
ganglia, which are found outside and above the limbic system, contribute to our experience of
pleasure and reward because they are washed in dopamine, opioid, and cannabinoid
neurotransmitters that can be thought of as pleasure chemicals (Chatterjee, 2014a; Shimamura,
2012).
When the emotional and rational systems fall out of balance due to trauma, we feel it
viscerally in the heart, lungs, and gut; the imbalance is manifested in physical discomfort as well
as psychological misery (Morgan et al., 1993). The outcome of severe trauma can be that the
individual is stuck in survival mode (van der Kolk, 2015). Such stress can affect what Pavlov
(1927) named the reflex of purpose; which involves both movement and emotions - feeling and
doing. When the left hemisphere shuts down either during the actual trauma or during
reactivations of the original trauma, the individual frequently relates it feels as if they are losing
their mind; in fact, they are experience what is referred to as the loss of executive functioning -
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many feelings are present but no way to organize or name them is available to the individual
(Ogden et al., 2006).
Fear triggers the amygdala to release serotonin, a neurotransmitter and stress hormone
that drives up blood pressure, heart rate, and oxygen intake (Roozendaal, Mcewen, & Chattarji,
2009). Individuals with low levels of serotonin are hyperreactive to stress, while those will
higher levels of serotonin have a reduction in their 'fear system', making them less likely to
become aggressive or frozen in response to a threat or potential threat (Gray & McNaughton,
1996; Ogden, Minton, & Pain, 2006). Extreme trauma causes an immobilization of Brocca's
area, which is one of the speech centers of the brain; in this way, trauma leaves the individual
speechless, unable to put words to their experience and so we see mute assault victims, soldiers,
and traumatized children (Roozendaal et al., 2009; van der Kolk, 2015).
In addition to immobilizing Brocca's area, trauma 'lights-up' Bordmann's area 19, which
is a region in the visual cortex that normally activates when visual stimuli first enter the brain;
even when trauma has long since passed, this area is reactivated (Roozendaal et al., 2009; van
der Kolk, 2015). Van der Kolk (2015) also noted that sounds, smells and physical sensations
register in reactivated trauma "apparently unmodified by the passage of time" (p. 44), these
experiences are commonly referred to as ‘flashbacks’. As I explained previously when I describe
the concept of lateralization, the left-brain is where vocabulary, facts, and statistics are
processed, while the right brain stores sounds, touch, and smell (Chatterjee, 2014a; Shimamura,
2012). Ordinarily, the two sides work together fluidly, but when one side shuts down, the
individual cannot organize experience logically, nor can it put feelings and perceptions into
words (van der Kolk, 2015). The effects of trauma include memory and attention issues, and
irritability and sleep problems, all stemming from elevated stress hormones (Roozendaal et al.,
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2009; van der Kolk, 2015). Talk therapy has a limited usefulness in such cases since "no matter
how much insight and understanding we develop, the rational brain is basically impotent to talk
the emotional brain out of its own reality" (van der Kolk, 2015, p. 47). Drug therapy may dull the
consequent feelings but it does nothing for the root cause; the trick for the one traumatized it
seems, is to find a way to integrate the experience into the whole of their life (Roozendaal et al.,
2009; van der Kolk, 2015).
One way to integrate traumatic experience is through the adaptive response. The adaptive
response to threat is basic to human survival and this response is characterized by at least two
critical aspects: first is the ability to take an active role - to become an agent of one's own rescue;
the second is to imagine a creative alternative (van der Kolk, 2015). Van der Kolk (2015) offers
the example of, Noam the five year-old son of a family friend, who attended PS 234, an
elementary school only 1500 feet from the World Trade Center in Manhattan. On September 11,
2001, Noam, his older brother, and their dad all had to run for their lives as planes began striking
the World Trade Center. They made it safely home and the next day Noam created a drawing of
what he had witnessed. Noam's drawing included airplanes, flaming buildings, and figures
leaping from the buildings. It also included a black circle at the base of one building. When
Noam was questioned he related it was a trampoline, "So the next time people have to jump, they
will be safe" (van der Kolk, 2015, p. 52). Thus Noam demonstrates the two aspect of the
adaptive response mentioned above; he was able to be an agent of his own rescue by running
away, and he was able to imagine a creative alternative in the form of a trampoline. In this
example we see the impact of self-agency in the healing of trauma.
An individual who cannot make an adaptive response becomes stuck; he or she cannot
integrate the experience into his or her life and thus are doomed to continually relive an
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unchanging, immutable trauma -- every new event is thus contaminated by the past (Roozendaal
et al., 2009; van der Kolk, 2014). When stress hormone levels remain elevated and cannot be
restored to normal, an individual can experience ongoing fear, rage, and even physical disease
(Roozendaal et al., 2009; van der Kolk, 2015). Since the early 1990s, with the development of
brain imaging tools, neuroscience can show what happens inside the brains of those who are
traumatized. Because of these tools we have come to understand the manner in which profound
trauma is not simply an event that happened, but instead become imprinted on the mind, body,
and brain; this imprint has consequences for how the individual experiences the world (Insel,
2010; van der Kolk, 2015).
When the brain's alarm system is turned on, it automatically triggers
preprogrammed physical escape plans in the oldest part of the brain. As in other
animals, the nerves and chemicals that make up our basic brain structure have a
direct connection with our body. When the old brain takes over, it partially shuts
down the higher brain, our conscious mind, and propels the body to run, hide,
fight, or, on occasion, freeze. By the time we are fully aware of our situation, our
body may already be on the move. If the fight/flight/freeze response is successful
and we escape the danger, we recover our internal equilibrium and gradually
regain our senses. (van der Kolk, 2015, p. 54)
The ability to move, to take an active role to do something to save oneself, is an aspect of the
adaptive response enabling the survivor of trauma to integrate that trauma (Lima, et al., 2010). If
this ability is thwarted and the trauma cannot be integrated, the body keeps its reaction going and
thus the survivor experiences the world with a different nervous system than the one they
possessed before the trauma (Lima, et al., 2010).
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Van der Kolk (2015) proposes 3 possibilities for helping individuals whose lives have
been dramatically affected by trauma. These include drug therapy which involves treating trauma
chemically, talk therapy which allows for greater understanding of the trauma experience and
reaction, and finally a palliative solution which allows "the body to have experiences that deeply
and viscerally contradict the helplessness, rage, or collapse that result from trauma" (van der
Kolk, 2015, p. 3). In other words, when the individual was somehow thwarted from making an
adaptive response at the time of the trauma, a palliative solution allows for it after the fact.
We have begun to understand how overwhelming experiences affect our innermost
sensations and our relationship to our physical reality - the core of who we are. They are not just
events that are part of the past; such experiences leave an imprint on mind, brain, and body. This
imprint has ongoing consequences for how the human organism survives and thrives in the
present. In the next section I present non-drug trauma treatments, which utilize “perception,
interpretation, emotion, and action” as aesthetic experience (Chatterjee, 2014a), in order to
engender an adaptive response in traumatized individuals. An ecofeminist vision of learning as
aesthetic, embodied and connected, embraces the role of such experiences to heal because they
connect all aspects of an individual’s being – the physical, social, and environmental – in
meaningful, healthful ways.
Aesthetic Learning Experience as a Means of Integrating Trauma
Van der Kolk (2015) suggests that resonance (the opposite of dissonance) is key to the
healing of trauma. In 1893, Pierre Janet, who explored trauma, described what he named "the
pleasure of completed action," (1893/1925, p. 660) to characterize the relief that comes from
therapies which help the individual restore a sense of agency, in particular he was interested in
what today we term somatic therapies, because they utilize the body in a variety of ways, for
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achieving the resonant pleasure of competed action. When faced with extreme stress, the body
responds by producing stress hormones to facilitate fleeing, fighting, or freezing (Insel, 2010;
van der Kolk, 2015). When these inclinations are thwarted, and the individual is helpless or
immobilized, the hormones continue to be secreted and therefore the body persists in its hyperaroused state (Insel, 2010; van der Kolk, 2014).
Unlike ordinary events, traumatic events are not something one remembers via a coherent
story, something with a beginning, middle, and end (van der Kolk, 2014). Instead, traumatic
events are relived through physical sensations, emotions, images, and even smells or sounds
associated with the event (Insel, 2010; van der Kolk, 2015). As fMRIs indicate, the portion of the
brain that provides a sense of time and perspective, as well as the portion that integrates images,
sounds and sensations into a coherent story, are offline during a traumatic experience, allowing
for the development of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (Mithoefer et al., 2013; van der
Kolk, 2015). Trauma can be successfully processed only when the entire brain is kept
online while the individual remembers what happened; the ability to quietly observe oneself, in
order to put the pieces together, finding words where words were absent, is crucial (Insel, 2010;
van der Kolk, 2015).
Thus, ‘words’ in the form of a cohesive trauma story help to lessen the isolation of
trauma, but they can obscure the fact that trauma changes people - individuals are not the same
before and after a traumatic event since the brain rewires itself as a result (Kelley, Macrae,
Wyland, Caglar, Inati, & Heatherton, 2002). Ways of knowing are localized in very different, far
removed parts of the brain; physical sensations of moment to moment self-awareness are found
in the emotional brain (the limbic system and the reptilian brain together) while autobiographical
ways of knowing, which track the self across time, and creates assemblages of experiences into
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coherent stories, is found in the medial prefrontal cortex (Kelley et al., 2002). Usually the
autobiographical and emotional work together, however in severe trauma, they can be split and
tell different stories. This is called posttraumatic stress syndrome.
[P]osttraumatic stress is the result of a fundamental reorganization of the central
nervous system based on having experience an actual threat of annihilation, (or
seeing someone else being annihilated), which reorganizes self experience (as
helpless) and the interpretation of reality (the entire world is a dangerous place).
(van der Kolk, 2015, p. 258)
The emotional brain can only be changed, and the two stories integrated through the
autobiographical system in the medial prefrontal cortex (Kelley et al., 2002). Thus we see how
trauma works to break connections. An ecofeminist vision of learning as aesthetic, embodied and
connected offers a vision for a tangled web of connection in which all aspects of the individual
work as n integrated whole. For this integration to occur, all aspects of the individual including
the social or interhuman, the internal, which includes the cognitive, emotional and invisible
body, all of which together I call the intrahuman, and the environmental must connect (Kelley et
al., 2002; van der Kolk, 2015). The following are examples of healing as a result of such
connection. They are manifested through what I label ‘aesthetic learning experiences’ because
they utilize subjective sensory experiences, thus they help to fill in my ecofeminist vision of the
tangled web of learning.
Reciprocity
The standard medical treatment for the effects of trauma is to find the right drug and not
to deal with how the effects of the drug prevent the individual’s meaningful engagement in
community (Porges, 2011; van der Kolk, 2015). Feeling safe with others is probably the single
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most important aspect of mental health, enabling us to enjoy meaningful and satisfying lives
(Porges, 2011; van der Kolk, 2015). "The critical issue is reciprocity; being truly heard and seen
by the people around us, feeling that we are held in someone else's mind and heart" (van der
Kolk, 2015, p. 81). In order to become calm, to quiet our enflamed system we need a visceral
feeling of safety (Holt, 1997). Holt (1997) has named this ability, licking and grooming behavior
after the behavior that animals use to quiet their enflamed systems. Danger turns off our ability
to socially engage, resulting in the desire for “fight or flight," however there is a third option
which is dissociation, or withdrawal and shutting down (Porges, 2016). This type of
disengagement and collapse is controlled by the DVC (the dorsal vagal complex), which is an
evolutionarily ancient part of the parasympathetic nervous system (Porges, 2016; van der Kolk,
2014).
Knowing that we are seen and heard by the important people in our lives can make
us feel calm and safe, and ... being ignored or dismissed can precipitate rage
reactions or mental collapse. [This] ...helps us understand why focused attunement
with another person can shift us out of disorganized and fearful states. (van der
Kolk, 2015, p. 80)
Humans are amazingly attuned to the emotional shifts of others, revealing the brain as a cultural
organ shaped by experience (Porges, 2016). Research confirms that positive relationships are a
powerful protection against trauma; feeling safe at a visceral level helps us feel protected against
threat, "much of the wiring of our brain circuits is devoted to being in tune with others" (Van der
Kolk, 2015. p. 212). For this reason, when trauma occurs within relationships, it’s effects are
usually more difficult to resolve than those of trauma that occurs in an accident (Insel, 2010).
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A feeling of reciprocity becomes impaired when we are unable to connect with others. In
the next sections, I offer examples of how this reciprocity can be restored through movement,
rhythm, action, and mindfulness (Holt, 1997; Porges, 2011; van der Kolk, 2014).
Drama Therapy
Traumatized adolescents are noticeably out of sync with others and drama therapy as
been shown to improve their ability to engage through mirroring exercises, which involve things
like one person raising their arm, while the other raises theirs in response (James & Johnson,
1996).
Trauma is about trying to forget, hiding how scared, enraged, or helpless you are.
Theater is about finding ways of telling truth and conveying deep truth to your
audience. This requires pushing through blockages to discover your own truth,
exploring and examining your own internal experience so that it can emerge in
your voice and body on stage. (James & Johnson, 1996, p. 320)
In this way participants in drama therapy are helped to connect and become attuned viscerally,
rather than cognitively, to another's experience (James & Johnson, 1996).
In his work with a variety of patients at the Trauma Center in Brookline Massachusetts,
van der Kolk (2015) noted those individuals who felt unwanted as children did not fully benefit
from conventional psychotherapy, presumably because they could not activate old traces of
feeling cared for. His question then became, how to help such people become viscerally
acquainted with feelings that were lacking early in their lives? In answer to this, van der Kolk
(2015) highlights the work of Albert Pesso and Diane Boyden-Pesso, whose therapeutic
approach Pesso Boyden Systems Psychomotor (PBSP) he found both fascinating and effective.
In short, this system provides opportunities for individuals who are traumatized to replay and
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rescript their trauma with caring support and witnesses (https://pbsp.com/). Pesso creates
tableaus or what he calls 'structures’ in which group members are asked to play roles of
significant people in the 'protagonist's' life, and different groups members play the roles of the
ideal or wished-for parents or significant others (Pesso, 1985). The result of these 'structures,' as
van der Kolk observes, was that the protagonists "clearly experienced profound physical and
mental relief after these imaginary scenarios" (2014, p. 300), allowing them to reweave the past
in a way that provided a visceral memory from which to draw in the future. This suggests how
important visceral memories are for giving an individual a springboard from which to engage
future experience (Pesso, 1997).
Movement and Rhythm
In a short book entitled Keeping Together in Time (1997), William McNeil investigates
what he entitles the "muscular bonding," that emanates from military drill, dancing, and theater.
Finding that in some instances, these have a powerful effect, such as when Prince Maurice of
Orange (circa 1600) instituted close-order drill, thereby enabling the Dutch to drive out the
Spanish, in the Dutch Revolt (1568-1648) (McNeil, 1997). Such examples shed light on the way
that languages encompassed by the fine arts (drama, dance, music, visual art) can hold the key
to a visceral communication, which is direct and powerful (Dewey, 1934/2005; McNeil, 1997).
In another example of the physical release that comes from communal rhythm and
movement, van der Kolk (2015) describes an experience with a group of traumatized women in
South Africa when he was following the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in
1996:
One day I attended a group for rape survivors in the courtyard of a clinic in a
township outside Johannesburg. We could hear the sound of bullets being fired at
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a distance while smoke billowed over the walls of the compound and the smell of
teargas hung in the air. Later we heard that forty people had been killed.
Yet, while the surroundings were foreign and terrifying, I recognized this
group all too well: The women sat slumped over - sad and frozen - like so many
rape therapy groups I had seen in Boston. I felt a familiar sense of helplessness,
and, surrounded by collapsed people, I felt myself mentally collapse as well.
Then, one of the women started to hum, while gently swaying back and forth.
Slowly a rhythm emerged; bit by bit other women joined in. soon the whole
groups was singing, moving, and getting up to dance. It was an astounding
transformation; people coming back to life, faces becoming attuned, and vitality
returning to bodies. I made a vow to apply what I was seeing there and to study
how rhythm, chanting, and movement can help to heal trauma. (p. 216)
For traumatized people physical sensations can become the enemy because such sensations can
hijack them; therefore, learning to connect to physical sensation is an important aspect of healing
from trauma (Kabat-Zinn, 1990/2013; van der Kolk, 2015).
Mindfulness
An ecofeminist vision of connection can refer to interhuman, as between individuals, or
intrahuman, as within a single person’s being – though of course these two connect. Mindfulness
training, pioneered by Jon Kabat-Zinn (among others), who founded the Mindfulness-Based
Stress Reduction (MBSR) program at the University of Massachusetts Medical Center in 1979,
promotes mindfulness as the means to transform the scattered and reactive energies of the mind
and focus them into a coherent source of energy for living, problem solving, and healing (KabatZinn, 1990/2013). Mindfulness training includes focused attention on bodily sensations as a way
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to observe the interplay between thoughts and physical reactions, since self-awareness is at the
core of recovery, or said in another way, there is no mind without mindfulness (Kabat-Zinn,
1990/2013). Brain research confirms this thinking, demonstrating that the practice of
mindfulness decreases the activity of the amygdala, the smoke detector, thereby decreasing
reactivity to triggers (Banks, Eddy, Angstadt, Nathan, & Phan, 2007). We can directly train our
arousal system by the way we breathe, chant, and move because the vagus nerve, which connects
the brain with many internal organs, contains fibers that are afferent, meaning they attach
directly into the brain (Porges, 2016). Since emotions and physical impressions become
inscribed on the body during trauma, they are not experienced in the present as memories but as
intrusive physical reactions, so learning to remain in a state of relative physical relaxation
through breathing and other methods, while accessing horrifying memories, becomes an essential
tool (Porges, 2016). Thus, movement, rhythm, action, and mindfulness, which are found in
things like rhythmic drumming, martial arts, and yoga have all been shown to have a positive
effect on post-traumatic stress (Lee, 2013; van der Kolk, 2014).
As an aspect of mindfulness, the practice of yoga helps with interoception, or the sense of
the internal states of the body (Lee, 2013; van der Kolk, 2015). According to Van der Kolk
(2015), once an individual begins to observe his or her own bodily sensations with curiosity
rather than fear, everything shifts and he or she can begin to notice rather than ignore what is
going on inside themselves, in order to nurture emotional regulation. Because of its focus on
breathing, yoga helps to promote the awareness of the connection between the body and the
emotions and how breathing can affect various sensations (Lee, 2013; van der Kolk, 2015).
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Neurofeedback
Another way to form intrahuman connection is with neurofeedback. When we can stay
calm, control our impulses and emotions, and thereby choose our actions, we feel more in control
than when we are hijacked by our impulses (Hopper, Spinazzola, Simpson, & van der Kolk,
2004). The HRV is an indicator of the ability to modulate impulses (Hopper et al., 2004; van der
Kolk, 2015). HRV stands for heart rate variability, a biological metric that measures the relative
balance between the sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous systems. In individuals with
PTSD the HRV is out of balance; in those who are healthy, their HRV reflects their wellbeing
(van der Kolk, 2014).
The ANS - (autonomic nervous system) is made up of the SNS (sympathetic nervous
system), so named by the Roman physician, Galen who noticed it functions with the emotions
and acts as the body's accelerator, and the PNS (parasympathetic nervous system), which serves
as the brakes (Carter et al., 2014; Hopper et al., 2004). The SNS is responsible for arousal by
moving blood to the muscles, partly by triggering the adrenal glands to release adrenaline; the
PNS triggers the release of acetylcholine, which calms arousal (Carter et al., 2014; van der Kolk,
2014). The SNS and PNS work together in a complementary fashion to manage the body's
energy flow. When we breathe in and out, we are experiencing both systems. As we breath in,
the SNS is activated, and a small burst of adrenaline speeds up the heart; as we exhale, the PNS
is activated, which in turn slows down the heart (Carter et al., 2014; van der Kolk, 2014). Thus
yoga and meditation practices utilize conscious attention to breathing. Interestingly, the interval
between heartbeats is never exactly the same, though a balanced or healthy HRV is indicated by
a greater interval (Carter et al., 2014; van der Kolk, 2014). Research has shown that teaching
individuals to become aware of their HRV can be used to treat PTSD (Hopper et al., 2004).
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As early as the late 1950s, University of Chicago psychology professor Joe Kamiya
(1970) discovered that people could learn, through feedback, to tell when they were producing
alpha waves, which are associated with relaxation. Barry Sterman at UCLA did subsequent
research in which a woman who suffered with epilepsy, learned to control her seizures with
neurofeedback (Sterman, Macdonald, and Stone, 1974). Significant funding for this type of
research into the potential of the human mind, ended in the mid 1970s with newly discovered
psychiatric drugs that manifested in psychiatry and brain science adopting a chemical model of
mind and brain (van der Kolk, 2015).
Happily, today, a large body of research is happening around the idea of the
"connectome," referring to the "exquisitely interconnected network of neurons (nerve cells) in
the brain. Like the genome, the microbiome, and other exciting 'ome' fields, the effort to map the
connectome and decipher the electrical signals that zap through it to generate thoughts, feelings,
and behaviors has become possible through development of powerful new tools and
technologies" (Collins, 2012, p. 1). According to Thomas Insel, director of the National Institute
of Mental Health:
Brain regions that function together to carry out normal (and abnormal) mental
operation can be thought of as analogous to electrical circuits - the latest research
shows that the malfunctioning of entire circuits may underlie many mental
disorders. (2010, p. 48)
In spite of the chemical metaphor, which invigorates much of the mental health field, work is
being done in the ways neurofeedback can be used to treat trauma.
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Somatic Therapy
One method that allows for a unique means self-connection for putting the pieces
together is called eye movement desensitization and reprocessing (EMDR) (Shapiro,
2001). Francine Shapiro, PhD, serendipitously discovered this therapy as she walked through a
park looking left and right as she pondered painful memories. Afterward, she noted an
experience of relief and thus began studying the phenomenon.
In the treatment that Shapiro ultimately developed and refined, a therapist directs the
patient in an external stimulus, which is usually lateral eye movements but can include hand
tapping and audio stimulation, while simultaneously attending to emotionally disturbing material
in brief sequential doses (Shapiro & Forrest 2016). Shapiro (2001) hypothesizes that EMDR
therapy facilitates the accessing of the traumatic memory network, allowing for the formation of
new associations, which then allows the trauma story to become integrated, thus eliminating
emotional distress. During a session, the patient is encouraged to observe mental images and
bodily sensations that become apparent. Shapiro and Forrest (2016) theorizes that in the same
way the brain processes events during the rapid eye movements of deep sleep, traumatic
memories and other adverse life experiences are accessed and processed during EMDR
treatment, in order to bring them to an adaptive resolution. With EMDR therapy, the traumatized
individual can access memories without being overwhelmed by them (Shapiro, 2001).
Traumatic memories, unlike linear, story-type memories, persist as unmodified images,
sensations, and emotions, which are not integrated, but rather split-off (Stickgold & Walker,
2007). As with EMDR, dreams replay, recombine, and thereby reintegrate old memories for
months and even for years (Stickgold, Scott, Rittenhouse, & Hobson, 1999). Stickgold & Walker
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(2007) speculate that the activation of distant associations could explain why dreams are so
bizarre.
If the bilateral stimulation of EMDR can alter brain states in a manner similar to that seen
during REM sleep then there is now good evidence to suggest that EMDR should be able to take
advantage of sleep dependent processes, which may be blocked or ineffective in PTSD suffers,
thus allowing effective memory processing and trauma resolution (Stickgold et al., 1999). In
other words as with REM sleep, EMDR may open up the associative process, allowing memories
to become integrated (van der Kolk, 2014).
Final Thoughts
Hearing and being heard, seeing and being seen by others, these are important to every
human:
As long as we feel safely held in the hearts and minds of the people who love, us,
we will climb mountains and cross deserts, and stay up all night to finish projects.
Children and adults will do anything for people they trust and whose opinion they
value. (van der Kolk, 2015, p. 352)
Hearing and seeing another requires that we are able to hear and see ourselves. Or said another
way, the interhuman connection requires an intrahuman connection. Understanding what our
body communicates when we are upset, as well as when we are inspired and filled with joy, is
empowering.
As the previous examples demonstrate, aesthetic learning experiences can erase, or
mitigate, the traumatic ‘score’ left on the body. These aesthetic learning experiences may happen
in community with others and engage the reciprocity found in drama, movement, or rhythm.
They may involve the individual turning inward to find a kind of reciprocity with his or her own
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physical reactions through mindfulness, neurofeedback, or somatic therapies. All of these
therapies allow the one traumatized to access the pleasure of the adaptive response in order to
restore a sense of self-agency. Such aesthetic learning experiences help individuals re-learn at the
deepest, visceral level. In effect aesthetic learning experiences ‘score’ the traumatized individual
in a positive, generative way. I theorize that, even in the absence of trauma, aesthetic experiences
do this work within us; they mark us and form a framework that scaffolds our deepest and most
passionate desires (Garrison, 1997). If, as van der Kolk (2015) states, "resilience is the product of
agency" (p. 357), then by engendering a sense of agency, aesthetic learning experiences may
become the oil that ‘greases the wheels’ for the kinds of learning that require hard work and a
delay of reward. By engendering sensations that are aesthetic through reciprocity with the
individual’s own body, or with others, beauty becomes part of the body’s score.
In this chapter I have shown how beauty lives in the body, becoming inscribed through
the holistic interaction of the body-mind in dialogue with subjective sensory (aesthetic)
experience. This theorizing is supported by an ecofeminist epistemology that embraces knowing
as simultaneously cognitive, emotional, spiritual, and embodied (Jun, 2014). Such ways of
knowing are exemplified in the experiences of women; honoring the bodily knowledge shaped
by race, class, and gender (Kings, 2017) and springing from a cultural and historic situatedness
(Glazebrook, 2002). Within this holistic vision the aesthetic quality of an experience is the bridge
that connects doing and undergoing; the glue that holds an experience together (Hohr, 2002;
Dewey, 1934/2005). Thus, knowing as relational and mutually interdependent becomes a
defining metaphor (Jun, 2014).
As a Western civilization, our culture collectively embraces an oppressive root metaphor
that prizes hierarchy and domination (Kings, 2017), which clouds our ability benefit from a
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holistic understanding of the body as the “center of vision, center of action, center of interest”
(James, 1890/1950, p. 86). An ecofeminist epistemology finds learning manifested through
material bodies that are situated culturally and environmentally, and it recognizes knowing as
simultaneously cognitive, emotional, and spiritual (Jun, 2014).
An individual's emotional engagement system is foundational to who they are (van der
Kolk, 2015). When home and neighborhood are chaotic, it becomes even more important for
schools to be places where students are known and seen and where they can learn self-leadership
and an internal locus of control in order to find self-agency and to become resilient (van der
Kolk, 2015). Instead it seems that schools are often sustained by an oppressive conceptual
framework of knowledge as hierarchal and competitive and which understands it to be held in
particular places or by particular individuals and therefore NOT held by others (Harvester &
Blenkinsop, 2010). My vision reveals the ability of the aesthetic to allow for the integration of
subjectivity and will, recognizing learning as shaped by an individual’s life experience, including
culture, gender, race, class, sexuality, and environment.
In the next chapter I tie all the threads together presenting an ecofeminist vision of
learning as aesthetic, embodied, and connected as I visualize what that might mean for the
educational process.
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CHAPTER 6
PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER: AN ECOFEMINIST VISION OF LEARNING AS
AESTHETIC, EMBODIED AND CONNECTED
As he was about to climb yet another dune, his heart whispered, “Be aware of the
place where you are brought to tears. That’s where I am, and that’s where your
treasure is.”
Paulo Coelho, The Alchemist, (1988, p. 90)
In his 2017 book, The Evolution of Beauty: How Darwin’s Forgotten Theory of Mate
Choice Shapes the Animal World – and Us, evolutionary ornithologist Richard Prum, traces his
love for birds to a time when he was a young boy. His personal experience offers a resonant
story of learning for my final chapter:
It all started with glasses. I got my first pair of eyeglasses during fourth grade, and
within six months I was a bird-watcher. Before glasses, I spent a lot of time
memorizing facts out of the Guinness Book of World Records and asking my
siblings to quiz me on them. I was especially interested in the records of extreme
human “achievement,” like the tallest and heaviest men, and the now suppressed
category of “gastronomical” records, like the greatest number of whelks eaten in
five minutes. But after glasses, the outer world came into focus. Soon, my
amorphous nerdiness found something to organize around, something to run with
– birds. (p. 1)
In a powerful illustration of my thesis, that at its deepest, learning is embodied, aesthetic, and
connected with an individual’s life experience and culture in what I term, an ecofeminist web,
Prum shares the story of a day that served to cement the passion which became his life’s work.
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On a foggy morning in 1974, when he was twelve, Prum joined a group of birders, all of
whom were adults, on a day trip to Machias Seal Island off the coast of Maine, the southernmost
nesting colony of the Atlantic Puffin. He describes being dive-bombed by Arctic Terns, sitting
in bird blinds for many hours, and then "some hours later, returning to the boat sunburned,
covered in smelly tern shit, and ecstatically happy" (Prum, 2017, p. 339). Many events of that
day are vivid to him, forty years later. "The convergence of book learning and life experience of savoir and connaissance - created a profound joy. It was an early and formative avian
epiphany" (Prum, 2017, p. 339). Liston's (2001) vision of Joy - exactly.
From those beginnings, Prum went on to become the William Robertson Coe Professor of
Ornithology at Yale University and Head Curator of Vertebrate Zoology at the Yale Peabody
Museum of Natural History. Though the impact of the kind of experiences Prum describes is not
always so profound, I theorize that the embrace of an ecofeminist vision of learning as aesthetic,
embodied, and connected can help ensure such learning is not left to chance, but intentionally
encouraged as an integral piece of a complex process. As Prum (2017) relates, his work on the
evolution of beauty, which had its genesis in an experience of aesthetic, embodied learning forty
years prior, gives him tremendous intellectual and personal pleasure, “Never in my career have I
been more excited and inspired to do science, I get goose bumps just thinking about the
evolution of avian beauty” (p. 15).
Within this dissertation, I demonstrate that, particularly where learning is concerned, all
things are connected in complex webs of communal networks (Griffin, 1989); that matter,
energy, and human and non-human experience are all parts of a greater whole:
This whole is not an abstract mentalism but has infinitely complicated
characteristics somewhat analogous to the way communities of beings manage
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individual and collectivist realities. Ecofeminist writers suggest that humans have
lost their integrated wholeness through a gradual shortfall of perceptual awareness
initiated and sustained by modern institutions, economies, and educational
systems. (Besthorn & McMillen, 2002, p. 225)
My conception for a solution to the ‘shortfall of perceptual awareness’ concerns reshaping how
our educational system approaches learning. In this dissertation I frame an understanding of
learning that supports and encourages a conception of integrated wholeness. As I argue, the way
our Western society currently conceptualizes learning as a linear, cognitive process of the mind
apart from experience of the lived body, apart from what the individual finds meaningful or
aesthetic, and apart from any connection to the individual, lies at the root of why our educational
system fails so many students. In this chapter, I weave the pieces of my vision together.
For ecofeminist philosopher, Huey-li Li (2007), an individual’s gender ideology
influences his or her world-view. I think she has it backwards, and instead, our worldview
contributes to our gender ideology. The primary metaphors that undergird our ideology shape all
our values (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). Hence, those who have built their world-view upon the
ideal of vertical, hierarchy naturally prefer the hierarchy of traditional gender ideology.
The Western view of nature stresses the divide between humans and nature, emphasizing
those aspects of being human, like rationality, freedom, and transcendence from 'wildness', that
define humanity negatively, or by what a human is not (Plumwood, 1996). Such a view,
illustrates the idea of humanity as outside of nature and ontologically divided and discontinuous
from nature (Plumwood, 1996). As ecofeminism reveals:
Western thought has given us a strong human/nature dualism that is part of the set
of interrelated dualisms of mind/body, human/nature, reason/emotion,
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masculine/feminine and has important interconnected features with these other
dualism. (Plumwood, 1996, p. 162)
Within education, the conception of learning as a cognitive matter of the mind that leaves out
embodied and subjective experience, illustrates a particular focus on mind/body and
objective/subjective dualisms. In this way of thinking whatever is natural or animal (the body,
sexuality, reproduction, emotionality, the senses, and agency) are separate and distinguished
from those characteristics that are authentically human, that define us as human (Plumwood,
1996).
The problem with understanding something dualistically is “it typically polarizes
difference and minimizes shared characteristics, it construes difference along lines of superiority/
inferiority, and views the inferior side as a means to the higher end of the superior side (the
instrumental thesis)" (Plumwood, 1996, p. 168). So, challenging dualisms is not just a matter of
elevating the inferior side, but of reconceptualizing the dualistically construed categories. I
suggest to aid with this reconceptualization a new conceptual metaphor is needed. In the visual
arts we often begin with basic shapes. To my thinking, a vertical line, discrete, hierarchical, and
disconnected, seems to characterize the Western worldview. Ideals of individualism, personal
rights, and separation find a home in this metaphor. I offer instead the metaphor of a web,
characterized by the connections between the entities who still retain their individuality, yet are
profoundly connected.
Humanity has developed symbol systems (metaphors) to explain and understand the
world, but as those who experienced cultural disadvantage that was virtually universal, women
were excluded from participating in this development no matter the culture (Lerner, 1986; Li,
2007). In China and other non-Western societies, nature is not traditionally associated with
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women (Li, 2007; Tuan, 1968). Despite this, the use of gendered imagery plays a role in shaping
the construction of institutions, just as it does in the West (Lerner, 1986; Li, 2007). Women are
oppressed in eastern society and in fact "ancient Chinese misogyny coexisted with an organic
world-view, which has proven capable of sanctioning the massive transformation of natural
environments" (Li, 2007, p. 355). Li (2007) makes an interesting point; even within a society that
embraces an organic worldview, hierarchical oppression thrives. Oppressions are interconnected
and thus, there can be no liberation for women or solutions to the ecological crisis within a
society for which domination, either at the micro or macro level, continues to be an animating
metaphor (Li, 2007: Reuther, 1996). Rather than promote an organic world view and be done
with it, ecofeminism promotes the validation of difference, challenges claims to universal truth,
and seeks to facilitate social transformation and thereby suggests a different metaphor (Li, 2007;
Weiler, 1989).
As an example of the power of metaphor, Western science has adopted a war-like vision
of creation illustrated by ‘the big-bang’, alternately "ecofeminists visualize a complex and
mystical birthing process, swelling and growing into life" (Besthorn & McMillen, 2002, p. 226).
Since the earth is a living entity, not just random bits of cosmic dust, there is an organic unity
between humanity and nature for which the war-like ‘big bang’ does not allow.
Given the power of metaphor, a new understanding of learning requires a new metaphor,
one which suggests the complexity of the human and nature relationship, provides an image of
interconnection, and evokes transformative possibilities for the way humans perceive their place
within the natural environment and within the community of being (Besthorn & McMillen,
2002). According to social work theorists, Fred Besthorn and Diane McMillen (2002), the social
sciences tend to perceive individuals as existing on the environment rather embedded within
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complex environmental and social systems. A new vision is needed to ontologically bond
humans and nature; a metaphor of entanglement encourages a vision of connection (Besthorn &
McMillen, 2002). Building on my previous vision of a web of connection, and incorporating
Besthorn and McMillen’s (2002) vision of entanglement, I suggest what I entitle, the
‘ecofeminist tangled bank,’ to provide for biotic (which include human and non-human animals),
inter-human, and intra-human interconnections.
I begin my metaphor with Darwin’s resonant image in, On The Origin of Species
(1859/1964) which I shared in the previous chapter, but it is helpful to see it again here:
It is interesting to contemplate a tangled bank, clothed with many plants of many
kinds, with birds singing on the bushes, with various insects flitting about, and
with worms crawling through the damp earth, and to reflect that these elaborately
constructed forms, so different from each other, and dependent upon each other in
so complex a manner, have all been produced by laws acting around us… (p. 429)
My vision of the ecofeminist tangled bank includes Darwin’s (1859/1964) biotic tangle, but adds
to it the vision of human entanglement. The human threads consist of what I call the interhuman, or those threads that characterize human relations of all types, including cultural and
familial, and the intra-human, which includes the individual's relationship with his/her/their own
being - the body, mind, and spirit. These additional threads weave up and down, and in and out
of the biotic, in a manner complex and profound, to characterize a lived experience at once
individual, communal, and environmentally situated. It embraces self-contradictory unity
(Liston, 2001) of inter-being (Hanh, 1997) that recognizes the self as at once individual and
connected to community (Liston, 2001; Palmer, 2007). For learning, the ecofeminist tangled
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bank frames an ecological epistemology that honors knowledge as structured by the conditions
created within communities of learning.
This image does not invite a desire to untangle but instead, encourages an acceptance of
the dialectical nature of these various points of view. The ecofeminist tangled bank allows for the
synenergy that is inherent in the space between (Hohr, 2002; Winnicott, 1971). Additionally, this
metaphor incorporates an alternative vision of the sources of human satisfaction, incorporating
spaces for non-material sources of fulfillment:
simple conversations, spiritual rituals, neighborhood/community gatherings,
family outings, artistic pursuits, music, dance, literature, and experiencing nature.
All are ways of life and being that can endure through countless generations. This
is a kind of simple life vision adorned with nonmaterial sources of fulfillment. It
includes the kinds of activities and associations that most people would admit are
the main determinants of happiness. (Besthorn & Mc Millen, 2002, p. 228)
These ‘nonmaterial sources of fulfillment’ characterize subjective sensory (aesthetic) experience.
For Prum (2017), subjective sensory experience is an existential key that has been long rejected
among scientists. He frames the subjective experience of beauty as a crucial piece of the
developmental puzzle, demonstrated in the subjective experience of female birds acting to shape
the outward beauty of males of their species. For Prum (2017), beauty is “the result of a
coevolutionary dance between desire and display" (p. 554).
Darwin discovered that evolution is not merely about the survival of the fittest but
also about charm and sensory delight in individual subjective experience. The
implications of this idea are profound, requiring us to acknowledge that the dawn
bird song chorus, the cooperative group displays of the Chiroxiphia manakins, the
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spectacular plumage of the male Great Argus Pheasant, and many other wondrous
sights and sounds of the natural world are not merely delightful to us: they are
products of a long history of subjective evaluations made by the animals
themselves. (Prum, 2017, p. 325)
Within this vision, the evolution of sensory evaluation and choice is manifested in a type of selfagency in which individual judgments drive the evolutionary process (Prum, 2017). For Prum
(2017) the most revolutionary aspect of Darwin's theory of mate choice is that it was
straightforwardly aesthetic owing to the idea that "animals had evolved to be beautiful to
themselves" (p. 25). When most people hear the word evolution, they think of adaptive
evolution, or evolution by natural selection, which Darwin described in, On the Origin of Species
by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life
(1859/1964). In that work, Darwin (1859/1964) details the evolutionary mechanism of natural
selection by which Galapagos finches evolved different beak shapes among generations since
beak shape is highly heritable (Darwin, 1859/1964; Prum, 2017). Natural selection leads to
adaptation:
because subsequent generations will have evolved beak shapes that function better
in their environment, contributing directly to improvements in individual survival
and fecundity. (Prum, 2017, p. 9)
In contrast, to natural selection, is sexual selection, in which desire and the object of desire
coevolve (Prum, 2017; Ryan & Cummings, 2013; West-Eberhard, 2014). We can think of this as
aesthetic evolution in which display and mating preference shape each other - beauty and desire
in dialogue (Prum, 2017; Ryan & Cummings, 2013; West-Eberhard, 2014). As an example, the
iridescent plumage of the hummingbird has coevolved as a result of selection based on subjective
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evaluation; the plumage and the desire for the plumage coevolved through mate choice (Prum,
2017; Ryan & Cummings, 2013; West-Eberhard, 2014).
Mainstream evolutionary biologists do not embrace Prum's ideas about aesthetic. Most
think of sexual displays as a type of 'honest signaling' about the health and quality of a potential
mate. In this way of thinking beauty is about utility; the handmaiden of natural selection (Prum,
2017; Weiner, 1995). Prum (2017) argues, "in pursuit of their subjective mate preferences,
individuals can make mating choices that are maladaptive - resulting in a worse fit between the
organism and its environment" (p. 11). When Charles Darwin proposed and championed the idea
of the role of subjective experience in sexual selection, he was vehemently criticized.
By viewing nature's beauty exclusively through the ‘human gaze’, humans have a limited
understanding of "the powerful aesthetic agency of nonhuman animals" (Prum, 2017, p. 334).
Sexual ornaments of birds, such as the peacock’s tail, demonstrate the concept of coevolution.
While "changes in mating preferences have transformed the tail, … changes in the tail have
transformed mating preferences" (Prum, 2017, p. 334). How cultural ideas of the aesthetic
coevolve with works in the fine arts is perhaps another example of coevolution at work.
In The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex (1871), Darwin addressed the
problems of human origins and beauty. I take my title from this quote:
Courage, pugnacity, perseverance, strength and size of body, weapons of all
kinds, musical organs, both vocal and instrumental, bright colors, stripes and
marks, and ornamental appendages, have all been indirectly gained ... through the
influence of love and jealousy, through the appreciation of the beautiful ... and
through the exertion of a choice. (Darwin, 1871, p. 794-795)
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As he discovered, within sexual selection, variations are determined by differential sexual
success (Darwin, 1871; Prum, 2017). Thus sexual selection is responsible for ornaments and
armament, those heritable features that contribute to success at obtaining mates (Prum, 2017;
Weiner, 1995). Darwin (1871) hypothesized that ‘the law of battle’, or the struggle between
individuals of one sex - often male - for sexual control would result in the evolution of large
body size and weapons of aggression like horns (Darwin, 1871; Prum, 2017). The “taste for the
beautiful has resulted in the evolution of those traits, including songs and colorful plumage”,
which are aesthetically pleasing because of the innate preferences of one sex (usually the female)
(Prum, 2017, p. 22).
As my title suggests, acting on subjective judgment through the ‘exertion of a choice’
whether we are a female bird or a human being in a classroom, has significance. Self-agency, or
the ability to exert a choice – to choose (also important in the healing of trauma) (vander Kolk,
(2015) - manifests as a result of sensory evaluation; it is subjective. The scientific community’s
‘allergy’ to the notion of subjective experience whether in evolutionary biology or in education,
has contributed to a partial understanding of the role of subjective, embodied experience (Prum,
2017).
The Ecofeminist Tangled Bank
Incorporating a vision of interconnection and complexity in the human-to-nature and
human-to-human relationships, as well as with each human’s relationship with his/her/their own
being, the ecofeminist tangled bank validates difference, challenges universals, and seeks
interventions for oppression. My vision for a complication of Darwin’s biotic metaphor
incorporates a variety of interacting systems:
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each with its characteristic structure, … organization and spatial and temporal
properties. The social environment comprises human beings organized in dyadic
relations, social networks, bureaucratic institution, and other social systems
including the neighborhood, community, and society itself. The physical
environment comprises the natural world of animals, plants, and landforms, and
the built world of structures and objects constructed by human beings. The social
and physical environments are related to each other in complex ways. (Germain &
Gitterman, 1980, p. 137)
To these relating plant, animal and human systems, I add the intra-human to provide for an even
more complicated picture.
Humans and Nature
The human world and the natural world comprise the same interconnected world. Much
of our debate around the question of how humans should interact with other biological
communities revolves around the question of whether other species should be valued only for
their usefulness to humans (Plumwood, 1996; Stephens, 2013). Within this instrumentalist view,
objects or 'others' are only valued for their usefulness toward a predefined end (Midgley,
2000). Oppression, or unjust treatment or control of any sort toward another, occurs as a result of
a value-based hierarchical ranking (Stephens, 2013). Ecofeminism sees oppression of women
and nature as bound up together, springing from the value/power hierarchy that exploits the
human and the non-human (Lahar, 1996; Stephens, 2013; Warren and Cheney, 1996). Since
dualisms are connected, a critique of rationalism must connect with critiques of
anthropocentrism and sexism (Plumwood, 1996; Stephens, 2013). The first task becomes to
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see ourselves as ecologically embodied and situated beings who are akin to other animals rather
than superior because of our rationality.
Within an ecofeminist paradigm, complex ecosystems and species are valued apart from
their usefulness to humans, and research and educational agendas incorporate a generative model
in which learning follows from the interaction of constituent parts or participants (Plumwood,
1996; Stephens, 2013). In ecosystem dynamics this generative ability springs from emergent
properties, or those properties that become apparent as the system functions and which are not
observable from examination of constituent parts alone (Odum & Barrett, 2005). Our Western
conception of the rational self lies at the root of the proclivity for marginalizing the feminine, the
emotional, the bodily, the animal, and the natural world (Plumwood, 1996). According to
Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274): "The intellectual nature is alone required for its own sake in the
universe, and all other for its sake" (1270/1976, p.56). This view of the ‘intellectual nature' as
what characterizes and separates the human from the nonhuman, is responsible for the
discontinuity or separation between humans and nature and also those within the human self, e.g.
mind/body and reason/emotion (Plumwood, 1996).
Ecofeminism's "complex ontology of interconnection" (Besthorn & McMillen, 2002, p.
226) helps to heal this division by weaving together the individual's lived, sensual, experience
with complexity of nature. Ecofeminism's complex ontology does not hierarchize either
humanity or nature, but illuminates the interconnectedness of each to the other (Besthorn &
McMillen, 2002).
According to Anne Stephens (2013) reductionist science bears the burden for our
collective disconnection from our own bodies, our subjectivity, our natural surroundings as well
as human and nonhuman others. She states, "We need to reconnect the experience of the body,
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our subjectivity and our surrounding ecological nature with others..." (p. 3). I agree the need to
reconnect is urgent, though I propose that in addition to looking at reductionist science, our
reductionist approach to learning also needs examination.
The idea of differentiation helps us develop anti-reductionist alternatives to positivist
scientific approaches (Lahar, 1996). Differentiation allows for revealing how the interlocked
functions and activities of human and natural 'others' disclose differentiated accounts of the
world; these differentiated accounts reveal a collective reality that values differences (Lahar,
1996; Stephens, 2013).
Inter-Human Interaction
Social justice figures largely in the ecofeminist tangled bank since it reveals that humans
are interconnected with other humans and those forces that seek to oppress humans are the same
forces which denigrate and oppress nature (Besthorn & McMillen, 2002). Just as they have
affected our relation to nature, positivist scientific strategies have resulted in the acceptance of a
fragmented, rather than communal, web-based, view of modern life (Besthorn & McMillen,
2002). I submit that our culture's conception of learning furthers this fragmented, linear,
hierarchical metaphor, shaping and influencing our collective understanding of how the world
works at the deepest level. For social work, Besthorn and McMillen (2002) propose what they
call an 'expanded ecological model,' which emphasizes interaction that springs from caring,
rather than "the dominance, competition, and exploitation inherent in our current competitionbased social systems" (p. 229). This model acknowledges that social, political, and
environmental issues are interrelated and that oppression of any kind undermines the wellness of
the community that supports it. I claim the expanded ecological vision, with its emphasis on
interaction that springs from caring, for the ecofeminist tangled bank.
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Gender and diversity are linked in many ways. The construction of women as the 'second
sex' is linked to the same inability to cope with difference, as is the development paradigm that
leads to the displacement and extinction of diversity in the biological world. The patriarchal
worldview sees man as the measure of all value, with no space for diversity, only for hierarchy.
Woman, being different from man, is treated as unequal and inferior. Nature's diversity is seen as
not intrinsically valuable in itself, its value is conferred only through economic exploitation for
commercial gain (Shiva, 2014b). This criterion of commercial value thus reduces diversity to a
problem a deficiency. Destruction of diversity and the creation of monocultures becomes an
imperative for capitalist patriarchy (Shiva, 2014b, p. 164).
In the indigenous setting, sacredness is a large part of conservation. Sacredness
encompasses the intrinsic value of diversity; sacredness denotes a relationship of
the part to the whole - a relationship that recognizes and preserves integrity.
(Shiva, 2014b, p. 169)
Shiva (2014b), uses the conception of the seed to illustrate the point that seeds conserved for
replanting by indigenous societies preserve in a real form, both the sacredness of plant and
human heritage within the seed, incorporating an image of reproduction rather than production.
High yield varieties (HYV) of seeds that are genetically engineered and owned by the seed
companies, break the sacred cycle, discrediting the view of the seed as an integral part of the
sacred whole (Shiva, 2014b).
For the one who produces, his or her products are abstractions that represent potential
money; to the producer it makes no difference if those products are cookies or neutron bombs
(Kurz, 1991; Mies, 2014b). But for the consumer, there is an interest in use-value and sensuous
qualities of the product since each consumer wishes to have clothing, food, and habitation that
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are aesthetic (Kurz, 1991; Mies, 2014b). In the subsistence perspective, rather than an
opportunity for production of an abstract product as part of "capitalist patriarchy's model of
unlimited growth of goods and money" (Mies, 2014b, p. 297), work (as in subsistence work) is
life-producing, life-preserving, and a necessary precondition for survival, within it there is a
sensuous, direct satisfaction of needs. "Ecological impacts are often experienced most directly
and pertinently as effects on human bodies, and ecofeminism acknowledges that our
embededness with the 'environment' is derived from our embodied position as human animals."
(Cudworth, 2005, p. 3).
Rather than a reductionist, instrumentalist view of knowledge, a subsistence/ecofeminist
perspective allows for a participatory, feminist, people-based, ecologically sound epistemology
that includes indigenous/survival wisdom (Mies, 2014b). A subsistence/ecofeminist perspective
incorporates the practical and theoretical recognition of the interconnectedness of life, resulting
in a politics that practices experiential ethics reflected in a consistency of means and ends (Mies,
2014a). Such a perspective is based on the recognition that different dominance systems and
problems are interconnected, and that they cannot be solved in isolation (Mies,
2014a). Instead, they require a synergistic problem solving approach (Mies, 2014a). Thus
patriarchal relations, inequality, alienation, and poverty must be solved together with ecological
problems; "the interconnectedness of all life on earth, and of problems and solutions is one of the
main insights of ecofeminism" (Mies, 2014a, p. 320).
The inability of the West to embrace indigenous ways of knowing is fueled by a great
colonial anxiety around exposing the exploitation and appropriation that coexist within the
shadows of privileged Western ways of knowing (Stevens, Tait, & Varney, 2018). An
ecofeminism that honors the voices of indigenous women exposes and names this colonial
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anxiety (Kwaymullina, 2018). As with the impact of personal anxiety within one's own body,
exposing and naming can steal power from fears that are hidden (van der Kolk, 2015)
Intra-Human Interaction
Human experience is an interconnection of the whole self, the mind and body, the
subjective and the objective, and reason and emotion. The rationalist paradigm interprets the
world in terms of dichotomies, which by definition are oppositional (Collins, 2000; Plumwood,
1996; Stephens, 2013). The rationalist worldview additionally construes one side of the
oppositional dichotomy as having hierarchy. In other words one side is superior and other is
inferior; as with the following pairs of dichotomies, the 'superior' is stated first:
masculine/feminine, reason/emotion, private/public, mind/body, reason/emotion, human/nature,
etc. Highlighting the importance of root metaphors, Griffin (1989) suggests, "We no longer feel
ourselves to be a part of this earth. We regard our fellow creatures as enemies. And, very young,
we even learn to disown a part of our own being. Western culture "still privileges the rational
and empirical proof" (Tait, 2018, p. 178). Emotional affect and visceral dimensions of
experience are minimized, making it possible to suppress and ignore bodily needs (Tait, 2018).
“We come to believe that we do not know what we know ... dividedness is etched into our
language" (Griffin, 1989, p. 7). I agree with Griffin (1989), a portion of our own being is
disowned. Our conception of 'mind' so dominates that of 'body', that we have no means
of interpreting what our body communicates. Even within our own being we are divided. The
ecofeminist tangled bank includes a vision of the whole, tangled self rather than just a single
thread.
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Implications for Education and Learning
In a 2009 TED talk, Nigerian novelist Chimanada Ngozi Adichie describes what she
entitles, The Danger of a Single Story. The child of a Nigerian professor and administrator,
Adichie’s life growing up can be called middle class. She recalls a time as a young girl taking
clothing and food to the home of Fide the ‘poor’ houseboy her family employed. Adichie’s eightyear-old sensibilities were shocked to find Fide’s family had made and used beautiful
baskets. “All I had heard about them was how poor they were, so that it had become impossible
for me to see them as anything else but poor. Their poverty was my single story of them”
(Adichie, 2009, 3:31). She goes on to describe reading only British and American children’s
books as a child, and forming the conclusion that books had to be about apple-eating people who
were white, with blue eyes. After discovering African writers like Chinua Achebe and Camara
Laye, “I realized that people like me, girls with skin the color of chocolate, whose kinky hair
could not form ponytails, could also exist in literature” (Adichie, 2009, 2:15). Adichie came to
the United States at the age of 19 in order to attend Harvard University. Her roommate at that
time requested to hear her ‘tribal music’ and was disappointed when Adichie produced a Mariah
Carey tape.
What struck me was this: She had felt sorry for me even before she saw me. Her
default position toward me, as an African, was a kind of patronizing, wellmeaning pity. My roommate had a single story of Africa: a single story of
catastrophe. In this single story, there was no possibility of Africans being similar
to her in any way, no possibility of feelings more complex than pity, no
possibility of a connection as human equals. (Adichie, 2009. 4:49)
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Adichie goes on to relate, after she had been in the U.S. for some time, consuming American
media and view points, she took a trip to Mexico. She was surprised to see people going to work
and in the marketplace laughing and talking together, and then she realized,
I had bought into the single story of Mexicans and I could not have been more
ashamed of myself. So that is how to create a single story, show a people as one
thing, as only one thing, over and over again, and that is what they become.
(Adichie, 2009, 8:54 – 9:26)
When we accept a single story, we are accepting a stereotype. The problem is that stereotypes are
not necessarily completely untrue- they are partial (Adichie, 2009). With that in mind, the danger
of the single story is that it fails to communicate the richness and therefore the whole truth of a
person, place, or thing. Even an activity like learning can suffer as a victim of a single story. I
propose that what is accepted in our society as learning - the acquisition of memorized facts,
problem solving, the ability to reason deductively - are all important within the learning process,
yet each is partial, a single story. By including embodied learning, such as we find within
indigenous knowledges as well as subjective sensory (aesthetic) experience within an
ecofeminist tangled bank, we can begin to see a more complete picture.
The goal of traditional rationalist science and the traditional cognitive approach to
learning is to emancipate humanity (mostly 'man') from nature and by way of the power of
reason and rationality, to hold dominion over natural processes (Plumwood, 1996; Stephens,
2013). A positivist approach seeks to gain an objective understanding. When the human is
uncoupled from the natural, many systems will begin to degrade or in other words, become
unsustainable (Stephens, 2013). I would add, this view embraces a separation of mind and body
within the individual, disallowing embodied forms of knowing (Garrison, 1997). The
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consequences of the emancipation logic of a neutral scientific approach that is value-free, are
seen in the destruction of the environment and in the consequences to the lives of women,
children, and those who are 'other' (Midgley, 2000; Stephens, 2013). An approach that values
learning over time (Eisner, 2002b), rather than learning as something completed as one
absorbs knowable chunks of information, can assist with paradigmatic change helping human
beings to understand themselves as one piece of a complex, tangled bank (Midgley, 2000;
Stephens, 2013). "Situated knowledge requires that the object of knowledge be pictured as an
actor and agent" (Haraway, 1988, p. 593) in which a logic of discovery acknowledges the agency
of the world in knowledge. Embodied cognition locates the body in sense-making; finding that
human cognition is dependent on interaction with the environment, therefore action, perception,
and emotion are important threads in knowledge formation (Groth, 2016).
In education, when social phenomena such as race, class, gender, sexual preference,
and/or abilities are considered in isolation from one another, we often fail to contextualize
learning experiences meaningfully, as a result the educational process works towards the
interests of the privileged (Stephens, 2013). An ecofeminist framework helps to reduce this
(perhaps) unintended bias.
Ecosystem analysis offers an interesting lens for consideration of the biotic aspects of our
world and this lens can suggest way of approaching the ecofeminist tangled bank. Besides the
'population-community' approach to ecology which views ecosystems as networks of interacting
populations, and the 'process-functional' approach which is based on a "quantitative,
mathematical, thermodynamic biophysical model" (Warren and Cheney, 1996, p. 247), a
methodology called the 'observation set' approach, sometimes called, 'hierarchy theory,' provides
an inclusive theoretical framework for a variety of ecosystem analyses. The idea of observation
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sets is important for looking at learning as well. In this framework, the observation set is a
particular way of viewing the natural world; it includes the phenomena of interest, the
measurements used, and the techniques used to analyze the data (Warren & Cheney, 1996).
When developing useful theory it becomes necessary to consider many observation sets (O'Neill,
Deangelis, Waide, Allen, & Allen, 1986). The complexity of natural systems is overlooked or
discounted when one focuses on a single observation set, as O'Neill et al. (1986) observe:
A forest stand can be looked at from an organismic standpoint (e.g. as enduring,
stable individual trees or populations of trees) or from an energy flow and nutrient
cycling standpoint (e.g. as fluxes and flow or carbon and oxygen recycled through
photosynthesis). Because the forest stand may accurately be viewed in either way,
it is incorrect, in fact impossible, to designate the components of the ecosystem the designation depends on the spatiotemporal scale and changes as that scale
changes. (p. 83)
When we rely on only a single aspect of ecosystem dynamics (one observation set) to describe
that system, the resulting theory is false or incomplete (Warren & Cheney, 1996). This sounds
very much like Adichie’s single story. In terms of observation sets we can see how one views the
ecosystem will depend on the observation sets one employs; this is similar to ecofeminism
emphasis on a description of 'ways of thinking', 'conceptual frameworks' or 'world views'
(Warren & Cheney, 1996). Attention to observation sets is an acknowledgement of the
importance of context in both ecology and ecofeminist theorizing. In education, we attempt
through nationalization of standards and testing to erase the importance of context from the
picture.
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As an art teacher, I find myself compelled to offer an example from the art world that
illustrates the importance of context. It paints the picture in a meaningful way and I think the
ecofeminist framework is flexible enough for color theory to weave into the tangled bank.
In 1824, Michel Eugene Chevreul was appointed Director of the dying department at
Gobelins Manufacture in Paris. Chevreul was a chemist, who had, in his previous work,
determined that animal fats contain different acids, which he isolated and gave the names
(stearic, oleic, margaric, etc) (Roque, 2010). This discovery led to important improvements in the
candle-making field, among others. From the early 1800s, a chemist had directed Gobelins since
this was the individual who oversaw the dyes used by the company for wool and silk tapestries;
additionally, the dyes were sold to other companies that manufactured carpets, and fabrics for
furniture coverings (Roque, 2010). As a renowned chemist, thanks to his earlier discovery,
Chevreul was offered, and subsequently accepted, the Directorship, and soon discovered that
beyond his tasks of maintaining the quality of the dyes, he became what today we call the
customer service representative.
The difficulties of my position were greatly increased by numerous perplexing
questions proposed to me for solution by the directors of that establishment; I was
therefore obliged to arrange my labours differently than if I had been free from
every other occupation. (Chevreul, 1855, xi)
Many of the ‘perplexing questions’ (a.k.a. complaints), Chevreul received had to do with the
“want of vigour in the blacks employed in making shades in blue and violet draperies”
(Chevreul, 1855, xii). After much research, which included comparing Gobelins dyes with those
of other celebrated manufacturers, Chevreul determined “the want of vigor complained of in the
blacks was owing to the color next to them, and was due to the phenomena of contrast of
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colours” (Chevreul, 1855, p. xii). Lest his reader misinterpret the law of ‘simultaneous contrast
of colours’ to mean that the colors were indeed changed, Chevreul (1855) reiterates, this is a
matter of perception:
I beg the reader never to forget when it is asserted of the phenomena of
simultaneous contrast, that one colour placed beside another receives such a
modification from it, that this manner of speaking does not mean that the two
colours, or rather the two material objects that present them to us, have a mutual
action, either physical or chemical; it is really only applied to the modification that
takes place before us when we perceive the simultaneous impression of these two
colours. (p. xiv) (Emphasis in original)
In his research, Chevreul also notes that the value (darkness or lightness) and the intensity
(pureness of hue) impact the phenomenon of simultaneous contrast of colors. What Chevreul
called ‘antagonistic’ or complementary colors (those across from each other on the color wheel,
e.g. orange/blue, red/green, violet/yellow) create the highest degree of contrast and thereby
“mutually strengthen each other” (Chevreul, 1855, p. 240). Both Impressionist and NeoImpressionist painters were aware of the law of simultaneous contrast and “applied it …in their
works to give them more intensity” (Roque, 2010).
The dulling or intensifying of a visual perception happens as one color relates to another;
and the energy of relating is strongest between antagonists or oppositions. The energy generated
by the relation is what gave such visual impact to works of the Impressionist and NeoImpressionist painters who were influenced by Chevreul’s color theorizing, and I think the idea
of energy generated by relation can help paint a picture for learning as well. I have spoken of this
energy in various ways throughout my dissertation as: “a dynamic paradoxical unity of
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opposites” (Jun, 2014); “wholeness within oppositions” (Palmer, 2007); “self-contradictory
unity” (Liston, 2001); and “separateness in unity” (Buber, 1958). Each of these characterizes the
generative and powerful energy that may be generated when separate entities relate to each other,
whether that relating is visual, emotional, or physical.
As a society, our view of learning is based on a linear, singular idea; as I stated
previously, we view learning as a discretely cognitive operation in which material “knowledge”
is directly transmitted to students. As an artist, I claim the idea of simultaneous contrast for my
ecofeminist vision of learning as aesthetic, embodied and connected because it paints a picture of
learning in which context matters.
For Warren and Cheney (1996), there are three reasons why context is important to
ecofeminist ethics: 1) what a thing is (person, community, population, species, animals, river), is
partially a function of geographic and historic location- thus attention to place is important; 2)
context helps illuminates conceptions of male and naturist bias around ideas of reason,
rationality, and morality so they can be illuminated and weeded out; and 3) context conceives of
ethics as growing out of defining relationships (Warren & Cheney, 1996).
...what ecology shows it not simply that the context makes a difference to the
kind of action we engage in. It shows, rather, that what kinds of things we are,
what sort of options for fulfillment and self-realization are open, are themselves
very much context-dependent. (Brennan, 1988, p. 162)
So the ontology, or the image of being, that emerges from an investigation is relative to the
observation set that produces it, or the ontology is relative to what it simultaneously contrasts
with. According to Warren and Cheney (1996) "this does not make that ontology "‘subjective’ in
a pernicious sense" (I must smile at pernicious subjectivity); but it does mean that accepting a
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solution to a particular problem is not an acceptance of an absolute understanding. The idea of
context, which observation sets provide, illuminates the understanding that differences and
commonalities are both important in a functioning ecosystem (Warren & Cheney, 1996). The
same can be said of the ecofeminist vision of the constructed self; contexts and relationships
(including relationships with the natural world) are recognized as relevant (Warren & Cheney,
1996).
For Swimme (1990), our exclusively positivist scientific strategies are sustained within
an educational process that utilizes only a sliver of our mind.
It is a sliver chiseled to perfection for controlling, for distancing, for calculating
and for dominating.... Our insistence on analysis, on computation, on
categorization has blinded us to the reality of the whole. We have been seated at a
table heavy with food, and instead of realizing that this is a feast we are meant to
join, we occupy our minds with counting the silverware over and over as we
starve to death. (p. 16)
What a tragic image, counting the silverware until we starve. Of course, missing the point - the
feast, is easy when we cannot see the whole. Our vision of learning forms the framework for our
attachment to the pieces, which precludes any sense of how the pieces fit together and how they
are pieces of a whole. Rather than understanding the parts as a means to understanding the
whole, Western reductionism, reduces to the parts....and that's enough. An ecofeminism vision
honors the individual parts and the whole; at once, individual and connected, the simultaneous
contrast of the individual within their unique natural, cultural, and embodied/emotional
environment.
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Ecofeminism not only calls attention to the double domination of women and nature, this
view is well situated to highlight the ways in which capitalist globalization creates interrelated
economic and social problems (Li, 2007). By building coalitions among activists as well as
centering lived experience, ecofeminism unveils hidden assumptions in scientific fields which
notoriously exclude the personal (Li, 2007), enabling an ecofeminist pedagogy that honors
connection and lived experience. I propose that an education built around an ecofeminist vision
of learning as aesthetic, embodied and connected would help learners conceive holistically as a
natural result of their learning.
Modern public schools have the primary responsibility for educating citizens for "their
civic engagement in the public domain" (Li, 2007, p. 358). The schools' embrace of rationality,
individualism, and the pursuit of progress - ideals that revolve around men's experience in the
public sphere rather than women's experiences of cooperation and mutuality in the private
sphere- reveal how educational institutions have contributed to the human domination of nature
and fostered a kind of bio-phobia (Li, 2007; Wilson, 2013). Sex and gender roles are entrenched
in social institutions, including schools, which have power to shape the ways individuals interact
with each other and the earth (Biehl, 1991; Gaard, 1994; Li, 2007). Herein lies the connection
between modern schools, ecological problems, and gender ideology (Biehl, 1991; Gaard, 1994;
Li, 2007).
Interventions
In Ecofeminism and Systems Thinking (2013), Anne Stephens delineates five principles to
aid reflection around ways to affect social change: Center nature, select appropriate
methodologies, be gender sensitive, value the voices from the margins, and bring about social
change (p. 44). I would like to suggest three of these - center nature; value voices on the margins,
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and be gender sensitive- can provide a framework for a holist view of learning as embodied,
aesthetic and connected. Be gender sensitive: When we view learning as a process that takes
place within a system, we can see that the gender with which an individual identifies is impacted
by the cultural system within which they live. "When we overlook what is distinctively different
about men's and women's experience, we can implicitly assume that the difference is
unimportant" (Stephens, 2013, p. 44). Value the voices on the margins: this can mean socially
including the voices of those whose perspective is frequently overlooked, and the inclusion of
the 'voices' of intuition and emotion and one's bodily experience. Finally, centering nature
requires that we view the environment as impactful to learning with a unique voice and agency
that must be considered. So, voices on the margins, include those ‘voices’ within our own
bodies, as well as external ‘voices’ within nature, and socially which includes the voices of other
humans. Ecofeminism seeks to challenge the ontological divide between humans and nature, to
encourage a "situated rootedness" that enables a "resonant identification with the organismic
whole" (Stephens, 2013, p. 51). Centering nature as a component of an ecofeminist framework
for learning helps encourage this resonance.
The principle of valuing voices from the margins extends the analysis to 'non-human'
voices. According to Plumwood (1996) the dichotomy between man and nature can be
transcended by revaluing emotion, subjectivity, particularity, and animality. A re-conception of
the self in a discordant pluralism creates a dialectical model where issues are framed in a manner
that allows perspectives and respective viewpoints (Stephens, 2013).
As our physiology suggests, and as Warren (1990) notes, "Relationships are not
something extrinsic to who we are, they are not an add-on feature of human nature; they play an
essential role in shaping what it is to be human" (p. 143). While relationships are intrinsic to who

205
we are, we are not indistinguishable within them. Instead, the relational self exists "embedded in
a network of essential relationships with distinct others" (Plumwood, 1996, p. 172).
In curriculum studies we ask, “What knowledge is of the most worth?” (Pinar, 2006, p.
80); or in the words of William Schubert (2009b), “What is worthwhile? What is worth knowing,
experiencing, needing, doing, being, becoming, overcoming, sharing, and contributing?” (p.
176). The ecofeminist tangled bank allows for all of these questions since by including threads
for interhuman, intrahuman, and biotic connection, such a metaphor honors cultural, historic, and
environmental situatedness.
When it comes to learning as practiced within the school setting, subjective experience or
personal, emotional, intuitive, experience is not consistently honored as integral to the process. I
theorize that subjective experience is essential to the transformative learning process, and offers
a key to a more complete picture of what makes learning transformative. When the learner
engages with the material of an experience and allows him or herself to be changed by the
engagement they are transformed (Dewey, 1934/2005). Likewise, aesthetic learning is an aspect
of transformative experience; such learning is a subjective sensory experience, which leaves the
learner understanding some aspect of the world differently than they did before. These define an
experience, as described by Dewey (1934/2005), thus transformative learning is not simply a
matter of the mind, or of cognition, such learning utilizes the body. We feel it.
Four curriculum theorists helped me to make the case for an ecofeminist vision of
learning as aesthetic, embodied and connected. John Dewey, Maxine Greene, Elliot Eisner, and
Delores Liston offered insights, enabling me to paint a picture of the tangled bank that is
learning.
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According to John Dewey (1934/2005) experience is “a relation between doing and
undergoing” (p. 48), as such experience becomes a way of living in the world. Experience
utilizes sensory and cognitive engagement to become transformative. For Dewey (1934/2005) an
experience embodies certain qualities: it satisfies an impulsion; is receptive and perceptive; it
causes the one engaged to reflect; and it achieves consummation. In the same manner an
educative experience does not occur in a vacuum but instead it has both continuity and
interaction (Dewey, 1938/1997). When an experience is connected to all previous experiences it
becomes available to be useful – to be continued – giving preparation for future life experiences,
thus we can say the experience is continuous (Dewey, 1938/1997). Experience becomes
interactive and purposeful when it utilizes observation, knowledge, and judgment without which
there can be only impulse (Dewey, 1938/1997).
For Greene (1995) aesthetic learning experiences are embodied within the arts and
therefore teaching students the language and skills of a particular discipline enables them to
access the ‘estranging languages’ that constitute those experiences. For Greene (1995, 2001),
sensory experience and objective forms illuminate each other. Through the imagination
experience with the arts instills in us the ability to decenter ourselves, breaking through the crust
of our own life experience (Greene, 1995).
Elliot Eisner (1998), an art teacher like myself, finds that knowledge is not completely
cognitive, instead much is tacit, and therefore intuitive, experiential, personal, and secured in
action. In Eisner’s (2002b) vision, students must learn to ‘read’ important ideas that are rendered
nondiscursively so that they may understand the ideas encoded within such renderings. In order
to engage in this type of reading, students require experience and instruction, enabling them to
realize that ‘smartness’ may exceed the limits of language arts and math (Eisner, 2002b). When a
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curricular discipline utilizes aesthetic properties, it can generate aesthetic experiences, which in
turn engender aesthetic learning for the student (Eisner, 2002b). In any artistic medium, how
forms relate is critical (Eisner, 2002b) and within aesthetic learning this relation is key.
For Delores Liston (2001), an image of Joy “provides experiential understanding of the
non-dualistic interrelatedness of each of us to each other of us” (p. 14). Transformative learning
happens best within a community of learning where the individual maintains their unique
individuality while simultaneously feeling connection with the group. Allowing for experiences
of connectedness can transform education by allowing for a shift from a focus on skill and
knowledge development to the exploration of ideas (Liston, 2001).
Reflecting back on the story, of Christopher and his experience with abstract
expressionist painting, that inspired the direction of this dissertation journey, I at last have words
to describe what I sensed was significant.
Developing a Curriculum of Aesthetic, Embodied, and Connected Learning
When Christopher stated, “I see now, this is about energy!” it made my heart happy. My
own bodily reaction encouraged me to notice and remember the incident and as I stated
previously, this dissertation is my attempt to ‘inform my noticing.’ So what have I determined
about Christopher’s experience and about this complex endeavor we call learning?
For the most part, those of us who teach think about learning in terms of utility. In the K12 setting we say things like, “You’ll never be able to do second grade if you don’t learn this in
first grade!” or “You’ll have to know this for the SAT!” Such statements are not wrong, but what
I’ve come to see is that they are partial (Adichie, 2009). Of course we learn for utility. For
example, learning the times tables is useful. But, when learning transforms us it does not do so
because of its usefulness, instead, as this dissertation theorizes, we are transformed by its beauty

208
and by the way our experience of it makes us feel- in other words, the subjective, sensory
experience which the body feels and within which we make connections to past knowledge and
past experiences as when we feel the “pleasure of completed action” (Janet, 1893/1925, p. 660).
We are transformed by learning that compels us. We may be compelled by the subject calling out
to us, or compelled by a teacher, whom we love or admire, introducing us to a subject which
he/she/they love, or we may be compelled by pieces of the puzzle that seemed disparate, finally
falling into place as when Christopher said, “I used to think this was just drips and splashes, but
now I see…”
In previous chapters I have laid the groundwork for a new, more complete vision of
learning that includes what we already know but complicates the picture with an aesthetic,
embodied and connected vision. Educators have more power than we acknowledge. This is the
educational power to move students by creating a classroom culture in which they are compelled
to exert a choice.
As teachers we must always be aware of the importance of our interpersonal,
intersubjective communication with students. Beyond the body of knowledge we wish to impart
(which is also important), students viscerally absorb how we feel about our subject and how we
feel about them. These are powerful indicators for whether or not the subject matter will prove to
be aesthetic to our students. Of course relationships, whether with an individual or with an area
of expertise, spring from multifaceted, deep places shaped by an individual’s cognitive and
affective selves working together. In teaching we seek to identify and mitigate the weaknesses of
our students; this is not wrong, it’s just partial (Adichie, 2009). When we can also help students
identify and enjoy their strengths and where their passions lie, such knowledge continues well
past their time in our classrooms.
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Students arrive in our classrooms with their own interests and passions and, in spite of all
the ways those in power seek to undermine the teacher’s autonomy, when the door closes and it
‘us and them,’ we hold the power in those moments to share a bit of ourselves and what we care
about in order to help our students hear their own heart whisper as they exert a choice to learn.
When years pass and the information we imparted has grown fuzzy in our students’ minds, this
aesthetic, embodied treasure will endure.

210
REFERENCES
Adichie, C. N. (2009). The danger of a single story. TEDGlobal, 2009. [video file]. Retrieved
from: https://www.ted.com/talks/chimamanda_adichie_the_danger_of_a_single_story
Aesthetics. (n.d.). In Oxford dictionary online. Retrieved from
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/aesthetic
Adorno, T. (1989). The culture industry reconsidered. In S. E. Bronner & D. M. Kellner (Eds.),
Critical theory and society (pp. 128–135). New York: Routledge.
Al-Chalabi, A., Turner, M. R., & Delamont, R. S. (2008). The brain: A beginner's guide. Oxford:
Oneworld.
Alaimo, S. (2008). Trans-corporeal feminisms and the ethical space of nature. In Alaimo &
Hekman (Eds.), Material feminisms (pp. 237-264). Bloomington, IN: Indiana University
Press.
Allen, J. (1992). The thinking muse: Feminism and modern French philosophy. Bloomington,
IN: Indiana University Press.
Aquinas, T. (1976). De aeternitate mundi. (vol 43), Rome, IT: Leonine Edition. (Originally
published in 1270). Retrieved from: http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/repedleo.html
Araya R. (2016). Social Facilitation Due to Online Inter-classrooms Tournaments. In: Verbert
K., Sharples M., Klobučar T. (eds) Adaptive and Adaptable Learning. EC-TEL 2016.
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 9891. Springer, Cham.
Aristotle. (n.d.). Rhetoric (Book 1) (J. H. Freese, Trans.). Retrieved from
https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Rhetoric_(Freese)/Book_1
Austring, B. D., & Sorensen, M. (2012). A Scandinavian View on the Aesthetics as a Learning
Media. Online Submission).

211
Baca Zinn, M., Eitzen, D. S., & Wells, B. (1993). Diversity in families. New York: Harper
Collins.
Baker-Fletcher, K. (1998). Sisters of dust, sisters of spirit: Womanist wordings on God and
creation. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press.
Banks, S. J., Eddy, K. T., Angstadt, M., Nathan, P. J., & Phan, K. L. (2007). Amygdala-frontal
connectivity during emotion regulation. Social Cognitive and Affective
Neuroscience,2(4), 303-312. doi:10.1093/scan/nsm029
Barad, K. (2003). Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of How Matter Comes
to Matter. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 28(3), 801-831.
doi:10.1086/345321
Barrett, M. J. (2005). Making (some) sense of feminist poststructuralism in environmental
education research and practice. Canadian Journal of Environmental Education, 10, 7993.
Baumgarten, A. (1750). Aesthetica. Retrieved from:
https://sites.google.com/site/artandaesthetics/Home/classics
Bear, M. F., Connors, B. W., & Paradiso, M. A. (2007). Neuroscience: Exploring the brain.
Philadelphia, PA: Lippincott Williams & Wilkins.
Beardsley, M. C. (1966). Aesthetics from classical greece to the present. Tuscaloosa, AL: The
University of Alabama Press.
Beecher, H. K. (1946). Pain In Men Wounded In Battle. Annals of Surgery, 123(1), 96-105.
doi:10.1097/00000658-194601000-00008

212
Berman, L. M., Hultgren, F. H., Lee, D., Rivkin, M. S., Roderick, J. A., & Aoki, T. (1991).
Toward curriculum for being: Voices of educators. Albany, NY: State University of New
York Press.
Berridge, K. C. (2003). Pleasures of the brain. Brain and cognition, 52(1), 106-128.
Berridge, K. C., & Kringelbach, M. L. (2008). Affective neuroscience of pleasure: Reward in
humans and animals. Psychopharmacology, 199(3), 457-480. doi:10.1007/s00213-0081099-6
Berry, T. (2009). The sacred universe: Earth, spirituality, and religion in the twenty-first
century. New York: Columbia University Press.
Besthorn, F. H., & McMillen, D. P. (2002). The Oppression of Women and nature: Ecofeminism
as a framework for an expanded ecological social work. Families in Society: The journal
of contemporary human services, 83 (3), 221-232.
Bianchi, M. D., & Dickinson, E. (1924). The Life and letters of Emily Dickinson. London: Cape.
Biehl, J. (1991). Rethinking ecofeminist politics. Boston, MA: South End.
Biscotte, S. (2015). The necessity of teaching for aesthetic learning experiences in undergraduate
general education science. JGE: The Journal of General Education, 64(3), 242.
Bremner, J. D. (2016). Posttraumatic stress disorder: From neurobiology to treatment.
Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.
Brewin, B. (2011). Military's drug policy threatens troops' health, doctors say. NextGov.com.
https://www.nextgov.com/cio-briefing/2011/01/militarys-drug-policy-threatens-troopshealth-doctors-say/48321/
Broudy, H. (1994). Enlightened cherishing: An essay on aesthetic education. Urbana, IL:
University of Illinois Press.

213
Brown, L. S. (2003). The politics of individualism: Liberalism, liberal feminism and anarchism.
Montreal, QC: Black Rose Books.
Bruner, J. (1990). Acts of meaning. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Buber, M. (2002). Between man and man. New York, NY: Routledge. (Originally published in
1947).
Buber, M. (1958). I and Thou / with a postscript by the author (R. G. Smith, Trans.). Edinburgh:
T. & T. Clark.
Buckingham, S. (2004, June). Ecofeminism in the twenty-first century. Geographical journal,
170(2), 146-154. doi:10.1111/j.0016-7398.2004.00116.x
Burns, K. A. (2008). Warren's ecofeminist ethics and Merleauponty's body-subject:
Intersections. Ethics & the Environment, (2), 101.
Carr, D. (2003). Making sense of education: An introduction to the philosophy and theory of
education and teaching. London and New York: Routledge.
Carter, R., Aldridge, S., Page, M., & Parker, S. (2014). The human brain book. New York, NY:
DK Publishing.
Carter, R., & Frith, C. D. (2010). Mapping the mind. Berkeley, CA: University of California
Press.
Carter, R. E. (1989). The nothingness beyond God: An introduction to the philosophy of Nishida
Kitaro. New York: Paragon House.
Cavanaugh, S. C. (2014). Science Sublime: The Philosophy of the Sublime, Dewey's Aesthetics,
and Science Education. Education & Culture, 30(1), 57-77. doi:10.1353/eac.2014.0001
Chaplin, A. D. (2005). Art Embodiment: Biological and Phenomenological Contributions to
Understanding Beauty and the Aesthetic. Contemporary Aesthetics, 3, 1-16.

214
Chatterjee, A. (2014a). The aesthetic brain: How we evolved to desire beauty and enjoy art. New
York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Chatterjee, A. (2014b). Neuroaesthetics: Researchers unravel the biology of beauty and art. The
Scientist, (May 1), 1-8.
Chevreul, M. E. (1855). The principles of harmony and contrast of colours, and their application
to the arts (C. Martel, Trans.). London, ENG: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans.
Chircop, A. (2008). An ecofeminist conceptual framework to explore gendered environmental
health inequities in urban settings and to inform healthy public policy. Nursing Inquiry,
15(2), 135-147.
Collins, F. (2012). The symphony inside your brain. https://directorsblog.nih.gov/2012/11/05/.
Collins, P. H. (2000). Black feminist thought: Knowledge, consciousness, and the politics of
empowerment. New York: Routledge.
Clandinin, D. J., & Connelly, F. M. (1988a). Narrative inquiry: Experience and story in
qualitative research. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Clandinin, D. J., & Connelly, F. M. (1988b). Shaping a professional identity: Stories of
educational practice. London, Ontario, Canada: Althouse Press.
Coelho, P. (1988). The alchemist. New York: HarperCollins.
Covaleskie, J. (1993). Power goes to school: Teachers, students, and discipline. Retrieved
from http://www.ed.uiuc.edu/EPS/PES-Yearbook/93_docs/COVALESK.HTM
Crenshaw, K. (1989). Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine. The University of Chicago Legal Forum: 139–
67.

215
Csikszentmihalyi, M., & Robinson, R. E. (1990). The art of seeing: An interpretation of the
aesthetic encounter. Malibu, CA: J.P. Getty Museum.
Cudworth, E. (2005). Developing ecofeministy theory: The complexity of difference.
Houndsmills, UK: Palgrave MacMillan.
Cuomo, C. (2002). On ecofeminist philosophy. Ethics and the environment, 7(2), 1-11.
Cuthbert, B. (1981). Strategies of arousal control: Biofeedback, meditation, and motivation.
Journal of experimental psychology: General, 110(4), 518-546. doi:10.1037//00963445.110.4.518
Damasio, A.R. (1994). Descarte’s Error: emotion, reason, and the human brain. New York,
NY: G.P. Putnam & Sons.
Danto, A. C. (2006). The abuse of beauty: Aesthetics and the concept of art. Chicago Ill.: Open
Court.
Darwin, C. (1964). On the origin of species by means of natural selection, or the preservation of
favoured races in the struggle for life. (E. Mayr, Ed.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press. (Originally published in 1859).
Darwin, D. (1871). The descent of man in relation to sex. London, ENG: John Murray Publishing
D'Eaubonne, F. (1974). Le féminisme ou la mort. Paris: Pierre Horay.
Dewey, J. (2005). Art as experience. New York: Minton, Balch & Company. (Originally
published in 1934).
Dewey, J. (1997). Experience and education. New York: Simon & Schuster. (Originally
published in 1938).
Dewey, J. (1991). Logic: The theory of inquiry. New York: Holt & Co. (Originally published in
1938).

216
Dewey, J. (1996). The Collected Works of John Dewey, 1882-1953 (2nd release). The Later
Works of John Dewey, 1925-1953. Volume 3: 1927-1928, Essays. (pp. 25-40).
Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press. (Originally published in 1928).
Dickie, G. (2015). Introduction to aesthetics: An analytic approach. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Diehm, C. (2002). Arne naess, val plumwood, and deep ecological subjectivity a contribution to
the deep ecology-ecofeminism debate. Ethics and the environment, (1), 24.
Dieterich-Hartwell, R. (2017). Review article: Dance/movement therapy in the treatment of post
traumatic stress: A reference model. The Arts in Psychotherapy, 54, 38-46.
doi:10.1016/j.aip.2017.02.010
Durt, C., Tewes, C., & Fuchs, T. (2017). Embodiment, Enaction, and Culture. [electronic
resource] : Investigating the Constitution of the Shared World. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.
Eaton, H. (2001). At the Intersection of Ecofeminism and Religion: Directions for
Consideration. Ecotheology: Journal of Religion, Nature & the Environment, 6(1/2), 75.
Eaton, M. M. (1998). Locating the aesthetic. In C. Korsmeyer (Ed.), Aesthetics: The big
questions (pp. 84-90). Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Edelman, G. M., & Gally, J. A. (2013). Reentry: A key mechanism for integration of brain
function. Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience, 7. doi:10.3389/fnint.2013.00063
Eisner, E. W. (2012). Inside the academy: Elliot Eisner. (October 23). [video file]. Retrieved
from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5Twwn-2adaQ
Eisner, E. W. (1979). The educational imagination: On the design and evaluation of school
programs. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Merrill Prentice Hall.

217
Eisner, E. W. (1983). The art and craft of teaching. Educational Leadership, 40(4), 4.
Eisner, E. W. (1991). What the arts taught me about education. In G. Willis & W. H. Schubert
(Eds.), Reflections from the heart of educational inquiry: Understanding curriculum
and teaching through the arts (pp. 34-48). Albany, NY: State University of New York
Press.
Eisner, E. W. (1997). Cognition and Representation: A Way to Pursue the American Dream? The
Phi Delta Kappan, 78(5), 348.
Eisner, E. W. (1998). The kind of schools we need: Personal essays. Portsmouth, NH:
Heinemann.
Eisner, E. W. (2002a). From episteme to phronesis to artistry in the study and improvement of
teaching. Teaching and Teacher Education, 18, 375-385. doi:10.1016/S0742051X(02)00004-5
Eisner, E. W. (2002b). The arts and the creation of mind. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Eisner, E. W. (2002c). The enlightened eye: Qualitative inquiry and the enhancement of
educational practice. New York: Teachers College Press.
Epistemology. (2017). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/
Falk, J. H. (2010). Identity and the museum visitor experience. Walnut Creek, CA: Left Coast
Press.
Feinberg, R. & Genz, J. (2012). Limitations of Language for Conveying Navigational
Knowledge: Way-Finding in the Southeastern Solomon Islands. American
Anthropologist, 114(2), 336-350. doi:10.1111/j.1548-1433.2012.01429.x

218
Ferguson, K. E. (1993). The man question: Visions of subjectivity in feminist theory. Berkeley,
CA: University of California Press.
Fisher, S. F. (2014). Neurofeedback in the treatment of developmental trauma: Calming the feardriven brain. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
Fiske, J. (1993). Power plays, power works. New York: Verso.
Flinders, D. J. & Thornton, S. J. (2009) Introduction, In D. J. Flinders & S. J. Thornton
(Authors), The curriculum studies reader (pp. 1-4). New York: Routledge, Taylor &
Francis Group.
Fowler, R. C. (2018). The disappearance of child-directed activities and teachers' autonomy
from Massachusetts' kindergarten (Issue brief). doi:https://www.deyproject.org
Freedberg, D., & Gallese, V., (2007). Motion, emotion and empathy in aesthetic experience.
Trends in cognitive science. 11, 197–203.
Freud, S. (1989). New introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. (J. Strachey, Trans.; J. Strachey,
Ed.). London: Penguin. (Originally published in 1933).
Furman, G. C., & Gruenewald, D. A. (2004). Expanding the landscape of social justice: A
critical ecological analysis. Educational Administration Quarterly, 40(1), 47-76.
doi:10.1177/0013161x03259142
Gaard, G. (1994). Misunderstanding ecofeminism. Z magazine, 3(1), 22-40.
Galetzka, C. (2017). The Story So Far: How Embodied Cognition Advances Our Understanding
of Meaning-Making. Frontiers in Psychology, (8).
Gallagher, S. (2006). How the body shapes the mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

219
Gallup Jr., G. G., & Frederick, D. A. (2010). The science of sex appeal: An evolutionary
perspective in Review of General Psychology, 14(3): pp. 240-250.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0020451
Garrison, J. W. (1997). Dewey and eros: Wisdom and desire in the art of teaching. New York:
Teachers College Press.
Germain, C. B., & Gitterman, A. (1980). The life model of social work practice. New York:
Columbia University Press.
Girod, M., & Wong, D. (2002). An Aesthetic (Deweyan) Perspective on Science Learning: Case
Studies of Three Fourth Graders. The Elementary School Journal, (3), 199.
Girod, M., Twyman, T., & Wojcikiewicz, S. (2010). Teaching and Learning Science for
Transformative, Aesthetic Experience. Journal of Science Teacher Education, 21(7),
801-824. doi:10.1007/s10972-009-9175-2
Glazebrook, T. (2002). Karen warren's ecofeminism. Ethics & the Environment, 7(2), 12.
Glazebrook, T. (2004). Toward an ecofeminist phenomenology of nature. In J. A. Wainwright
(Ed.), Every Grain of Sand: Canadian Perspectives on Ecology and Environment (pp. 87100). Waterloo, CDN: Wilfrid Laurier University Press.
Golden, K. B. (2006). Nietzsche and embodiment : Discerning bodies and non-dualism. (SUNY
series in contemporary continental philosophy). Albany : State University of New York
Press.
Goleman, D. (2007). Social intelligence: The revolutionary new science of human relationships.
New York: Bantam Dell.
Goodman, N. (1978). Ways of worldmaking. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.
Gopnik, A. (1998). Explanation as orgasm. Minds and machines, 8: pp. 101 – 118.

220
Gottlieb, R. (2005). Forcing the spring: The transformation of the American environmental
movement. Washington, DC: Island Press.
Gould, C. (1983). Private rights and private virtues: Women, the family, and democracy. In C.
Gould (Ed.), Beyond domination: New perspectives on women and philosophy, Totowa,
NJ: Rowman and Allanheld.
Gough, A., & Whitehouse, H. (2003). The "nature" of environmental education research from a
feminist poststructuralist viewpoint. Canadian Journal of Environmental Education, 8,
31-43.
Gray, J. A., & McNaughton, N. (1996). The neuropsychology of anxiety: Reprise. In The
Nebraska Symposium on Motivation (Vol. 43, pp. 61-134). Lincoln, NB: University of
Nebraska Press.
Greene, M. (1995). Releasing the imagination: Essays on education, the arts, and social change.
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
Greene, M. (2001). Variations on a blue guitar: The Lincoln Center Institute lectures on
aesthetic education. New York: Teachers College Press.
Griffin, S. (1990). Curves along the road. In I. Diamond & G. F. Orenstein (Eds.), Reweaving the
world: The emergence of ecofeminism. San Francisco, CA: Sierra Club Books.
Griffin, S. (1989). Split culture. In J. Plant (Ed.), Healing the wounds, the promise of
ecofeminism (pp. 7–17). Santa Cruz, CA: New Society Publishers.
Griffin, S. (1987). Woman and nature: The roaring inside her. New York: Harper & Row.
Grossman, P., Niemann, L., Schmidt, S., & Walach, H. (2010). Mindfulness-based stress
reduction and health benefits: A meta-analysis. Focus on Alternative and Complementary
Therapies, 8(4), 500-510. doi:10.1111/j.2042-7166.2003.tb04008.x

221
Groth, C. (2016). Design- and Craft thinking analysed as Embodied Cognition.
FORMakademisk, 9 (1). doi:10.7577/formakademisk.1481
Gruenewald, D. A. (2003). The Best of Both Worlds: A Critical Pedagogy of Place. Educational
Researcher, 32(4), 3-12. doi:10.3102/0013189x032004003
Hanh, T. N. (1997). The heart of understanding: Commentaries on the prajnaparamita heart
sutra. Berkeley, CA: Parallax.
Haraway, D. (1988). Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege
of Partial Perspective. Feminist Studies, 14(3), 575-599. doi:10.2307/3178066
Harris, M. L. (2016). Ecowomanism: Black Women, Religion, and the Environment. In Black
Scholar (Vol. 46, pp. 27-39). Routledge. doi:10.1080/00064246.2016.1188354
Harvester, L., & Blenkinsop, S. (2010). Environmental Education and Ecofeminist Pedagogy:
Bridging the Environmental and the Social. Canadian Journal of Environmental
Education, 15, 120-134.
Hayden, D. (1985). The grand domestic revolution a history of feminist designs for American
homes, neighborhoods, and cities. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press.
Hegel, G. W. (1993). Introductory lectures on aesthetics (B. Bosanquet, Trans.; M. J. Inwood,
Ed.). London: Penguin Books. (Originally published in 1883).
Heidegger, M. (1977). The question concerning technology, and other essays (W. Lovitt, Trans.).
New York: Harper Perennial.
Hein, H. (1990). The Role of Feminist Aesthetics in Feminist Theory. The Journal of Aesthetics
and Art Criticism, 48(4), 281.
hooks, b. (1989). Talking back: Thinking feminist, thinking Black. Boston: South End Press.

222
Hohr, H. (2002). Does beauty matter in education? Friedrich Schiller's neo-humanistic approach.
Journal of Curriculum Studies, 34(1), 59-75. doi:10.1080/00220270010029771
Hohr, H. (2013). The Concept of Experience by John Dewey Revisited: Conceiving, Feeling and
'Enliving'. Studies in Philosophy & Education, 32(1), 25-38. doi:10.1007/s11217-0129330-7
Holmes, O. W. (1891). The autocrat at the breakfast table. Cambridge, UK: Houghton Mifflin.
http://books.googleusercontent.com/books/
Holt, J. C. (1997). How children learn. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Pub.
Hopper, J. W., Spinazzola, J., Simpson, W. B., & van der Kolk, B. A. (2006). Preliminary
evidence of parasympathetic influence on basal heart rate in posttraumatic stress
disorder. Journal of Psychosomatic Research, 60(1), 83-90.
doi:10.1016/j.jpsychores.2005.06.002
Hurley, M. M., Dennett, D. C., & Adams, Jr, R. B. (2011). Inside Jokes: Using Humor to
Reverse-Engineer the Mind. MIT Press.
Hurston, Z. N. (1998). I love myself when I am laughing ...: And then again when I am looking
mean and impressive: A Zora Neale Hurston reader (A. Walker, Ed.). New York:
Feminist Press at the City Univ. of New York.
Insel, T. R. (2010). Faulty circuits. Scientific American, 302(4), 44-51.
doi:10.1038/scientificamerican0410-44
Inside the academy:Elliot Eisner. (2012, October 23). [video file]. Retrieved from
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5Twwn-2adaQ
Inwood, M.J. (1993). Introduction. In Hegel, G. W., Bosanquet, B., & Inwood, M. J.
Introductory lectures on aesthetics. (pp. ix – xxxviii). London: Penguin Books.

223
James, M., & Johnson, D. R. (1996). Drama therapy for the treatment of affective expression in
posttraumatic stress disorder. In D. L. Nathanson (Ed.), Knowing feeling: Affect, script,
and psychotherapy (pp. 303-326). New York: W W Norton & Co.
James, W. (1979). Percepts and Concepts. In Some Problems of Philosophy. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press. (Originally published in 1911)
James, W. (1950). The principles of psychology. New York: Dover Press. (Originally published
in 1890).
Janet, P. (1925). Psychological healing. New York: MacMillan. (Originally published in 1893).
Janson, H. W., & Janson, A. F. (1998). History of art. London: Thames and Hudson.
Jason, M. (2010). The Role of Medial Prefrontal Cortex in "Social" Cognition. Frontiers in
Human Neuroscience, 4. doi:10.3389/conf.fnins.2010.14.00018
Jeannerod, M. (1994). The representing brain: Neural correlates of motor intention and
imagery. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 17(02), 187-245.
doi:10.1017/s0140525x00034026
Johnson, M. (2007). The meaning of the body: Aesthetics of human understanding. Chicago, IL:
The University of Chicago Press.
Jun, H. (2014). Tonghak Ecofeminist Epistemology. Theology Today, 71(3), 310-322.
doi:10.1177/0040573614542307
Kabat-Zinn, J. (2013). Full Catastrophy Living. New York: Delta. (Originally published in
1990).
Kandel, E. R., Schwartz, J. H., & Jessell, T. M. (2000). Principles of neural science. New York:
McGraw-Hill.

224
Kamiya, J. (1968). Conscious control of brain waves. Psychology Today. (April 1968), 56-60.
doi:10.1037/e400092009-006
Kant, I., (1987). Critique of judgment. (W. S.Pluhar, Trans.) Indianapolis, IN: Hackett
Pub. (Originally published in 1790).
Kauffman, S. A. (2015). The origins of order: Self-organization and selection in evolution.
Milton Keynes: UK: Lightning Source UK.
Kelley, W. M., Macrae, C. N., Wyland, C. L., Caglar, S., Inati, S., & Heatherton, T. F. (2002).
Finding the Self? An Event-Related fMRI Study. Journal of Cognitive
Neuroscience, 14(5), 785-794. doi:10.1162/08989290260138672
Kheel, M. (1993). From heroic to holistic ethics: The ecofeminist challenge. In G. C. Gaard
(Ed.), Ecofeminism: Women, animals, nature (pp. 243-71). Philadelphia: Temple
University Press.
King, Y. (1989). Healing the wounds: Feminism, ecology, and nature/culture dualism. In A. M.
Jaggar & S. Bordo (Eds.), Gender/bodyknowledge: Feminist reconstructions of being and
knowing. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
Kings, A. E. (2017). Intersectionality and the Changing Face of Ecofeminism. Ethics & the
Environment, 22(1), 63-87.
Know. (2017). In Oxford dictionary online. Retrieved from
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/know
Korsmeyer, C. (2004). Gender and Aesthetics: An introduction. New York: Routledge.
Kosslyn, S. M. (1994). Image and brain: The resolution of the imagery debate. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.

225
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